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ABSTRACT 
Pharmaceutical antitrust is currently a centre of attention for the European 
Commission, with one decision against Lundbeck and Statements of Objections in 
investigations against Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, and Les Laboratoires Servier. 
This thesis is the first to develop in detail a ‘European approach’ to pay for delay 
settlements and early entry agreements – two types of conduct identified by the 
European pharmaceutical sector inquiry. Although pay for delay settlements have 
received extensive antitrust scrutiny in the United States, one has to be cautious 
when drawing from this expertise, as the underlying regulatory regimes are 
fundamentally different in Europe and the US. This need for careful comparative 
analyses in pharmaceutical antitrust and the fact that similar conduct might have to 
be treated differently on both sides of the Atlantic is showcased by a case study of 
the General Court’s AstraZeneca judgment. The analysis shows that the General 
Court was correct to dismiss AstraZeneca’s claim that its conduct would not have 
led to antitrust scrutiny following the US Walker Process Doctrine, which in fact 
covers similar conduct.  Additionally, the hypothetical application of the market 
definition in AstraZeneca to the market of anti-epileptic drugs highlights the 
difficulties that the European Commission might encounter in its future 
enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector.  
Based on the different incentives for the parties of EU pay for delay settlements, a 
novel European theory of harm is developed for pay for delay settlements and early 
entry agreements, the latter posing significant anticompetitive potential in Europe. 
Based on this theory, pay for delay settlements are scrutinised under EU 
competition law and a novel “structured effects-based” test is proposed that is 
inspired by the recent Actavis judgment of the US Supreme Court. In terms of early 
entry agreements, this thesis is the first to apply EU competition law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1.  Purpose of the thesis 
This thesis explores the specific types of conduct engaged in by innovating 
pharmaceutical companies (brand companies) and generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers (generic companies) who extend patent protection, or the 
monopolistic profits associated with patent protection, beyond the life of the 
intellectual property right. In particular, this thesis investigates pay for delay 
settlements and early entry agreements in the European pharmaceutical sector. 
Fundamentally, the aim of this thesis is to establish whether or not the European 
Commission can rely on the extensive expertise of the US authorities and courts 
with regard to pharmaceutical antitrust or if it has to develop its own approach to 
these types of conduct based on a European theory of harm. Before one can 
establish the need for a European approach to pharmaceutical antitrust, one has to 
address the following questions: 
 
What are the differences between pharmaceutical antitrust in Europe and the 
United States? Are the two regimes actually comparable? What factors do we have 
to consider if we, nevertheless, want to draw from the US expertise? 
 
These questions will be answered throughout this thesis, informing the 
development of a novel European theory of harm and providing an analysis of pay 
for delay settlements and early entry agreements in the context of European 
competition law. These analyses will include the proposal of a novel “structured 
effects-based” test for European pay for delay settlements and, for the first time, a 
detailed competition law analysis of early entry agreements in Europe. 
 
2. Setting the scene 
This section shall help the reader to appreciate, on the one hand, the importance of 
patent protection for brand companies in the pharmaceutical sector in general and, 
on the other hand, the issues that raise antitrust scrutiny towards the end of patent 
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protection. Finally, it identifies the status quo of the US and European antitrust 
enforcement in relation to pay for delay settlements, thereby alluding to the 
fundamental differences between the two regulatory regimes, which warrants 
cautious comparative legal analysis. 
Pharmaceutical antitrust is an important yet complex field of competition 
policy. Its aim is to ensure that the consumer is provided with life-saving medicine 
priced at a competitive level. However, what makes the field of pharmaceutical 
antitrust so problematic is the highly regulated nature of the pharmaceutical sector 
and the fact that brand companies are heavily reliant on patent protection, more so 
than any other high-tech sector.1 The importance of patent protection can be 
explained by the resource-intensive and time-consuming nature of the drug 
discovery process and the lengthy and highly regulated drug approval procedure. 
New drugs are extremely expensive to develop. A number of economic 
studies have estimated the costs of research and development (R&D) for a new 
drug to be several hundred million US dollars,2 with the highest estimate for a 
single drug being US$1.8 billion.3 These costs are extremely high for a number of 
reasons. The success rate for the development of new drugs is very low. Typically, 
less than 1 per cent of the molecules4 discovered in pre-clinical tests enter the 
clinical trial stage,5 and only 16 per cent of these molecules survive the process of 
                                                          
1 Henry Grabowski, ‘Patents, innovation and access to new pharmaceuticals’ (2002) 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law 849, 850. 
2 Joseph A DiMasi, Roland W Hansen and Henry G Grabowski, ‘The price of innovation: new 
estimates of drug development costs’ (2003) 22 Journal of Health Economics 151 (finding an 
estimated estimated average out-of-pocket cost per new drug is US$ 403 million (2000 dollars). 
Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 11% 
yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of US$ 802 million (2000 dollars)); Christopher P Adams and 
V. van Brantner, ‘Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?’ (2006) 
25 Health Affairs 420; Christopher P Adams and Vu van Brantner, ‘Spending on new drug 
development’ [2010] 19 Health Economics 130; Both studies replicate the estimates in the DiMasi 
study and come to similar findings of an average of US$ 868 million  with variations from US$ 500 
million to US$ 2000 million. 
3 Steven M Paul and others, ‘How to improve R&D productivity: the pharmaceutical industry's grand 
challenge’ (2010) 9 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 203, 205. 
4 The term molecules refers to the chemical compounds in a drug that cause the therapeutic effect 
in patients.  
5 Grabowski (n 1) 851. 
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human clinical trials and gain drug approval.6 The R&D costs of these failed 
molecules, that will never reach the market, are thus a substantial part of the 
aforementioned estimates. In addition, the development of a new drug is very 
time-consuming. It has been estimated that the development takes, on average, 12 
years from the initial discovery of a new molecule to the final market approval of 
the new drug.7 By contrast, generic drugs are a lot easier and cheaper to develop, 
as the generic company does not have to undertake the same time-consuming R&D 
with the same low success rate as the brand company. Generic drug companies can 
rely on the clinical test results of the brand company, because the generic drug has 
to be chemically identical to the brand drug, otherwise known as ‘bioequivalence’.8 
This process normally takes a few years and will usually cost between US$1-2 
million.9 Due to these significant cost and time differences, patent protection 
(which generally lasts for 20 years from the point of application) is vital for the 
brand company, as the generic company would otherwise have the ability to “free-
ride” on the brand company’s innovation.10  
Yet, in contrast to other sectors, the effective patent life in the 
pharmaceutical sector is a lot shorter. This is owing to the fact that pharmaceutical 
patents are applied for at the point of discovery of the relevant molecule prior to 
the clinical testing which, as noted above, can take up to 12 years.11 Brand 
companies, therefore, have a significantly shorter period of time in which to 
recover the substantial R&D investment in a new drug, which also explains their 
                                                          
6 J. A DiMasi and others, ‘Trends in Risks Associated With New Drug Development: Success Rates for 
Investigational Drugs’ (2010) 87 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 272 (using a sample of all drug 
in the pipeline of the 50 largest pharmaceutical companies which entered into clinical testing in the 
period 1993-2004 through to 2009.) 
7 DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski (n 2) 181. For a description of the development process of a new 
drug see Appendix sec. 1.1. (for the United States) and sec. 2.1. (for Europe). 
8 In relation to the European framework see Council Directive 2001/83/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use 
[2001] OJ L 311, Art. 10 (1) (the generic company does not have to provide the ‘results of pre-clinical 
tests and of clinical trials if he can demonstrate that the medicinal product is a generic of a reference 
medicinal product which is or has been [already] authorised). For the similar regulation for the 
United States see 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(2)(A). 
9 Grabowski (n 1) 852. 
10 Ibid. 851. 
11 Henry G Grabowski and Margaret Kyle, ‘Generic competition and market exclusivity periods in 
pharmaceuticals’ (2007) 28 Managerial & Decision Economics 491, 492. 
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incentive to extend the period of patent protection by as much as possible. A large 
proportion of the costs are incurred at the beginning of the development of the 
new drug, whereas the majority of the revenue is generated towards the end of the 
patent life, which has been estimated to be 9 to 14 years.12  The apparent 
discrepancy between the time for development and the remaining period of 
effective patent life is to be explained by what is regarded as ‘patent restoration 
provisions’.13 Most countries with brand companies have enacted such provisions 
to mitigate the loss of patent life caused by the time-consuming regulatory 
procedure for drug approval and to avoid a stifling effect on innovation.14 
Notwithstanding this, brand companies – as profit-maximising corporations – 
attempt to extend the patent protection by as much as possible, particularly 
because of the amount of revenue that is potentially at stake. This is highlighted by 
a statement made by the CEO of Cephalon, a large US biopharmaceutical company, 
in relation to a settlement entered into with 4 generic companies: 
 
‘We were able to get six more years of patent protection. That’s $4 billion in 
sales that no one expected.’15 
 
However, this gain in revenue goes beyond the gain envisaged by pharmaceutical 
patent policy, which is aimed at ensuring an adequate return for the brand 
company’s innovation. In the case of Cephalon, this additional revenue was 
achieved by a so-called pay for delay settlement in which the brand company pays-
off the first generic entrant in order to keep them out of the market. In the United 
States, it is exactly this kind of pay for delay settlement that has raised significant 
antitrust concern for the Federal Trade Commission. 
                                                          
12 Joseph A DiMasi and Henry G Grabowski, ‘R&D costs and the return of new drug development: A 
review of the evidence’ in Patricia M Danzon and Sean Nicholson (eds), The Oxford handbook of the 
economics of the biopharmaceutical industry (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 36, 37; also 
Grabowski and Kyle (n 11).  
13 For a detailed description please see Appendix sec. 1.1.3 (for the United States) and sec. 2.1.3. (for 
Europe) 
14 Grabowski (n 1) 852. 
15 ‘FTC v. Cephalon, Inc. No. 08-cv-2141: Complaint for injunctive relief’ (13 February 2008) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/061-0182/cephalon-inc>, 2. 
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In fact, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has estimated that such pay for 
delay settlements have deprived consumers in the United States of savings totalling 
US$3.5 billion over the period of 2004 to 2009.16 
 
The FTC has devoted significant time and resources to the research into pay 
for delay settlements and pharmaceutical antitrust more generally, resulting in an 
extensive body of research in the form of reports,17 as well as significant expertise 
in terms of the FTC’s advocacy efforts18 and the investigations it has undertaken at 
its own initiative over the last decade.19  Also, a substantial body of case law of 
conflicting opinions has been developed based on private enforcement initiatives.20 
Based on these conflicting opinions, a split between Circuit courts finally led to an 
appeal to the US Supreme Court that handed down its judgment on 17 June 2013.21 
 
                                                          
16 Federal Trade Commission, Pay-for-Delay: How drug company pay-offs cost consumers billions - A 
FTC staff study (2010) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-
consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff>. 
17 Federal Trade Commission, Generic drug entry prior to patent expiration: A FTC study (2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study>; Federal Trade 
Commission, To promote innovation: The proper balance of competition and patent law and policy. A 
report by the Federal Trade Commission (2003) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf>; Federal Trade Commission, Authorized 
Generics: An interim report (2009) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/authorized-generics-interim-report-
federal-trade-commission>; Federal Trade Commission, Pay-for-Delay: How drug company pay-offs 
cost consumers billions(n 16).Federal Trade Commission, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term 
Effects and Long-Term Impact (2011) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-
term-effects-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission>. 
18 The Federal Trade Commission filed amicus curiae briefs in a number of cases: e.g. In re Cardizem 
CD Antitrust Litigation  332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation  686 F. 3d 197 (3d 
Cir. 2012); Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc.  677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012); 
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride Antitrust litigation  544 f.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S.Ct. 2828 (2009); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation  466 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2005); Valley 
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc  344 F.3d 1294, (11th Cir. 2003). 
19 FTC v. Cephalon, Inc.  551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC  402 F.3d 
1056, (11th Cir. 2005). 
20 Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc.  677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012); In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride Antitrust litigation  544 f.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litigation  466 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2005) all finding pay for delay settlements to be lawful 
and In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation  686 F. 3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) finding such settlements to be 
presumptively unlawful.  
21 A split circuit refers to the situation when a number of circuit courts have handed down diverging 
judgments over the same issue. Such a split circuit significantly increase the change for the US 
Supreme Court to grant writ certiorari (appeal for judicial review), as it has happened in FTC v. 
Actavis  133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013). 
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In addition to the FTC’s efforts in respect of pay for delay settlements, it has filed 
administrative complaints against pharmaceutical companies that have abused the 
regulatory system for the approval of drugs.22 In the matter against Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, for example, the FTC issued a complaint against the company for the 
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, asserting that the 
company had wrongfully acquired a patent by providing misleading information to 
the US Patent and Trademark Office. In doing so, Bristol-Myers Squibb was able to 
delay timely entry of a generic version of the drug BuSpar because of the 
peculiarities of the regulatory system for generic drug approval in the United 
States.23  
It is exactly these types of conduct that should attract antitrust scrutiny, where the 
brand company unilaterally or in a concerted effort with the generic company, 
attempts to extend its monopolistic profits beyond the life of the patent. 
Despite the fact that, so far, all of the examples and enforcement initiatives 
provided are US-based, pharmaceutical antitrust is no longer unique to the United 
States. For a number of years, the pharmaceutical sector has been a central point of 
focus for the European Commission and has led to a significant amount of 
competition law enforcement activities. In 2005, for instance, the European 
Commission issued a key decision against AstraZeneca. This found that the 
company abused its dominant position by providing misleading information to 
patent offices, resulting in the granting of patent extensions of which the company 
would not have been entitled to.24 On appeal, the General Court and the Court of 
Justice had – for the first time – an opportunity to address the misuse of intellectual 
                                                          
22 Federal Trade Commission, Administrative complaint in the matter of Bristol-Myers    
Squibb. FTC file No.0110046. <http:/www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0110046/bristol-
myers-squibb-company-matter%3e.%20> 
23 Federal Trade Commission, Analysis to aid public comment: In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company File Nos. 001 0221, 011 0046, and 021 0181 (2003) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/ 
bristolmyersanalysis.htm>. 
24 AstraZeneca (Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3) Commission Decision 2006/857/EC, [2005] OJ L 332. 
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property rights in the context of competition law and policy, largely upholding the 
European Commission’s decision in 2010 and 2012 respectively.25  
In 2008, the European Commission also launched its pharmaceutical sector 
inquiry to investigate an apparent lack of competition in the sector. On 8 July 2009, 
the final report was published which found that market entry for generic drugs was 
being delayed and that there had been a decline in the number of novel medicines 
reaching the market. On the day of the publication, it was stated by the then 
Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes, that it was now clear what was wrong 
with the sector and that the  time had come to act, emphasising that the 
Commission would not hesitate to apply the antitrust rules to types of conduct that 
delay generic entry in an anticompetitive way.26 The final report was followed by 
four annual monitoring reports,27 in addition to the launch of a number of formal 
proceedings against pharmaceutical companies suspected of attempting to delay 
the entry of generic drugs into the relevant pharmaceutical market.  
On 7 January 2010, an investigation was opened into the Swedish 
pharmaceutical brand company Lundbeck and a number of generic drug makers in 
relation to the delayed entry of generic versions of the anti-depressant drug 
                                                          
25 Case T-321/05  AstraZeneca v European Commission (2010) ECR 00; upheld by Case C-457/10 P 
AstraZeneca v European Commission (ECJ, 6 December 2012). 
26 European Commission, Antitrust: shortcomings in pharmaceutical sector require further action 
(Brussels, 8 July 2009) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1098_en.htm>. 
27  These monitoring exercises collected information about the patent settlements concluded 
between brand companies and generic companies during the respective monitoring periods and 
analysed them for their potential delay of generic entry including a value transfer to the generic 
company. The first report saw a decrease in problematic settlements from 22% (45 settlements) 
during the sector inquiry to 10% (9 settlements). European Commission, 1st Report on the 
Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: mid 2008 - end 2009) (2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report1.pd
f>; The second monitoring exercise reported a further reduction to 3% (3 settlements)European 
Commission, 2nd Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January-December 2010) 
(2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_ 
report2.pdf>; while the last two exercises recorded an increase to 11% (11 settlements) and 7% (13 
settlements) respectively. European Commission, 3rd Report on the Monitoring of Patent 
Settlements (period: January-December 2011) (2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ 
pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report3_en.pdf>; European Commission, 4th Report 
on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January-December 2012) (2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report4_e
n.pdf>. 
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citalopram.28 This investigation recently led the European Commission to issue its 
first decision against pharmaceutical brand and generic companies in relation to 
European pay for delay settlements, imposing fines totalling €146 million.29 In a 
similar investigation, Johnson & Johnson and Novartis were fined €16 million for 
delaying the entry of a generic version of the pain-killer fentanyl in the 
Netherlands.30 In another major case, Les Laboratoires Servier and a number of 
generic drug makers were issued with a statement of objections alleging the delay 
of entry for the generic version of the cardiovascular drug perindopril on 30 July 
2012.31 
However, European enforcement activities cannot conceal the fact that the 
authorities’ expertise and academic thinking in pharmaceutical antitrust is trailing 
behind the United States. Describing the situation in the United States, one 
commentator as pointed out: 
‘Much ink has been spilled out on the topic of [pay for delay] settlement 
arrangements and their antitrust implications’32 
                                                          
28 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission opens formal proceedings against pharmaceutical 
company Lundbeck (Brussels, 7 January 2010) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-
8_en.htm>. 
29 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Lundbeck and other pharma companies for 
delaying market entry of generic medicines (Brussels, 19 June 2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-563_en.htm>. 
30 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Johnson & Johnson and Novartis € 16 million 
for delaying market entry of generic pain-killer fentanyl (Brussels, 10 December 2013) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1233_en.htm>. 
31 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections on perindopril to 
Servier and others (Brussels, 30 July 2012) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-835_en.htm> 
At the time of submission of this thesis a final decision in this investigation was not yet issued. 
32 Thomas F Cotter, ‘Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: 
Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship’ (2003) 71 
Antitrust Law Journal 1069, 1069; the dichotomy between the US courts is to a certain degree 
reflected in the academic literature. For example, Kevin D McDonald, ‘Patent Settlements and 
Payments that Flow the "Wrong" Way: The Early History of a Bad Idea’ (2002) 15 Antitrust Health 
Care Chronicle 2 (argues that pay for delay settlements should generally not be regarded as 
anticompetitive as long as they are within the scope of the patent, requiring genuine belief that the 
relevant patent is invalid); Daniel Crane, ‘Ease over accuracy in assessing patent settlements’ (2004) 
88 Minnesota Law Review 689 (accepts the anticompetitive potential but argues for an ex-ante 
evaluation of the likelihood that the generic company would be excluded from the market if the case 
was finally adjudicated); Marc G Schildkraut, ‘Patent-splitting settlements and the reverse payment 
fallacy’ (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 1033 (advocates for a non-interventionist approach because 
of the complexity of the process); Others are, however, in favour of illegality Thomas F Cotter, 
‘Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse 
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Indeed, compared to the extensive discussion of the issue in the United States, 
academic discussion in Europe is limited or, rather, in its infancy. An early article by 
Murphy sets out some of the differences between the two regulatory systems and 
calls for the application of the “scope of the patent” test, 33 as was applied in the 
Schering Plough decision of the 11th Circuit.34 Discussing the application of Art. 101 
TFEU to pay for delay settlements, Marc van der Woude highlights the difficulties 
that arise from the fact that these kinds of settlements have not yet been 
addressed by the European courts and, thus, explores the potential to apply related 
case law regarding trademark delimitation agreements and no-challenge clauses.35 
The only recent detailed analysis of pay for delay settlements under EU competition 
law strongly advocates for a case-by-case analysis for proving anticompetitive 
effects because of the probabilistic nature of patent settlements.36 However, at the 
same time, the analysis suggests that the European Commission would need to 
distance itself from an effects-based analysis, which it proclaimed in its 
pharmaceutical sector inquiry,37 and rather would have to regard these settlements 
as restrictions by object in order to have success. Since then, the application of EU 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley’ (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 1789 
(determines illegality based on the probability of success in the patent law suit); Herbert J 
Hovenkamp, Mark D Janis and Mark A Lemley, ‘Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property 
Disputes’ (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 1719  (suggest a rebuttable presumption based on the 
patent holder’s anticipated litigation costs) Michael A Carrier, ‘Unsettling drug patent settlements: A 
framework for presumptive illegality’ (2009) 108 Michigan Law Review 37 (bases the decision on the 
reasonableness of the payment from the brand company to the generic company); C. S Hemphill, 
‘An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition’ 
(2009) 109 Columbia Law Review 645 (argues for a presumption because of the growing complexity 
of these settlements); Others again offer an alternative route through legislative change C. S 
Hemphill, ‘Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem’ 
(2006) 81 New York University Law Review 1553; Michael A Carrier, ‘Solving the Drug Settlement 
Problem: The Legislative Approach’ (2009) 41 Rutgers Law Journal 83; C. S Hemphill and Mark A 
Lemley, ‘Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act’ (2011) 77 Antitrust 
Law Journal 947;  
33  Mark W Murphy, ‘Red flag or red herring? Reverse payments and the settlement of 
pharmaceutical patent litigation’ (2008) 4 European Competition Journal 541. 
34 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC  402 F.3d 1056, (11th Cir. 2005). 
35 Mark van der Woude, ‘Patent Settlements and Reverse Payments Under EU Law’ (2009) 5 
Competition Policy International 182. 
36 Pat Treacy and Sophie Lawrance, ‘Intellectual property rights and out of court settlements’ in 
Steven D Anderman and Ariel Ezrachi (eds), Intellectual property and competition law: New frontiers 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011). 
37 European Commission (n 26) para. 1575. 
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competition law to pay for delay settlements has not been discussed any further by 
means of a detailed legal analysis. 
Given the comparatively limited enforcement expertise of the European 
Commission and the limited academic thinking in the field, one could be tempted to 
draw from the expertise and the academic advancement in the United States in 
order to address issues of pharmaceutical antitrust in Europe. 
Yet, this thesis calls for caution when drawing from the wealth of experience of the 
United States in relation to pharmaceutical antitrust, because of fundamental 
differences between the pharmaceutical drug approval litigation in the United 
States and Europe. These differences are highlighted by the following brief 
discussion.38  
In contrast to the relevant European authorities, the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) does not only take factors such as safety, quality and efficacy 
into consideration during the generic drug approval process, but also economic 
factors such as the patent protection in relation to the relevant brand drug. This 
creates a so-called patent linkage in the US regulatory system with far-reaching 
consequences. This patent linkage, which has been introduced by the Hatch 
Waxman Act, allows the brand company to attack the generic drug application – 
which is filed before the relevant patents have expired – with a patent infringement 
lawsuit, leading to a delay of generic drug approval. In order to incentivise the 
generic entrant to nevertheless take the risk of applying for drug approval prior to 
the expiry of the brand company’s relevant patents, the first generic company is 
granted a generic exclusivity of 180 days, after the patent dispute is resolved. Until 
the generic exclusivity period has elapsed, the FDA is not allowed to accept any 
further generic drug applications for the litigated drug. It is these peculiarities in the 
regulatory drug approval process in the United States that open the door for 
procedural misuse by the involved parties. Instead of litigating, the parties resolve 
their dispute by means of settlement and stipulate the date of generic market entry, 
                                                          
38 This brief description does not include all the details of the respective regulatory regimes. It shall 
rather give the reader a general feel for the situation and set the overall scene. The detailed 
discussion of the differences between the US and EU regime takes place in chapter III. 
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which then triggers the generic companies exclusivity period of 180 days. The 
parties are therefore able to foreclose the relevant pharmaceutical market, as the 
FDA is not allowed to accept any further generic applications, thus acting as a gate 
keeper. 
The European framework, however, lacks such a patent linkage. Brand 
companies can also attack generic companies by means of a patent infringement 
lawsuit, if they enter the market prior to patent expiry. However, the brand 
company cannot foreclose the market by paying off a single generic entrant, as 
economic factors such as patent protection are not considered during the drug 
approval process. Generic companies might therefore risk patent infringement 
litigation prior to the brand company’s patent expiry, but they are not prevented 
from entering the market by the drug approval regulation in Europe, even if the 
brand company has already paid-off one or more of the generic competitors. 
Foreclosure is, thus, not achievable by the same means as in the United States. 
This brief description of the fundamental differences between the two 
regulatory regimes already highlights the importance of the questions posed at the 
outset of this introduction and hints at the need to develop a European approach to 
pharmaceutical antitrust, particularly in relation to pay for delay settlements. It 
would be wrong to simply apply the US approach to pay for delay settlements in 
Europe, without having first conducted a detailed comparative legal analysis. 
 
3. Originality 
Following the detailed comparative analysis of US and European regulatory 
framework, a European theory of harm for pay for delay settlements is devised, 
which accounts for the regulatory differences in Europe. This theory leads up to the 
analysis of these settlements under EU competition law and the development of a 
novel “structured effects-based” test. Inspired by the US Supreme Court’s judgment 
in FTC v Actavis, the proposed test also circumvents the need to determine the 
validity of the relevant patent and the probability of success in patent litigation. The 
test does not, however,simply apply the rationale of the Actavis judgment, but 
rather adapts it to the peculiarities of the European pharmaceutical framework. 
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 In addition to this novel European approach to pay for delay settlements, 
this thesis is also the first to develop a European theory of harm for so-called early 
entry agreements, which have also been identified by the European Commission in 
its sector inquiry.39  Following this agreement between a brand company and a 
generic company, the generic company is allowed market entry prior to the expiry 
of the brand company’s patents. In return for this early entry, the generic company 
has to accept additional terms of the agreement that are highly restrictive and 
provide the brand company with a significant amount of control over the first 
generic entrant. The fundamental antitrust concern on which this novel theory of 
harm is based is the brand company’s ability to create a “pet competitor” that 
allows the brand company to distort the competitive process and to retain generic 
prices above the competitive level.  
 
4. Significance of the thesis 
Cautious analysis is important with regards to potential antitrust infringements in 
the pharmaceutical sector, in particular because of the highly regulated nature of 
the sector and the fact that analysis operates at the intersection of competition law 
and the law relating to intellectual property rights. 
A sound antitrust policy is therefore essential, especially in the pharmaceutical 
sector. It is of utmost importance to strike the right balance between the incentives 
that spur innovation for the brand companies and the competitive price for drugs, 
which enhances consumer welfare. Over-enforcement could stifle innovation, 
whereas under-enforcement could lead to direct consumer harm. 
 With regards to European pay for delay settlements, the novel effects-based 
test proposed in this thesis does not only ensure that it is not over-inclusive in 
terms of general patent settlements and settlements that do not have 
anticompetitive effects, but it also enhances legal certainty within the 
                                                          
39 The European Commission has identified 87 early entry agreements in its pharmaceutical sector 
inquiry. These agreements included exclusivity terms such as exclusive sourcing obligations, single 
branding agreements, no-compete and no-challenge clauses. European Commission, Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry: Final Report (2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/ 
inquiry/index.html>para 808. 
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pharmaceutical sector. The test circumvents the need for an inquiry into the validity 
of the patent, which is a highly fact-specific and complex task with an outcome that 
is difficult to predict. Instead, the test rests upon an objective cost-based analysis – 
an analysis that is not only more feasible for competition authorities to administer, 
but also for the brand and generic companies to predict. 
In the case of early entry agreements, it is even more important to strike the 
right balance and to avoid being over-inclusive. After all, early generic entry 
undoubtedly has procompetitive effects as the entry leads to generic choice and 
lower prices prior to patent expiry. However, at the same time, early generic entry 
should also cause suspicion. Brand companies as profit-maximising corporations are 
unlikely to allow a generic company to enter prior to the expiry of their patents, 
without it being beneficial for the brand company in the long-run. If this were not  
the case, the brand company would defend its intellectual property rights 
aggressively against potential entry.    
  
5. Methodology 
This thesis reflects the law as it stood on 30 January 2014. All online resources in 
this thesis were visited and verified on 30 January 2014. The last visit to these 
websites is therefore not mentioned hereinafter.  
This thesis employs, in all four of its substantive chapters, a combination of 
doctrinal and comparative legal research, which comprises of the analysis of the 
relevant case law, decisional practice, legislation, policy documents and literature 
in Europe and the United States of America. These are predominantly based on the 
micro-comparison of the pharmaceutical regulations and fundamental antitrust 
principles in the United States and Europe, with the aim of illustrating differences 
as well as commonalities between the two regimes. These findings will determine 
whether categories of conduct, relating specifically to pharmaceutical antitrust 
present in both jurisdictions, should be dealt with differently or whether one can 
indeed draw from the experience and expertise in the United States. However, 
such a micro-comparison is only fruitful if the economic context is also taken into 
consideration. This becomes especially important when the already complex 
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intersection between competition law and intellectual property rights is analysed 
in relation to the highly regulated pharmaceutical sector. Without a sound 
understanding of the underlying legal and economic reasons behind competition 
policy decisions in the field of pharmaceutical antitrust, a reasoned and 
comprehensive comparison would not be possible. The study therefore also takes 
industrial economic principles into consideration, supported by empirical evidence 
were available. 
 
6. Outline of the thesis 
The thesis consists of four substantive chapters that are presented in the provided 
order to paint a picture of European pharmaceutical antitrust, spanning from the 
advent of pharmaceutical antitrust in AstraZeneca and the status quo to the 
proposed prospective enforcement priorities and policy considerations. Yet, at the 
same time, the chapters are self-contained and it is therefore possible for the 
reader to understand the contribution of the relevant chapter without having to 
read the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter II, as the first substantive chapter of this thesis, discusses the 
General Court’s judgment in AstraZeneca, the only European case of 
pharmaceutical antitrust that has been fully litigated to date. The discussion will 
focus on two aspects of judgment – namely the market definition and 
AstraZeneca’s comparative claim that the European approach, to conduct that 
entails the submission of misleading information to a patent office in an attempt to 
obtain a patent that the party is not entitled to, is overly restrictive in comparison 
to the relevant doctrine in the United States. The examination of both aspects aims 
to derive general principles not only for the benefit of future pharmaceutical 
antitrust investigations, but also to inform subsequent analyses in this thesis.  
First, the market definition in AstraZeneca and the European Commission’s 
finding of a dominant position is at issue. As the first and still the only published 
European antitrust decision in the pharmaceutical sector to date, the market 
definition in AstraZeneca should be seen as a major source of guidance. The 
European Commission has defined the relevant market in this case rather narrowly, 
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at least partially by the finding that doctors’ inertia with regard to their prescribing 
and switching behaviour of the drugs in question should be regarded as an 
exogenous factor in market definition. This assumption is critiqued in this chapter 
and it is argued that doctors’ inertia can in fact be decisive to the definition of the 
relevant market and should therefore not be categorically excluded.  This critique is 
supported by applying the AstraZeneca market definition to a hypothetical 
pharmaceutical market of antiepileptic drugs. Empirical evidence regarding the 
actual substitutability of antiepileptic drugs shows that the prescribing behaviour 
can have a significant impact on the drug choice and, in turn, the interchangeability 
of drugs. This analysis suggests that the General Court’s finding to exogenise 
doctors’ prescribing inertia should not be generalised for future references. This 
result is not only important for Art. 102 TFEU investigations, but also in relation to 
the examination of market share thresholds for the application of block exemptions 
under Art. 101 TFEU, as it shall be explored in chapter IV. 
Secondly, the chapter addresses the argument put forward by AstraZeneca 
during the proceedings that the conduct which the General Court’s judgment found 
to be an infringement of Art 102 TFEU would have been barred from antitrust 
scrutiny in the United States by means of a detailed comparative legal analysis. This 
analysis comes to the conclusion that the General Court’s judgment is not 
comparable to the so-called Walker Process Doctrine, due to major differences in 
the underlying antitrust principles in the US and the European Union. When 
compared to the more appropriate benchmark of the antitrust enforcement policy 
of the US Federal Trade Commission, it is shown that the FTC could indeed launch 
an investigation for the breach of US antitrust laws following AstraZeneca’s 
submission of misleading information to several patent offices. Thus, contrary to 
the company’s argument, AstraZeneca’s conduct would not be immune from 
antitrust scrutiny in the US. In contrast to the findings in relation to market 
definition above, the significance of the analysis of the comparative claim does not 
stem from the actual results, which are nonetheless interesting, but rather from the 
comparative analysis itself. It highlights the important fact that, although conduct 
of a very similar nature might exist on both sides of the Atlantic, the respective 
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appropriate approach to this conduct might – and in fact should – be very different.  
This finding should therefore be regarded as a cornerstone for the following 
analyses of pay for delay settlements and early entry agreements in the European 
context. 
Chapter III addresses each of these two types of agreements, which are 
entered into between brand and generic companies. The European Commission has 
in fact identified a number of pay for delay settlements and early entry agreements 
in its pharmaceutical sector. The chapter begins by describing in detail the 
anticompetitive potential developed by pay for delay settlements in the United 
States, based on the peculiarities of the Hatch Waxman Act. The chapter then turns 
to pay for delay settlements under the European regulatory framework and 
analyses the anticompetitive potential arising from them. It is argued that pay for 
delay settlements in Europe are not likely to exert their anticompetitive potential in 
the same way as in the United States, as it is not possible in Europe to automatically 
foreclose the relevant market by paying off a single generic entrant. That said, it 
could be possible for a brand company to foreclose the market depending on the 
actual structure of the market and the number of potential generic competitors 
that are present. Despite this arguably reduced anticompetitive potential, pay for 
delay settlements have received significant attention from the European 
Commission. 
Early entry agreements, on the other hand, do not seem to have attracted 
much attention, despite being identified in the pharmaceutical sector inquiry. 
Although it is not disputed that generic entry prior to patent expiry can have 
procompetitive effects, it is argued that the European Commission should not 
refrain from scrutinising early entry agreements simply because of the parties’ 
assertion of pro-competitive effects. A brand company is unlikely to allow the 
generic company to enter the market prior to patent expiry without gaining 
substantial benefits in return – these are, after all, markets that are worth billions 
and where the majority of the profits are realised towards the end of the patent life. 
The chapter therefore provides a detailed analysis of the parties’ incentives to enter 
into an early entry agreement. Finally, for the first time, a theory of harm for early 
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entry agreements is developed, showing the clear potential for exclusionary 
conduct with the ability to distort the competitive process on the market, resulting 
from what the chapter describes as “the creation of a pet competitor”. The 
following two chapters then put pay for delay settlements and early entry 
agreements under detailed European antitrust scrutiny. 
Chapter IV analyses pay for delay settlements under Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 
102 TFEU. As part of the Art. 101 analysis, it is determined whether one could rely 
on previous European case law on trademark delimitation agreements and no-
challenge clauses in an attempt to establish whether pay for delay settlements 
constitute anticompetitive agreements. Following the dismissal of this possibility, a 
novel “structured effects-based” approach to European pay for delay settlements is 
devised which takes into consideration the regulatory differences of the European 
pharmaceutical sector and, also, ensures against over-inclusiveness in relation to 
‘normal’ patent settlements. The development of this test is inspired by the 
underlying rationales of the US Supreme Court’s majority opinion in FTC v Actavis. 
The Art. 102 TFEU analysis of European pay for delay settlements focuses on a 
potentially broader unilateral strategy by the brand company, which is facilitated by 
means of a pay for delay settlement. The Art. 102 TFEU investigation is therefore 
not complementary to the scrutiny under Art. 101 TFEU but, rather, allows for an 
analysis of an alternative type of conduct that nonetheless utlises pay for delay 
settlements. 
 Chapter V puts early entry agreements under antitrust scrutiny. The analysis 
under Art. 101 discusses the applicability of the Vertical Block Exemption 
Regulation and the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation in the context 
of early entry agreements. This analysis offers a number of important insights: (1) a 
robust market definition is required in order to determine the applicability of block 
exemptions in the pharmaceutical sector; (2) early entry agreements have a 
number of pro-competitive effects that need to be recognised and considered 
when scrutinising such agreements; and (3) the anticompetitive potential of early 
entry agreements is raised with an increase in market power, which finally leads  to 
an analysis of these agreements under Art. 102 TFEU. For this examination, the 
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brand company is presumed to be in a dominant position. The focus in this last part 
of chapter V is on exclusive sourcing agreements and single branding agreements as 
part of early entry agreements, as it is only possible for the brand company to 
retain control over the generic price post patent expiry if subsequent entry is 
deterred or at least delayed. Without the deterrence or delay of entry, subsequent 
generic entrants would exert competitive pressure on the early generic entrant 
which would lead to a reduction in the price for generic drugs in the market.  
Finally, chapter VI summarises the findings of the preceding chapters and concludes 
the thesis, generally recommending an effects-based approach for all discussed 
types of conduct in pharmaceutical antitrust. 
  
7. Limitations 
This thesis does not consider pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement 
regulations. As mentioned above, the pharmaceutical sector is highly regulated. In 
contrast to the actual drug approval, whose regulation is on a European level or on 
a national level with harmonised legislation based on secondary European 
legislation, pricing and reimbursement regulations are national competences which 
are dealt with by the relevant Member State itself. Although the pricing regulations 
are partially harmonised by Directive 89/105/EEC,40 pricing and reimbursement 
differ from Member State to Member State – not only are the levels  different but, 
even more significantly, the approaches to regulation. This means that, with the 
accession of Croatia to the European Union, we now potentially have – to a certain 
extent – 28 different regulatory systems in place across the Union. In addition, 
these regulations are also subject to rather frequent changes. As this thesis 
examines European pharmaceutical antitrust and its approach to pay for delay 
settlements and early entry agreements on a “macro-level”, it has been necessary 
to exclude the different pricing and reimbursement regulations as well as different 
                                                          
40 Council Directive 89/105/EEC relating to the transparency of measures regulating the pricing of 
medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health insurance 
systems [1989] OJ L 40. The “Transparency Directive” requires the Member States to implement 
objective and verifiable criteria by which the decision on pricing and reimbursement are made 
within clear timelines and the possibility of appeal. 
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generic substitution regulations on the demand side from the analyses in this thesis. 
It is this “macro-approach” that enables the author to develop strong general 
arguments on a European level. Once the relevant theories of harm, the general 
principles and the potential approach to the investigated conduct by EU 
competition law is established, one can apply these findings on a case-by-case basis 
to different Member States. This is however outside the scope of this thesis.  
Nonetheless, the conclusion alludes to the potential exacerbating and mitigating 
effects that the different pricing and reimbursement regulations might have on the 
established principles – setting the scene for potential future research. 
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II. ASTRAZENECA - THE ADVENT OF EUROPEAN   
PHARMACEUTICAL ANTITRUST1 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter should be seen as a prologue to the analyses in the following chapters 
of this thesis. The General Court’s judgment in AstraZeneca, which was upheld by 
the ECJ, is the first judgment addressing issues of pharmaceutical antitrust on a 
European level.2 The General Court ruled for the first time on the European 
Commission’s ex post definition of the relevant market in a pharmaceutical 
antitrust case and addressed the issue of misuse of procedural rules and the 
potential anti-competitive harm of such misuse in the context of intellectual 
property rights in the highly regulated pharmaceutical sector. In its judgment the 
General Court upheld the European Commission’s finding that AstraZeneca had 
abused its dominant position by acquiring patent extensions, which it would not 
have been entitled to.  
As it is the only fully litigated case in European pharmaceutical antitrust to 
date, one would hope to be able to refer to this judgment as guidance in current 
and future antitrust investigations in the pharmaceutical sector. Particularly in 
relation to market definition in the pharmaceutical sector it would be highly 
beneficial to receive guidance from the EU courts in order to create legal certainty 
for the business sector. The sector is heavily relying on intellectual property rights 
and is also highly regulated. Both of these facts are likely to have a significant 
impact on market power of pharmaceutical companies.  
The first main objective of this chapter is therefore to establish whether 
general principles can be derived from the market definition as decided by the 
European Commission and upheld by the EU courts in the AstraZeneca judgment. It 
will be shown in a detailed analysis, unfortunately, that the market definition in 
                                                          
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in the European Competition Journal. See S Gallasch, 
AstraZeneca vs. the Walker Process – A real EU-US divergence or an attempt to compare apples to 
oranges (2011) 7 (3) European Competition Journal 505.  
2 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European Commission [2010] ECR 00; upheld by Case C-457/10 P 
AstraZeneca v European Commission (ECJ, 6 December 2012). 
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AstraZeneca offers only limited guidance to the pharmaceutical business sector and 
that it is difficult for pharmaceutical companies to derive general principles that 
would aid them in the assessment of their position in the relevant market. In terms 
of this thesis market definition becomes relevant in the discussion whether the 
brand company abuses its dominant position with regard to pay for delay 
settlements3 and early entry agreement. Furthermore, market definition becomes 
important in the assessment of the market share thresholds of block exemptions in 
relation to early entry agreements.4 
However, establishing whether the judgment can be used as guidance in 
relation to market definition is not the sole reason for the analysis of this judgment. 
The analysis of the process leading up to the EU Court’s judgment, including 
AstraZeneca’s appeal5 of the European Commission’s decision6 and the General 
Court’s judgment allows for a discussion of the importance of careful comparative 
legal analysis in cases where significant expertise and experience exist in one 
jurisdiction. The question that arises is whether one should rely on this experience 
in a jurisdiction which lacks such experience due to the novelty of the investigated 
conduct. In the case of AstraZeneca, the defendants argued throughout the entire 
investigation and in front of the EU courts that the novel finding of abuse 
committed through the submission of misleading information was overly 
restrictive.7 AstraZeneca supported this claim by referring to a US judicial doctrine, 
called the Walker Process Doctrine, and the relevant case law in the United States, 
which addresses a similar conduct to that which was under investigation in Europe. 
Nonetheless, the European Commission and the General Court unanimously 
rejected this comparative argument and instead developed a European approach to 
                                                          
3 The predominant focus with regard to pay for delay settlements is on the anticompetitive 
agreement between the brand company and the generic entrant, but as it is discussed below, the 
brand company could also use a pay for delay settlement in order to facilitate a broader unilateral 
strategy. See Chapter III sec.3. 
4 Chapter IV sec. 2. 
5 AstraZeneca/ Commission (Case T-321/05) Appeal to the General Court (25 August 2005) OJ C 
271/24. 
6 AstraZeneca (Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3) Commission Decision 2006/857/EC, [2005] OJ L 332. 
7 See AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) para. 316, 317 (all numbers in relation to the 
AstraZeneca judgment refer to paragraphs); AstraZeneca/ Commission 
  
 II. AstraZeneca – The advent of EU pharmaceutical antitrust 
22 
 
the conduct in question.8 A detailed comparative legal analysis of the European 
approach and the Walker Process Doctrine shows that the European Commission 
and the EU courts were correct to reject the comparative argument based on the 
US Walker Process Doctrine, as the EU and US antitrust regimes and their 
respective underlying principles are too different to allow one to seek guidance 
from the US jurisprudence, despite the fact that the investigated conduct is very 
similar.  
This finding has important ramifications for the analyses in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis, which discuss pay for delay settlements and early entry 
agreements in the pharmaceutical sector. Pay for delay settlements in particular 
have attracted significant antitrust scrutiny in the United States, which has led to a 
substantial body of case law and significant expertise for the US antitrust 
authorities. Just as in the case of AstraZeneca, the key question that arises in these 
analyses is whether the European Commission should rely on the US expertise or 
whether it should rather develop its own European approach to pay for delay 
settlements and early entry agreements.  
Considering the thesis as a whole, the discussion of the AstraZeneca 
judgment in this chapter should be seen as already mentioned above as a prologue 
to the remaining chapters that highlights two points. On the one hand, it highlights 
the difficulties that might arise in future pharmaceutical antitrust investigations in 
relation to market definition. On the other hand, it emphasises the possible need to 
develop a European approach to pay for delay settlements and early entry 
agreements and advocates for careful consideration before drawing from the 
extensive US expertise in relation to issues of pharmaceutical antitrust. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First it provides a brief overview of 
AstraZeneca’s conduct that led to the antitrust investigation (Section 2), the 
European Commission’s decision (Section 3) and AstraZeneca’s appeal of this 
decision to the General Court (Section 4). AstraZeneca’s pleas in relation to the 
definition of the relevant market and the comparative argument in relation to the 
                                                          
8 See AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 340-343 (the European Commission’s rejection) and 
368 (the General Court’s rejection of the argument). 
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US jurisprudence are then discussed in detail (Sections 5 and 6). The analysis begins 
by addressing the General Court’s findings in relation to both issues, but then goes 
beyond the discussion of the actual findings of the Court. 
In relation to the Court’s market definition, it is argued, in Section 5, that 
the definition in AstraZeneca is too fact-specific to derive general principles that can 
be used for guidance. This argument is supported by the application of the market 
definition in AstraZeneca to scenarios taking place in a hypothetical market for 
antiepileptic drugs. The impact of the key factor in the AstraZeneca market 
definition – namely, the disregard of doctors’ prescribing behaviour – will be at the 
centre of this discussion. 
With regard to AstraZeneca’s comparative argument, Section 6 starts by 
providing a detailed discussion of the Walker Process Doctrine and the relevant 
case law. Following this discussion it is argued that the General Court’s findings and 
the Walker Process Doctrine should not be compared, as the respective underlying 
antitrust principles are too different. In a further step, the comparative analysis 
shows that the findings of the General Court are not overly restrictive in 
comparison to the US approach when compared to the more appropriate 
enforcement regime of the Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of the FTC 
Act. This analysis is followed by the conclusion (Section 7). 
 
2. AstraZeneca’s conduct 
AstraZeneca is one of the world’s largest innovative pharmaceutical companies and 
has its headquarters in London. The company is involved in the entire process of 
pharmaceutical production and marketing. It is discovering new pharmaceutical 
compounds, is developing the drug, manufacturing it and finally marketing the 
finished product. Its innovative focus lies in different areas of healthcare, including 
cancer, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, infection, neuroscience, and respiratory 
and inflammation.9 
One of AstraZeneca’s most successful innovations is a drug called Losec. 
Based on the active ingredient omeprazole, the drug provides treatment for 
                                                          
9 AstraZeneca website <http://www.astrazeneca.com/about-us/key-facts/>. 
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gastrointestinal diseases whose effects are more commonly known as reflux and 
heartburn. Losec gained its market authorisation in the late 1980s and was 
subsequently launched in Europe.10 In 1996, Losec became the world’s best-selling 
prescription drug.   
AstraZeneca filed a patent application with the European Patent Office on the 3 
April 1979, which would provide patent protection in nine European Member 
States – namely Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden.11 Additionally, AstraZeneca filed 
patent applications in several other European Member States that, at the time, had 
not yet joined the European Patent Convention, such as Denmark, Finland, Austria 
and the Republic of Ireland.12 The patent applications lodged with the European 
Patent Office as well as the other national patent authorities were finally granted 
and thereby provided AstraZeneca with patent protection for omeprazole and thus 
Losec. The patent protection term lasted for 20 years from the filing date of the 
patent application,13 meaning it expired between April and August 1999, depending 
on the actual filing date in the respective above mentioned countries. 
Wary that its sales of Losec would severely decline after the term of patent 
protection had ended, AstraZeneca tried to extend its patent protection by applying 
for supplementary protection certificates (SPCs) in all Member States that granted 
an original patent for Losec.  
In the effort to mitigate for the reduction of effective term of patent 
protection caused by the delay between the filing of a patent application and the 
grant of the final market authorisation for a drug, the SPC grants the applicant a 
patent extension of a maximum of five years from the date on which the protection 
for the initial patent elapses.14  
In 1993 and 1994, AstraZeneca filed SPC applications with several national 
patent authorities to obtain a patent extension. During this application process, 
                                                          
10 AstraZeneca (n 6) para. 17 (all numbers in relation to the AstraZeneca decision refer to paragraphs) 
11 These nine Member State were the first Member State to join the European Patent Convention 
which is the legal bases for issuing of a European patent. 
12 AstraZeneca (n 6) 21. 
13 Art.  63 (1) of the European Patent Convention. 
14 Art. 13 (1) of the European Patent Convention. 
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AstraZeneca provided the patent offices with misleading information regarding the 
date of the first market authorisation for Losec in the European Union. This date is 
an essential requirement for the application as it determines the exact date on 
which the protection period of the SPC commences and logically the last day of 
protection.  
On 12 May 1999, two generic competitors, Generics (UK) Limited and 
Scandinavian Pharmaceuticals Generics, filed a joint complaint with the European 
Commission about AstraZeneca’s conduct, which led to proceedings against 
AstraZeneca by the European Commission that were initiated on 25 July 2003. 
 
3. European Commission’s AstraZeneca decision 
In 2005, the European Commission found in its decision that AstraZeneca had 
abused its dominant position in the market for proton pump inhibitors (PPI) in two 
different ways. The first abuse was found to be AstraZeneca’s acquisition of 
supplementary protection certificates (SPC) for patents following the misleading 
representation before several patent offices. The second abuse was the selective 
deregistration of the capsule-version of Losec and replacing it with a tablet-version 
Losec MUPS. Following these two infringements of Art. 102 of the Treat on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the European Commission fined 
AstraZeneca for EUR 60 million. AstraZeneca appealed this decision to the General 
Court. Before this section addresses the grounds for AstraZeneca’s appeal, the 
European Commission’s definition of the relevant market and the findings regarding 
the two types of abuse are briefly discussed in turns. 
 
 
3.1. European Commission’s market definition 
In the case of AstraZeneca, the market for gastrointestinal acid-related diseases 
was of concern – more precisely the market surrounding AstraZeneca’s blockbuster 
anti-ulcer drug Losec. AstraZeneca’s Losec was based on the active ingredient 
omeprazole, which works as a proton pump inhibitor (PPI). “[It] proactively inhibits 
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acid secretion into the stomach [and] was the first on the market to act directly on 
the proton pump, that is to say, the specific enzyme inside the parietal cells along 
the stomach wall, which pumps acid into the stomach.”15 Prior to the market entry 
of Losec, patients suffering from an ulcer were treated with antihistamines, so-
called H2 blockers. The question which had to be answered by the European 
Commission was whether PPI drugs based on omeprazole and H2 blockers 
belonged to the same market or were to be regarded as separate product markets. 
 
The European Commission started the definition of the relevant product market on 
the ATC 3 level of “drugs for the treatment of peptic ulcer”.16 This ATC class, “A2B”, 
includes five different types of drugs: (1) H2 blocker, (2) PPI, (3) prostaglandis, (4) 
bismuth antiulcerants, and (5) other antiulcerants. However, the European 
Commission narrowed down its analysis to the first two groups of drugs, as they are 
the only types of drugs which directly inhibit the source of the acid production, 
whereas the other three categories only remedy the effects caused by the acid.17 
To finally decide whether H2 blocker and PPI are in the same or separate product 
markets, the European Commission focussed on a number of factors including: (1) 
mode of action, (2) therapeutic use, (3) demand and price and (4) natural events. 
These factors will be discussed in turn. 
The mode of action describes the way in which the drug in question 
produces its therapeutic effects. This factor has been previously used by the 
European Commission in merger analyses to differentiate between drugs and to 
                                                          
 
15 Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v European Commission (ECJ, 6 December 2012), Opinion of AG 
Mazák, para. 3. 
16 AstraZeneca (n 6) 372. The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system divides 
products into different groups according to their anatomical site of action, therapeutic indications, 
composition, mode of action etc. ATC1 describes the anatomical site of action, i.e. cardiovascular 
system; ATC2 describes the therapeutic main groups within ATC1, including information about the 
indication, the therapeutic sub groups and the anatomical system; ATC3 includes pharmacological 
information about the drug in question, such as the intended use; ATC4 contains detailed 
pharmacological information on molecule level such as the actual formulation, the chemical 
description and mode of action. On ATC4 level the group may consist of a single molecule. WHO, 
‘ATC – Structure and principles’ < http://www.whocc.no/atc/structure_and_principles/>. 
17 Ibid. 375. 
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define the relevant market.18 In the AstraZeneca decision the respective mode of 
action of PPI and H2 blocker proved to be a distinctive factor. Both drugs 
proactively inhibit the acid secretion in the stomach, but PPI is the only drug that is 
directly blocking the proton pump. The proton pump is an enzyme which is situated 
in the so-called parietal cells in the stomach walls and is injecting acid into the 
stomach – causing ulcers and other acid related conditions. In contrast to this direct 
effect, H2 blockers only have an indirect effect on acid secretion in the stomach. 
They block histamine receptors in the same parietal cells which act as a stimulant 
for the proton pump. Apart from histamine receptors, other stimulants include the 
hormone gastrin but also caffeine and other foodstuffs.19 H2 blockers can therefore 
be seen as a partial solution to the problem by blocking one of many stimulants for 
acid production, whereas PPI goes to the root of the problem and blocks the acid 
producing enzyme itself. 
Despite the fact that it was seen as insufficient to define the market based 
on this distinction alone, the differences in the mode of action are closely linked to 
the therapeutic use of the drugs and have a significant impact on the functional 
substitutability between PPI and H2 blockers.20 Functional substitutability should 
not be solely determined by whether the drugs considered are prescribed for the 
same illnesses, but should also take into consideration their efficiency and 
appropriateness as a remedy against a certain illness.21 Based on medical evidence, 
statistical information provided by IMS Health22 and internal documentation by 
AstraZeneca, the European Commission has shown that AstraZeneca’s Losec has 
been the more cost-effective and therapeutically superior drug to H2 blockers in all 
cases considered.23 Omeprazole has been superior to H2 blockers in terms of 
healing rates, symptoms relief and eradication rates. Losec was regarded as “first 
line” treatment and the only adequate treatment in severe cases of peptic ulcer 
                                                          
18 E.g. Sanofi-Synthelabo/Aventis (COMP/M. 3354) Commission Decision 2004/C 213/03 [2004] OJ 
C213 para. 30. 
19 AstraZeneca (n 6) 34. 
20 Ibid. 377, 380. 
21 Ibid. 381. 
22  IMS Health is one of the leading companies providing detailed analytical data on the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
23 AstraZeneca (n 6) 386, 393. 
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diseases, as it could heal patients who were resistant to being treated with H2 
blockers.24 
The therapeutic superiority of Losec was also underlined by the higher price 
that AstraZeneca was able to extract. The higher price was used as an indicator for 
superiority based on the consideration that high prices can only be extracted from 
pubic authorities, if they regard the therapeutic value and the therapeutic 
innovation of the new drug as superior.25 
Finally, the European Commission relied on “natural events” in support of its 
definition of the relevant market, excluding H2 blockers. Generic entry of H2 
blockers and PPI was used to establish potential shocks to price and sales of brand 
H2 blockers and PPI. The European Commission observed that the entry of generic 
H2 blockers in Germany had an adverse effect on the prices of brand H2 blockers, 
whereas the price of Losec and the sales of other PPIs remained unaffected.26 In 
contrast to the entry of generic H2 blockers, the launch of generic omeprazole in 
Germany had a significant impact on sales volume as well as the market share of 
Losec.27 Following this evidence, the European Commission concluded that H2 
blockers do not exert significant competitive pressure on Losec and thus they 
should not be seen as part of the same market. 
 
3.2. European Commission’s finding of abuse 
In its decision against AstraZeneca, the European Commission found two different 
types of abuse in the investigated conduct. 
 
‘The [first] abuse consists of AstraZeneca’s pattern of misleading 
representations as part of its SPC Strategy for omeprazole during two stages with a 
view to preventing, or at least delaying, generic market entry.’28  
 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 39, 40, 44. 
25 Ibid. 385. 
26 Ibid. 423. 
27 Ibid. 425. 
28 Ibid. 773. 
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The first stage constituted the initial submission of misleading information to the 
relevant patent offices in relation to the date of the first marketing authorisation 
that AstraZeneca had received for its drug Losec, concealing two earlier dates.29 In 
the second stage, AstraZeneca provided further misleading information to the 
patent offices which raised further questions regarding the company’s SPC 
applications. The same kind of misleading representations were also made in the 
context of court proceedings brought by generic companies who sought to 
invalidate AstraZeneca’s SPCs.30 
The second abuse identified by the European Commission found was 
AstraZeneca’s selective deregistration of marketing authorisations for the capsule 
version of Losec in combination with the switch from the capsule version to a 
tablet-based version called Losec MUPS.31 According to the European Commission, 
it had been AstraZeneca’s intention to delay generic entry though technical and 
legal hurdles.32 AstraZeneca’s choice of countries to employ this strategy was 
dictated by the chances of achieving its exclusionary aim of bridging the gap 
between the expiry of the patent and SPC protection and the launch of the new 
version of the drug.33 
 
4. AstraZeneca’s appeal to the General Court34 
On 25 August 2005, AstraZeneca appealed to the General Court seeking to quash 
the European Commission’s decision. 35  The appeal challenged the European 
Commission’s definition of the relevant market and the finding of abuse. 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 628. 
30 Ibid. 629. 
31 The second abuse is addressed for the sake of completeness. It is not separately discussed in this 
chapter, as it is unlikely that this abuse arises again. Council Directive 2001/83/EEC as the relevant 
secondary legislation that made this abuse possible has been has been replaced Directive 
2004/27/EEC, which no longer provides the possibility to delay generic entry by withdrawing 
marketing authorisations. 
32 AstraZeneca (n 6) 788. 
33 Ibid. 789. 
34 AstraZeneca has appealed the judgment of the General Court to the ECJ on 6 November 2010 but 
the ECJ upheld the General Court’s judgment and dismissed AstraZeneca’s appeal in its entirety  
AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 168. Therefore the focus in this chapter is on the General 
Court’s judgment. 
35 AstraZeneca/ Commission (n 5). 
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With regards to market definition, AstraZeneca argued that the European 
Commission had made an error of assessment by defining the relevant market as 
being only that of proton pump inhibitors (PPI), used for the treatment of 
gastrointestinal acid-related diseases, and by excluding histamine receptor 
antagonists (H2 blockers) from the relevant market.36 This appeal was based, among 
other pleas in law, on the “alleged manifest error of assessment as to the relevance 
of the gradual nature of the increase in use of PPIs at the expense of H2 blockers.”37 
AstraZeneca claimed that the prescription rate for Losec only increased gradually 
over time and that it had never replaced H2 blockers completely. In fact, in most of 
the countries concerned, H2 blockers retained a significant percentage of 
prescriptions, approximately 20 per cent.38 According to AstraZeneca, this delayed 
and gradual increase of the prescription rate regarding Losec was caused by the 
prescribing doctors, who are largely focused on therapeutic effectiveness and 
appropriateness, and their inertia to switch from H2 blockers to Losec due to an 
increased risk of side-effects.39 It was thus argued by AstraZeneca that H2 blockers 
should have been included within the same market as PPI, as H2 blockers exert 
significant competitive pressure on PPI; a proposition that is supported by the fact 
that the sales of Losec increased in a gradual manner at the expense of H2 blocker 
sales.40 
Challenging the European Commission’s finding of abuse, AstraZeneca 
argued that submitting misleading representation to the patent office could not 
amount to an abuse unless the relevant patent was dishonestly obtained and was in 
fact enforced or at least capable of being enforced.41  In making this claim, 
AstraZeneca had essentially asked the General Court to consider the US Walker 
Process Doctrine.42 The doctrine itself is not referred to expressis verbis in the 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 29. 
38 Ibid.  37. 
39 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 34, 38. 
40 Ibid. 36. 
41 AstraZeneca/ Commission (n 5). 
42 Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.  382 U.S. 172 (1965) dealing with 
fraudulent patent procurement by means of misrepresentation in front of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO). The doctrine provides the defendant in a patent infringement 
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appeal, but the appeal does allude to the requirements that need to be fulfilled in 
order to invoke the Walker Process Doctrine successfully. Furthermore, Frances 
Murphy, who acted as AstraZeneca’s general counsel in this case, has published a 
case comment advocating for the consideration of the Walker Process Doctrine and 
its requirements by the EU courts.43 AstraZeneca also challenged the second abuse 
concerning the selective deregistration of marketing authorisations in relation to 
Losec as an improper interpretation of Art. 102 TFEU, claiming that there should be 
no obligation to maintain a marketing authorisation for a product that is no longer 
marketed.44   
 
Following this brief account of AstraZeneca’s appeal to the General Court, the 
remainder of this chapter addresses the Court’s findings in relation to market 
definition and the first abuse.45 The discussion of both of these issues expends 
beyond the findings of the Court.  
In relation to the Court’s definition of the relevant market the more general 
question is addressed; namely, whether the market definition of the AstraZeneca 
judgment can be used as guidance for future pharmaceutical antitrust investigation 
following Art. 102 TFEU. Such guidance would be desirable for the pharmaceutical 
business sector especially in relation to market definition, as AstraZeneca is the first, 
and so far, only market definition in the field of pharmaceutical antitrust. After the 
application of the market definition to the hypothetical market for antiepileptic 
drugs (which shows that only limited general guidance can be derived from the 
AstraZeneca judgment in relation to market definition), the discussion turns to the 
Court’s findings of abuse.  A detailed analysis of AstraZeneca’s plea to consider a US 
legal doctrine and the relevant US case law is then undertaken. A comparative 
analysis of the US Walker Process Doctrine and the General Court’s findings of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
lawsuit with possibility to bring an antitrust counterclaim against the plaintiff on the basis that the 
litigated patent has been obtained by fraud. This is an exception to the antitrust immunity in US 
private patent litigation. The doctrine is discussed in detail infra sec. 6.1.1. 
43 Frances Murphy, ‘Abuse of regulatory procedures - the AstraZeneca case: Part 2, Case Comment’ 
(2009) 30 (6) European Competition Law Review 289. 
44 AstraZeneca/ Commission (n 5). 
45 As mentioned above, the second abuse is not discussed in this chapter. Its brief discussion in 
section 3.2. is for the sake of completeness. 
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abuse will proceed to showcase and highlight the importance of careful 
consideration before drawing from the experience and expertise of the US Federal 
Trade Commission and the US jurisprudence. Such a careful approach to 
comparative analyses is especially warranted if the investigated type of conduct 
originates in one jurisdiction and now also surfaces in another jurisdiction, as is the 
case for pay for delay settlements. In terms of this thesis, the outcome of the 
comparative analysis in this chapter should act as a constant reminder that similar 
conduct should not necessarily be treated in a similar way. 
 
5. The General Court’s findings on market definition 
In its judgment, the General Court rejected AstraZeneca’s pleas of law. Its 
examination particularly focussed on whether doctors’ inertia would lead to a 
competitive constraint by H2 blockers. The European Commission found that 
doctors’ inertia is an exogenous factor to market definition which is inherent in the 
pharmaceutical prescription market and, as such, should be disregarded.46 It does 
not impose a competitive constraint akin to brand loyalty generated by past 
reputation or advertising, it is unrelated to competition on the merits and it 
autonomously dampens demand for a new product.47 The General Court stated 
that a causal link between the gradual increase of Losec sales at the expense of H2 
blocker sales and therefore a competitive constraint exercised by H2 blockers over 
PPI cannot be sufficiently established and that a presumption of such a causal link 
does not exist in principle.48 Although the General Court acknowledged that the 
degree of inertia slowed down the substitution of PPIs for H2 blockers, it 
nonetheless held that such inertia did not exercise a competitive constraint over 
PPI, as the inertia was based on the accumulation and dissemination of information 
amongst prescribing doctors as opposed to the quality of H2 blockers.49  
                                                          
46 AstraZeneca (n 6) 467. 
47 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 56. 
48 Ibid.  92, 93. 
49 Ibid. 47. 
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Leaving the criticism of the market definition in the specific case of 
AstraZeneca to one side,50 the focus of this section is on the more general and I 
think even more important question of whether the pharmaceutical industry can 
derive general guidance from this market definition.  
Fundamentally it has to be asked whether the European Commission and 
the EU courts have been correct in finding that doctors’ prescribing inertia should 
be an exogenous factor to market definition and that such inertia should only play a 
role when the inertia is based on drug quality concerns, rather than concerns 
related to possible side-effects.51 
In order to establish the general applicability of this finding, the EU courts’ 
approach to market definition is applied to a hypothetical market based on 
information acquired through a case study of antiepileptic drugs. The analysis of 
this hypothetical scenario shows that doctors’ prescribing inertia in relation to side-
effects is a key factor to determine a realistic market in this case. Fundamentally, 
this analysis shows that it is not possible to draw general conclusions from the 
market definition in AstraZeneca that could be used as guidance for future antitrust 
investigations in the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
5.1.  The market definition’s lack of general guidance 
The unfortunate lack of general guidance that can be derived from the market 
definition in the AstraZeneca judgment can be highlighted by the definition of a 
hypothetical market in this section. The EU courts’ approach to market definition is 
                                                          
50 Murphy heavily criticises almost every part of the decision in a number of articles. This is however 
not surprising as she was acting legal counsel for AstraZeneca. Frances Murphy and Francesco 
Liberatore, ‘Abuse of regulatory procedures - the AstraZeneca case’ (2009) 30(5) European 
Competition Law Review 223; Murphy (n 43); David W Hull, ‘The application of EU competition law 
in the pharmaceutical sector’ (2011) 2 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 481 argues 
that the dynamic approach to the estimation of competitive constraints of the European 
Commission is likely to create a high level of uncertainty for innovating pharmaceutical companies. 
While a new arguably superior drug enters the market and starts to increase its market share, it will 
be at least difficult to establish in the initial stages whether the legacy drug is going to exert any 
competitive pressure, whether this competitive pressure decreases over time due to delayed 
switching behaviour due to doctor’s inertia, and finally the extent to which the new drug is replacing 
the legacy drug. 
51  AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 47; Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v European 
Commission (n 2) 50. 
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applied to a hypothetical market based on information acquired through a case 
study of antiepileptic drugs. The analysis of this hypothetical scenario shows that 
doctors’ prescribing inertia in relation to side-effects is a key factor to determine a 
realistic market in this case and should therefore be regarded as endogenous. 
 
As mentioned above, the market scenario in AstraZeneca is very specific, as one 
brand drug effectively replaces another brand drug. In economic terms this scenario 
could be described as a vertically differentiated market. In a vertical differentiation 
model products differ in quality and this quality difference causes the consumers to 
prefer one product over the other.52 Under this model, everyone agrees on the 
quality of the product and would normally buy this product. Differences occur only 
because of differences in income, as not everyone can afford the product.53 In the 
case of AstraZeneca, the introduction of Losec constituted a new innovative step in 
the anti-ulcer treatment, superseding H2 blockers as the preferred treatment 
because of its therapeutic superiority. If the distribution of income is narrow 
enough, only one undertaking will operate in the market, as everyone buys the 
product of superior quality, which ultimately leads to a monopoly.54 In this case, the 
switching behaviour of prescribing doctors can be regarded as exogenous.  
However, it is questionable whether the approach to regard doctors’ 
prescribing inertia as exogenous to market definition is transferrable to other 
scenarios in the pharmaceutical sector. This could especially be the case, in a 
horizontally differentiated market in which generic companies are involved in a 
scenario which has led to an antitrust investigation. In contrast to a vertical 
differentiation model, a horizontal differentiation model describes a market in 
which consumers differ in their preferences over varieties of the same product.55 A 
simple example illustrating horizontal differentiation is the cement market, in which 
a number of companies offer cement in different geographical locations. Customers 
                                                          
52 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The economics of EC competition law: Concepts, application and 
measurement (3rd edn,  Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010). 3-035 
53 Massimo Motta, Competition policy: Theory and practice (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004) 77. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
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would choose the company to buy the cement from not on the basis of product but 
merely on the convenience of their location.56 When translating this example into 
the pharmaceutical sector, one should consider a market in which several drugs can 
treat the same medical condition, with generic drugs being the ultimate example 
for a horizontally differentiated product because they have to, by law, be 
bioequivalent to the brand version of the drug. Vertical differentiation in terms of 
quality should not be an issue in this case.   
This section therefore uses two scenarios to illustrate a hypothetical market 
definition of a horizontally differentiated market in the pharmaceutical sector – (1) 
a scenario in which a generic company enters the market prior to patent expiry of 
the brand drug with the permission of the brand company, followed by subsequent 
generic entry after patent expiry and (2) a scenario in which the brand company is 
paying off the generic company for not entering the market. The hypothetical 
analysis has two stages. First it defines the market based on the assumption that 
doctors’ prescribing behaviour is exogenous. However, following this stage it is not 
possible to explain the significant first-mover advantage that the first generic 
entrant has over subsequent entrants. The second stage therefore endogenises 
doctors’ prescribing behaviour. The analysis of a hypothetical horizontally 
differentiated market in which the prescribing behaviour is taken into consideration 
provides a market definition that is more realistic and precise. Additionally, the 
analysis leads to a smaller market with potentially higher market shares of the 
market players.  
 
5.1.1. The early generic entry scenario 
Imagine a scenario in which three different brand companies produce three 
different brand drugs (A, B and C). All treat the same medical condition, using 
slightly different modes of action but achieving equivalent efficiencies (Fig. 1). So 
far no generic versions of any of these brand drugs exist on the market. This 
changes when one generic company (GA) agrees with the first brand company 
                                                          
56 Bishop and Walker (n 52) 3-034. 
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producing A to enter the market before the patents that cover A expire at time (t), 
thus being the only generic drug on the market in this therapeutic area and the only 
generic version of drug (A). After the expiry of the patents which protect drug A, a 
second generic company with a generic version of brand drug (A) enters the market 
at time (t+1). At a later point in time (t+2) which is not related to the patent expiry 
of drug A but rather the expiry of the patent protection of drug B, a company with a 
generic version of brand drug (B) enters the market.  
In the following, this scenario is developed step by step, discussing the 
anticipated diversion of sales from the horizontally differentiated brand drugs (A, B 
and C) to the generic drugs and the change of these diversions after each generic 
entry. It is assumed that the subsequent generic entrant GA2 and GB enter the 
market respectively at a price which is 10 per cent below the previous entrant. It is 
further assumed that decision makers in this scenario, the prescribing doctor and 
the dispensing pharmacists are acting as “reasonable” agents. Any type of inertia is 
explicitly excluded. The only regulatory constraint that is taken into consideration at 
this stage is the regulations regarding the mandatory or indicative generic 
substitution by pharmacists.  
 
In contrast to the situation in AstraZeneca, the market in question is not vertically 
differentiated, but rather horizontally differentiated. Neither of the brand drugs can 
be characterised as “new” drug or as “legacy” drugs. None of the drugs have the 
therapeutic superiority which would enable it to replace the other drugs. Assuming 
similar modes of action and equivalent efficiency, all three drugs should be 
regarded as functionally interchangeable, thus putting them in the same relevant 
market. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1:  Initial market of 3 horizontally differentiated drugs 
A B C 
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The fundamental question is whether this scenario changes once generic 
companies enter the market. As noted above, generic versions of brand drugs are 
regarded as closest substitutes to the brand version because of the bioequivalence 
requirement. Hence, they are part of the same product market as the brand 
versions. It should therefore also be assumed that generic drugs exert competitive 
pressure not only on the brand drugs in the market but also on the other generic 
drugs. Due to their bioequivalence, one would also expect similar market share 
ratios for the generic drugs. 
In this scenario, generic company GA1 is entering the market following the 
conclusion of a so-called early entry agreement with brand company A. Thus GA1 
can enter the market prior to the expiry of the patents which protect brand drug A 
from generic competition at time (t). Being the first entrant and the closest 
substitute to brand drug A, GA1 is likely to exert significant competitive pressure by 
diverting a significant percentage of sales from A to GA1. The sales diversion (d) 
from A to GA1 is increased by the generic substitution laws that are likely to be in 
place.  Even if the prescribing doctor is not switching his patients from A to GA1, in 
most European Member States the dispensing pharmacist is likely to make this 
switch. In certain Member States, the pharmacist is obliged to substitute a brand 
drug with a generic version once available (mandatory substitution), in other 
Member States such a substitution is the decision of the doctor and/or the 
pharmacist (indicative substitution) and in a few Member Sates such automatic 
substitution is not permitted at all.57 Thus the level of competitive pressure should 
differ from Member State to Member State depending on the regulatory system in 
place. 
The degree of diversion of sales (d) from B and C after the entry of GA1 is 
likely to be smaller than the diversion from A to GA1, as illustrated by the narrower 
arrows below (Fig. 2). These differences are caused by the generic drug substitution 
regulation. Pharmacists are not allowed, under any of aforementioned substitution 
systems, to switch patients from B and C to GA1. This decision can only be made by 
                                                          
57 Sabine Vogler, PPRI report: pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement information (Gesundheit 
Österreich GmbH Geschäftsbereich ÖBIG, Vienna 2008) 106. 
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the prescribing doctor who has to specifically prescribe GA1. So despite brand drugs 
B, C and generic GA1 being therapeutically interchangeable in theory, the actual 
substitution depends on the doctor’s prescription behaviour. However, assuming a 
“reasonably acting doctor”, one should expect significant diversions of sales from B 
and C to GA1 due to the therapeutic substitutability, on the one hand, and the 
significant price differentials, on the other, which lead to significant cost savings.58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the entry of GA2 at the time of the expiry of the patents protecting brand drug 
A (t+1), the diversion of sales (d) would be expected to shift (Fig.3). The most 
significant diversions should again be experienced between A-GA2 and GA1-GA2. 
This effect is again owed to the generic substitution regulation in place. In these 
two cases, the dispensing pharmacist might be obliged or encouraged because of 
the generic substitution regulation to switch the patient from A to GA2 or from GA1 
to GA2 due to the decreased price of GA2. The differentiated nature of the market 
is likely to result in a higher degree of diversion of sales from GA1 to GA2 than from 
A to GA2. This is due to the fact that patients who have already been switched once 
                                                          
58 The potential competitive pressure of GA1 on B and C does not translate into reversed 
competitive pressure by B and C on GA1, largely because of the price differentials of brand drugs 
and generic drugs. However, such asymmetric competitive pressure has been acknowledged by the 
General Court in its AstraZeneca judgment. 
GA2 (at t+1) 
A B C 
GB (at t+2) GA1 
t d 
d 
d 
Fig. 2: Diversion of sales after “early entry” of GA1 
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from A to GA1 are less likely to have any form of brand loyalty towards the brand 
and thus should not be opposed to a second switch. Nonetheless, substantial sales 
should also be diverted from A to GA2 due to the increased price differentials. The 
diversion from B and C to GA2 should be similar or slightly increased compared to 
the previous stage regarding GA1, as the scenario has not changed much; doctors 
would still have to explicitly prescribe GA2 instead of B or C. Thus, the constraint in 
this scenario is the differentiated nature of the product as well as the lack of the 
increased diversion based on the regulatory framework for generic substitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the final stage of this scenario(Fig. 4), the diversions of sales (d) shift again with 
the entry of GB at the time of patent expiry for brand drug B (t+2). This time, the 
highest degree of diversion is likely to occur between B and GB. Again the generic 
substitution regulation has a major impact on the diversion of sales from B to GB, as 
dispensing pharmacist can or must to also switch their customers to the cheaper 
generic drug. The degree of diversion from C to GB should generally be similar to 
the previous stage. Yet, the big diversion from GA1 to GA2 in the previous stage 
does not reoccur in this stage. Despite the fact that the patients regarding the GA1-
GA2 switch seem to be eager to switch, which indicates either a certain degree of 
price sensitivity or is evidence of a stricter regulatory system based on mandatory 
d 
d 
d 
GA2 (at t+1) 
A B C 
GB (at t+2) GA1 
 
d 
Fig. 3: Diversion of sales after second generic entry at a 10 per cent discounted price (keeping prices for A, B, 
C and GA1 constant) 
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generic substitution, the diversion of sales from GA1 and GA2 to GB are likely to be 
significantly lower.  
However, because of these price differentials, the important question is 
whether subsequent generic entrants (GA2 and GB) are able to exert competitive 
pressure on brand drugs (A, B and C)as well as on the existing generic drug GA1. 
The pharmacist cannot switch customers to GB on his own accord, despite being 
therapeutic substitutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, one should expect the diversion of sales from brand drugs to generic 
drugs once the first generic company enters the market and, as time progresses, 
the diversion of sales from brand drugs and generic drugs to subsequent generic 
entrants. The only constraint that could impair the degree of diversions from brand 
drugs to generic drugs, as well as from generic drugs to other generic drugs should 
be the drug substitution regulations in place in the relevant Member States. In 
particular, the first generic entrant should experience diversions of sales to a 
subsequent generic entrant with a generic version of the same brand drug. It would 
be only logical for a reasonable doctor or pharmacist to switch patients, who have 
already switched once, to a cheaper generic version of the same drug. There should 
GA2 (at t+1) 
A B C 
GB (at t+2) GA1 
 
d d d 
d 
d 
Fig. 4: Diversion of sales after third generic entry at a 10 per cent discounted price (keeping the prices for A, 
B, C, GA1, and GA2 constant) 
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not be a significant first mover advantage for the early entering generic company 
with a corresponding positive effect on market shares compared to subsequent 
entrants, or at least it should not prevail.  
 
Consequently, this hypothetical scenario would lead to the definition of a large 
market with a number of market players that only have a small market share. Every 
new entrant exerts competitive pressure on the other market players. The level of 
pressure is only restricted by relevant drug substitution regulations. In such a 
market, it would therefore be less likely for brand company A to be found dominant.  
The next section, however, shows that the discussed scenario is unrealistic. In fact, 
a generic first-mover advantage does exist and it is likely to be caused by the 
switching inertia of prescribing doctors and dispensing pharmacists.  
 
5.1.1.1.  First-mover advantage based on prescribing inertia  
The notion discussed above, that a potential first-mover advantage of the early 
generic entrant would not prevail due to the competitive pressure that the other 
market players exert is contradicted by empirical evidence. This empirical evidence 
indeed shows that a first-mover advantage does exist and, in addition, can also 
have a significant positive impact on the market share of the early entrant as well 
as a negative impact on the market shares of subsequent entrants.59 The evidence 
further suggests that the market share of the first generic entrant might not be 
affected as significantly by subsequent generic entry as one would expect.60 While 
the market share of the first generic entrant remains constant or decreases just 
slightly, following subsequent generic entry, the market share of the second generic 
                                                          
59 Richard E Caves, Michael D Whinston and Mark A Hurwitz, ‘Patent expiration, entry, and 
competition in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry’ (1991) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 
(panel data of brand and generic prices, market shares and quantities sold for 30 drugs that lost 
patent protection during 1976 and 1987); Henry G Grabowski and John M Vernon, ‘Brand loyalty, 
entry and price competition in pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act’ (1992) 35 Journal of Law 
and Economics 331 (using panel data for 18 drugs that were first exposed to generic competition 
during 1983-1987); Aidan Hollis, ‘The importance of being first: evidence from Canadian generic 
pharmaceuticals’ (2002) 11 Health Economics 723. (using panel data for 31 drugs between 1995-
1999 that were faced with generic competition between1994-1997, sold in 9 Canadian provinces)  
60 Hollis (n 59) 729. 
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entrant is not only considerably smaller at the time of entry but also stays at almost 
the same level over the course of the proceeding three years.61 
This first-mover advantage could be explained by the prescribing inertia. 
Prescribing doctors as well as dispensing pharmacists show a considerable inertia to 
switch a patient from a brand drug to a generic version or, alternatively, from one 
generic version to another slightly cheaper one.  
There are several possible explanations for this inertia to switch patients to 
a newly marketed generic version of a brand drug. Prescribing doctors may wish to 
avoid confusing elderly patients who have taken a certain drug for a long time by 
prescribing then new drugs that may be of a different colour or shape drugs or even 
drugs in a different dosage form.62 They might fear that their patients do not fit the 
criteria of the group of patients which were used in the bioequivalence tests and, 
thus, will question the new drug’s effectiveness and safety for their patients.63 
Dispensing pharmacists have stated during interview studies that they sometimes 
tend not to switch patients from brand drugs to generic drugs even though they 
would be able to, out of tiredness having to educate suspicious and mistrusting 
patients about the bioequivalence of generic drugs compared to their brand 
counterparts. 64  However, such inertia can also be caused by serious doubt 
regarding the bioequivalence of a generic drug in relation to its brand counterpart, 
questioning the effectiveness and suitability of generic drugs as opposed to the 
brand version and the increased probability of adverse effects and life changing 
consequences for their patients.  
This problem can be highlighted by a case study regarding the drug treatment for 
epilepsy.  Epilepsy is a chronic neurological disorder that causes seizures. The aim of 
                                                          
61 Ibid. 
62 Peter Meredith, ‘Bioequivalence and Other Unresolved Issues in Generic Drug Substitution’ (2003) 
25 Clinical Therapeutics 2885.  
63 Ibid. 2879. 
64 Liz Gill and others, ‘How do customers and pharmacists experience generic substitution?’ (2010) 4 
International Journal of Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Marketing 375, 386. (interview study 
conducted in Australia, Italy and Finland, using unstructured interviews to explore subjective 
experience of 15 pharmacists and 30 customers in relation to generic substitution. The interviewees 
provided similar responses across the three different countries.) 
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the drug treatment is not to cure the disorder but to control the seizures.65 If such 
seizures are uncontrolled, they are likely to have serious adverse effects on the 
patient’s quality of life. Seizures can lead to loss of work time, an increase in doctor 
and hospital visits and possibility of severe motor vehicle accidents if they occur 
during travel.66 To achieve optimal seizure control many patients require careful 
‘fine-tuning’ of their medication.67 Once this optimisation of the drug treatment is 
achieved, one should be able to assume that the same dose of a bioequivalent 
generic drug will have the same effect. 
Yet, a number of treatment studies have shown that initially controlled 
patients experienced breakthrough seizures after being switched from the brand 
drug to a generic version or from one generic drug to another. Following a survey in 
which 150 neurologists participated, 30 per cent of the neurologist reported a case 
in which a patient had experienced a breakthrough seizure after being switched to 
a generic substitute of the brand anti-epileptic drug (AED).68 According to the study, 
almost all patients (92 per cent)69 were switched back to the brand AED after 
suffering the breakthrough seizure and 96 per cent of patients were able to regain 
seizure control after the switch-back.70 In a separate survey 196 out of 301 
neurologists reported breakthrough seizures after having patients switched to 
generic AED and 163 neurologists reported increased side-effects after the switch.71 
A further study provides evidence that patients who were admitted to hospital or 
treated in an emergency room following a seizure had 81 per cent greater odds of 
having experienced a switch from a brand AED to a generic AED within the previous 
                                                          
65 Meir Bialer, ‘Generic Products of Antiepileptic Drugs (AEDs): Is It an Issue?’ (2007) 48 Epilepsia 
1825. 
66 M. J Berg and others, ‘Generic substitution in the treatment of epilepsy: patient and physician 
perceptions’ (2008) 13 Epilepsy & Behaviour 689; Bialer (n 65) 1830. 
67  B. E Gidal, ‘Generic antiepileptic drugs: how good is close enough?’ (2012) 12 Epilepsy 
Currents/American Epilepsy Society 32. 
68 M. J Berg and others, ‘Generic substitution in the treatment of epilepsy: Case evidence of 
breakthrough seizures’ (2008) 71 Neurology 525. 
69 The few patients that have not been switched back had reportedly difficulties with their insurance 
companies and could not switch back due to cost reasons or increased the dosage of the generic 
AED. 
70 M. J Berg and others (n 68) 526. 
71 Andrew N Wilner, ‘Therapeutic equivalency of generic antiepileptic drugs: results of a survey’ 
(2004) 5 Epilepsy & Behavior 995. 
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6 months.72 A study also links the switch to a generic AED with an increase in daily 
dosage and a higher rate of utilisation of medical services such as doctor visits and 
hospitalisation.73 
Such severe negative consequences following the switch to a generic version 
of a brand drug should of course not be generalised. Not all medical conditions are 
chronic and not every switch from a brand drug to a generic drug will lead to such 
adverse effects. But the case study of AEDs highlights the fact, that despite being 
bioequivalent, generic drugs might not have the identical attributes in terms of 
efficacy that the brand drug possesses and, therefore, might not be regarded as 
substitutes in terms of market definition. This is an issue that is not only relevant to 
AEDs but also holds true for all drugs. The possible negative consequences become 
evident in AEDs which makes them the ideal case study in which to address the 
general issue regarding bioequivalence and its possible association with the 
prescribing inertia of doctors.  
Bioequivalence ensures that the generic drug is identical to the brand drug 
in terms of dosage form, strength, route of administration, quality and intended 
use.74 Testing bioequivalence generally involves the measurement of area under 
the plasma concentration time curve (AUC) and the maximum plasma 
concentration (Cmax). AUC describes the drug absorption in a given time, whereas 
Cmax describes the maximum plasma concentration, meaning the maximum 
concentration the drug achieves in the tested area after the drug has been 
administered.75 During the statistical analysis of bioequivalence the generic drug 
does not have to match the brand drug results to 100 per cent. The generic drug is 
regarded as bioequivalent if its AUC level is 90 per cent in relation to the brand drug 
and if its Cmax is in the acceptable range of 80 to 125 per cent. These facts can 
                                                          
72 W. M. Zachry and others, ‘Case-control analysis of ambulance, emergency room, or inpatient 
hospital events for epilepsy and antiepileptic drug formulation changes’ (2009) 50 Epilepsia 493. 
73 J. LeLorier and others, ‘Clinical consequences of generic substitution of lamotrigine for patients 
with epilepsy’ (2008) 70 Neurology 2179. 
74  European Medicines Agency, Guideline on the investigation of bioequivalence 
(CPMP/EWP/QWP/1401/98 Rev. 1 2008) 3. 
75  Jeff Evans, ‘Generic and Brand-Name AEDs Bioequivalent’ (2010) Internal Medicine News 
<http://imn.gcnpublishing.com/fileadmin/content_pdf/imn/archive_pdf/vol43iss10/70514_main.pd
f>. 
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make it necessary to differentiate bioequivalence into “drug prescribability” and 
“drug switchability”.76 Drug prescribability refers to the scenario in which the 
doctor decides to prescribe a new patient a drug for the first time, choosing either a 
brand drug or a generic version of the drug. Drug switchability refers to a scenario 
in which a patient is switched from the brand drug to a generic drug, or from one 
generic to another. 77  The potential difference between prescribability and 
switchability can be illustrated using a simple theoretical example. In the 
prescribability scenario a doctor chooses between a brand drug (A) and the generic 
version (GA). Having established that GA is bioequivalent to A and that all the 
necessary requirements have been fulfilled by relying on clinical test and 
documentation regarding the safety and efficacy of drug A, the prescribing doctor is 
aware that the GA’s quality, safety and efficacy is within the above mentioned AUC 
and Cmax parameters – parameters which were chosen by the agencies to ensure a 
maximum bioequivalence between brand drugs and their generic counterparts. In 
the second scenario regarding the switchability, the case might be different. In this 
scenario the doctor can choose from brand drug (A) and two generic versions of A: 
(GA1) and (GA2). A has been the reference drug for both generic drugs regarding 
the bioequivalence. However, this fact does not necessarily provide information 
regarding the relationship between GA1 and GA2, which is illustrated below (Fig. 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 Dieter Hauschke and Volker W Steinijans, ‘The U.S. draft guidance regarding population and 
individual bioequivalence approaches: comments by a research-based pharmaceutical company’ 
(2000) 19 Statistics in Medicine 2769. 
77 Bialer (n 65) 1827. 
A 
GA1 GA2 /
Fig. 5: Bioequivalence of drugs in relation to each other 
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GA1 and GA2 only have to be bioequivalent in relation to A. However, as has been 
described previously, a certain amount of acceptable variance is built in the 
statistical analysis of bioequivalence, i.e. the maximum plasma concentration of the 
generic drug can vary from 80 to 125 per cent in relation to the brand drug. In 
relation to each other, GA1 and GA2 could therefore show a possible variance of 45 
per cent, despite being bioequivalent in relation to A. Although it has been noted 
that the variance in practice should not normally occur and should not differ by 
more than 5 to 7 per cent,78 a recent study has shown that variances between 
generics with regard to relevant parameters can be greater than 15 per cent in a 
number of cases and, in some cases, even greater than 25 per cent.79 The study 
ultimately advocates for caution when switching from one generic to another as the 
variance is potentially higher than following the switch from a brand drug to a 
generic version. 80  Despite the likely limitations of these studies and the 
comparatively small number of cases in which the experience of breakthrough 
seizures following a drug switch could be associated with the increased 
pharmacological variance between the drugs, this evidence and the discussion of 
the likelihood of adverse effects following the generic switch of AEDs has had a 
significant impact on doctors’ prescribing behaviour. 88 per cent of doctors that 
participated in a survey study were concerned about an increase in such seizures in 
patients who are switched from a brand AED to a generic AED, or who are switched 
consistently from one generic AED to another.81 55 per cent of the doctors also 
were “very” or “extremely concerned” about the level of seizure control after the 
switch.82 
 
                                                          
78 Emilio Perucca and others, ‘Recommendations of the Italian League Against Epilepsy Working 
Group on Generic Products of Antiepileptic Drugs’ (2006) 47 Epilepsia 17. 
79 Gregory L Krauss and others, ‘Assessing bioequivalence of generic antiepilepsy drugs’ (2011) 70 
Annals of Neurology 221. 
80 Ibid. 224, 225. 
81 M. J Berg and others (n 68) 697.  
82 Ibid.  
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5.1.1.2.  Impact of doctors’ inertia on the early entry scenario 
Based on the discussion above, doctors’ inertia can have a significant impact on the 
diversion of sales from brand drugs to generic drugs. The assumption that patients 
who were willing to switch in the past will switch again does not necessarily hold 
true. As shown above using the example of AEDs, generic-to-generic switches might 
cause adverse effects for the patient who has already been treated with a brand 
drug and who has been switched to a generic drug. Switches from a brand drug to a 
generic version of a different brand drug are also unlikely to occur despite the fact 
that both brand drugs are horizontally differentiated and could be used equally to 
treat the same medical condition.  The difference between the above outlined 
base-line scenario and the scenario including the effect of doctors’ inertia is 
illustrated below (Fig. 6). Patients who were treated with brand drug (A) prior to 
the market entry of GA1 are likely to switch to GA1. Here, the difference compared 
to the previous scenario is that these patients are not likely to switch from GA1 to 
GA2 because of the discussed discrepancies regarding the bioequivalence between 
generic drugs and the associated lack of drug switchability. The same holds true for 
the diversion of sales from the brand drug B2 to the generic version GB1. Any 
diversion of sales between GA1 and GA2 to GB1 is not to be expected. The 
relatively small diversion of sales from A to GA2 follows from the size of the market 
for which GA2 is competing. The market for patients that are willing to switch to a 
generic drug should be smaller compared to the market for which the first entrant 
GA1 has competed initially.  
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Due to the distinction between drug prescribability and drug switchability and the 
respective prescribing behaviour of doctors in relation to “new” and previously 
treated “old” patients, it is necessary to have a more detailed look at this 
horizontally differentiated market and its mechanisms to understand the actual 
diversions of sales. The following analysis does not only hold true for the specific 
market for anti-epileptic drugs but can also be generalised, at least with regards to 
chronic or other long-term illnesses. (Fig. 7) 
Both groups comprise the market for AEDs, but the ratio is unbalanced. 
“Old” patients should represent the biggest share of the market. This is due to the 
fact that a number of patients that have already been treated with the brand drug 
accumulated over the years in which no generic version of the brand drug was 
available at all. The smaller share of the market is represented by “new” patients 
who were recently diagnosed with epilepsy and need to choose their form of 
treatment now. 
At the point of initial generic entry (GA1), the “old” patients can choose to 
switch to GA1 and the “new” patients can choose the brand drug (A) or GA1. Once 
the patients have made the choice to switch to GA1 or to use GA1 as their initial 
treatment, they are almost “locked in” and are no longer part of the market for 
which future generic entrants will be able to compete for. The analysis of the 
studies above has shown that patients who have switched once either stay with 
d 
d d 
GA2 (at t+1) GB (at t+2) GA1 
t 
A B C 
Fig. 6: Change in diversion of sales after considering doctors’ prescribing inertia  
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their generic choice or switch back to the brand drug in case they experience 
breakthrough seizures following the switch. Those patients who switch back to the 
brand (Ar) will not switch again and are therefore also no longer part of the market 
for subsequent generic entrants. The second generic entrant GA2 can therefore 
only compete for the remaining “old” patients who have not yet switched to GA1 
and the newly diagnosed “new” patients. That said, GA2 does not necessarily only 
face competition from G1 but also from generic versions of other brand drugs (like 
GB1) that are deemed to be suitable for the initial treatment of “new” patients.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This analysis shows that the prescribing behaviour of doctors and the associated 
prescribing inertia can have a significant impact on the substitutability of drugs on a 
horizontally differentiated market. Whereas all drugs in the market are 
substitutable in the baseline model, the situation is far different once prescribing 
inertia is introduced. This is especially the case, when one generic company enters 
early. Before drawing general conclusions from this hypothetical definition of the 
                                                          
83“[The German ad hoc commission of the German Chapter of the International League Against 
Epilepsy] stated that generic products of gabapentin and lamotrigine can be used without problems 
for initial treatment of epileptic patients.” Bialer (n 65) 1825. 
New patients 
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Fig. 7: Diagram highlighting contestable market for subsequent generic entrants (GA2 and GB2) 
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relevant market, the next sections examines whether the situation changes when 
the generic company agrees to not enter the market.  
 
5.1.2. Pay for delay scenario 
In this scenario, the same brand drugs (A,B and C) as in the early generic entry 
scenario are present in the market. They are still horizontally differentiated and can 
generally be used equally to treat the same medical condition. This time, however, 
instead of brand drug A agreeing to the early generic entry of GA prior to patent 
expiry, A is paying GA a lump sum of money and in return GA is agreeing  to not 
enter the market until the patent which covers A  expires. To simplify the scenario, 
only one generic entrant per brand drug exists. 
Using the same baseline scenario as in the early generic entry case above, 
one would not expect patients who have been prescribed drug A to switch unless a 
bioequivalent and less costly alternative to drug A is available. Due to the pay for 
delay agreement between A and GA, the latter will not enter the market until the 
patent which covers A expires. However, the patients who have been prescribed A 
should be able to switch to GB, the generic version of brand drug B, once it enters 
the market. This should be possible due to the fact that GB is bioequivalent to B, 
which is again part of a horizontally differentiated market of drugs (A,B and C)  that 
can all be used to treat the same medical condition. In this baseline scenario, the 
relevant market should thus be comprised of the brand drugs (A,B and C) and the 
generic versions of these brand drugs. 
However, as in the early generic entry scenario above, the baseline scenario 
does not take the prescribing behaviour of doctors and any associated inertia into 
consideration, following the market definition in AstraZeneca. As has been shown 
for the early generic entry scenario, taking the prescribing behaviour of doctors into 
consideration in the case of a horizontally differentiated market changes the 
picture completely. In certain cases, the prescribing behaviour is not driven by the 
doctor’s preferences of one drug over the other but, rather, it is driven by the 
doubt of the doctor regarding the actual effectiveness and suitability of the brand 
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drug or generic drug for their patients and the medical condition which needs to be 
treated.  
Once more taking the market for antiepileptic drugs as an example and 
applying the pay for delay scenario to this market, we again see a totally different 
picture compared to the baseline scenario in which the prescribing behaviour has 
been excluded (Fig. 8). The market is again divided into “new” patients who have 
not yet been treated for epilepsy and the majority of “old” patients who have been 
treated for epilepsy for a number of years. “New” patients can be treated with any 
of the brand drugs or with any of the generic drugs because of the “drug 
prescribabilitiy” of all drugs on the market. Already treated “old” patients, however, 
should only switch to the generic version of the brand drug that they have been 
prescribed over the years, as the generic version of other brand molecules might 
lack “drug switchability”.  
Following the structure of this horizontally differentiated market which 
emerged out of the prescribing behaviour of doctors in reaction to the 
pharmacological differences between brand drugs and their generic versions and 
between generic drugs themselves, a pay for delay settlement between a brand 
company and a generic company can have a significant impact on the market 
structure itself and available substitutes for the two groups of patients. With no 
generic version available for patients who have been treated with brand drug A for 
a number of years, these patients have no viable alternative to brand drug A. Even 
if a generic version to brand drug B enters the market, these patients will not be 
able to switch because of the lack of “drug switchability”. They are effectively 
locked-in to brand drug A. The “new” patients, who have not yet been treated, can 
be prescribed brand drugs A or B, as well as generic version GB once it enters the 
market (tGB). A pay for delay settlement between brand company A and generic 
company GA will thus have less of an impact on the drug choice of “new” patients. 
Compared to “old” patients, “new” patients at least have the opportunity to be 
prescribed a generic drug.  
Yet what needs to be kept in mind is the imbalance of the market share 
between the two groups of patients. Due to the long-standing market presence of 
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brand drugs A and B, all patients with epilepsy had been prescribed one of these 
drugs until generic version GB entered the market. No patient that has been 
prescribed brand drug A will switch to GB. Over the years, the share of patients who 
are “locked in” has accumulated substantially. The only part of the market that is 
not captured by the pay for delay settlement between A and GA is the smaller share 
of newly diagnosed patients who will be treated for epilepsy for the first time. The 
share of this part of the market is likely to be significantly smaller than the share of 
treated patients which has been accumulated over several years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Conclusion 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the application of the market 
definition in the AstraZeneca case to the hypothetical scenarios in a horizontally 
differentiated market. First and foremost it has to be mentioned that the actual 
market definition in the AstraZeneca judgment should only be used to provide 
limited guidance for future investigations. This is unfortunate, as it is the first and 
to-date only published market definition in the field of European pharmaceutical 
antitrust. In particular, the European Commission’s finding that doctors’ prescribing 
inertia should be regarded as exogenous should not be generalised. Although this 
finding has enabled the Commission to define the relevant market rather narrowly 
“New” 
patients 
“Old” patients 
BtGB AtGB 
GA  
A B 
GB  
Fig. 8: Diagram highlighting the contestable market for generic entrant GB 
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and subsequently find AstraZeneca dominant, the finding should not be applied to 
horizontally differentiated markets such as the one in the hypothetical analysis. As 
has been shown in the analysis of the two scenarios, doctors’ prescribing inertia 
based on the uncertainty of a drug’s effectiveness and potential side-effects can be 
a key factor for the appropriate definition of the relevant market. The failure to 
endogenise doctors’ inertia could lead to artificial market being defined, which 
potentially increases the likelihood of Type I or Type II errors depending on market 
characteristics. The failure to endogenise inertia in vertically differentiated markets 
as in AstraZeneca can lead to markets being defined too narrowly and thus to over-
enforcement and Type I errors. Whereas additionally, in horizontally differentiated 
markets - like the one in the hypothetical scenario - the failure to endogenise leads 
to the definition of overly broad markets and therefore to under-enforcement and 
potential Type II errors. 
 
6. The General Court’s finding regarding the first abuse 
Having discussed the General Court’s findings in relation to AstraZeneca’s appeal of 
the European Commission’s market definition and having extended the analysis of 
the Court’s key finding to a hypothetical market for antiepileptic drugs, this section 
addresses AstraZeneca’s plea in its appeal with regard to the first abuse. The 
section starts by addressing the General Court’s finding of abuse and, following a 
detailed comparative legal analysis of US Walker Process Doctrine and the General 
Court’s approach. This analysis shows that it was correct to dismiss AstraZeneca’s 
plea that the European Commission finding of an abuse in relation to the 
submission of misleading information to a patent office was overly restrictive 
compared to the US Walker Process Doctrine. In doing so, the analysis goes beyond 
the actual discussion of the abuse. However, in contrast to the previous section that 
highlights the lack of guidance that can be drawn from the AstraZeneca judgment 
with regards to market definition, this section uses the AstraZeneca judgment and 
the process leading up to it as a case study to showcase more generally the need 
for careful comparative legal analysis in the field of pharmaceutical antitrust. This 
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result has important implications for the analysis of European pay for delay 
settlements in the subsequent chapter. 
 
In its judgment the General Court has found that it amounts to an abuse to 
submit 
 
 ‘to the public authorities misleading information liable to lead them into error and 
therefore to make possible the grant of an exclusive right to which an undertaking is 
not entitled, or to which it is entitled for a shorter period’.84  
 
For this finding the Court relied upon the longstanding definition of exclusionary 
abuse stemming from the Court of Justice’s judgment in Hoffmann-la Roche v 
Commission, defining it as 
 
‘an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a 
dominant position which [influencing] the structure of the market [and] has the 
effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition.’85  
 
The General Court then went on to refer to the  special responsibility of a dominant 
company ‘not to allow its conduct to impair undistorted competition on the 
market’,86 meaning that certain types of conduct that are legitimate for non-
dominant companies might be considered as abusive, in the sense of Art. 102 TFEU, 
for dominant companies. 
Stating that this type of conduct is eliminating a competitor and thereby 
strengthening its position by using methods other than those which come within 
the scope of competition on the merits, 87  the Court further found that 
AstraZeneca’s special responsibility not only disallows the company to provide 
                                                          
84 AstraZeneca v European Commission [2010] (n 2) 355. 
85 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461, 91. 
86 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, 57. 
87 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 354.  
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misleading information to the public authorities but also obliges the dominant 
undertaking to inform the public authority of circumstances that might have led to 
the wrongful granting of an exclusive right even if these circumstances come to the 
attention of the dominant company after the right has been granted.88 
With regard to the degree of misrepresentation the Court decided that the 
misrepresentation does not have to be intentional to constitute an abuse due to 
the objective nature of the abuse.89 In fact, the question, which needs to be 
answered, is whether the public authority has created a regulatory obstacle to 
competition, based on wrong or partial information. Although the concept of abuse 
follows a primarily objective standard, the General Court found that intention and 
bad faith of the submission of misleading formation can nonetheless be considered 
as a relevant factor by the Commission.90  
Furthermore, the Court dismissed AstraZeneca’s argument that its conduct 
in question could not be deemed abusive due to a lack of enforcement of the SPC. 
First of all, intellectual property rights are presumed to be valid. It is assumed that 
such rights, which are granted by a public authority after examination, are lawful 
and have to be respected by competitors. Thus ‘the mere possession of such an 
exclusive right results in keeping competitors away’.91 Secondly, such a requirement 
would limit the application of Art. 102 TFEU. The enforcement of Art. 102 would be 
made conditional. Starting from the presumption of validity, the competitor would 
need to infringe the exclusive right to be able to challenge the alleged anti-
competitiveness. Moreover, the possibility of the public enforcement of such 
conduct would be dependent on private infringement of the right by a 
competitor.92 
 
 
                                                          
88 Ibid. 358. 
89 Ibid. 356 “proof of a deliberate nature of the conduct and of the bad faith of the undertaking in a 
dominant position is not required for the purpose of identifying an abuse of a dominant position.” 
90 Ibid. 359. 
91 Ibid. 362. 
92 Ibid. 362. 
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6.1.  The dismissal of AstraZeneca’s comparative argument – An exemplar of 
careful comparative analysis 
In its judgment, the General Court rejected AstraZeneca’s comparative argument in 
a single paragraph stating that 
‘with respect to the [AstraZeneca’s] arguments based on United States law, 
[it] suffices to note that the position adopted by the latter cannot take precedence 
over that adopted by European Union law’.93 
 
Just as in the case of the discussion of the relevant market definition above, this 
situation begs more general questions.  
 
Were the EU courts right to reject AstraZeneca’s comparative argument? Or should 
the Courts have drawn from the extensive expertise of the US jurisprudence94 with 
regard to the submission of misleading information to the patent office and its 
antitrust treatment? 
 
It is important to derive an answer to these questions and this can be done by way 
of a detailed comparative legal analysis. Although the analysis provides an answer 
to the question of whether the General Court’s approach to AstraZeneca’s conduct 
in front of the patent offices is overly restrictive to the US approach which relies on 
the Walker Process Doctrine, its significance for future investigations lies in the 
process of the comparative legal analysis itself. The analysis shows that one should 
refrain from prematurely applying concepts and rationales that have been 
developed in other jurisdictions, even - or rather especially - if the investigated 
                                                          
93 Ibid. 138; Interestingly, the ECJ has made no reference to US case law in its findings despite 
AstraZeneca’s appeal putting forward the same line of argument as in front of the General Court. 
AstraZeneca v European Commission [2012] (n 2). 
94 Over the last 45 years an extensive body of case law and expertise has been developed by lower 
US courts. See Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp. 828 F.2d 1572 (C.A.Fed.1987); Cygnus 
Therapeutics Systems v. ALZA Corp. 92 F.3d 1153 (C.A.Fed.1996).; Nobelpharma AB v. Implant 
Innovations, Inc. 141 F.3d 1059 (C.A.Fed.1998); Unitherm Food Sys. Inc. v Swift-Eckrich, Inc. 375 F.3d 
1341 (C.A.Fed.2004); Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP 474 F.3d 1344 (C.A.Fed.2007); Dippin' Dots, Inc. 
v. Mosey 476 F.3d 1337 (CA. Fed 2007); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co. Inc. 654 F.Supp. 915 
(N.D.Ill.1987); Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. 508 U.S. 49 
(1993). 
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conduct is similar. In this respect, the following analysis can be seen as a 
cornerstone for the analyses in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
 
Following the detailed analysis of the Walker Process Doctrine, it will be shown in 
two stages that (1) the AstraZeneca judgment is not comparable with this doctrine 
due to the underlying principles of antitrust policy in the context of private patent 
litigation in US antitrust enforcement, and (2) that the public antitrust enforcement 
policy of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as the more comparable US 
enforcement policy, would (in a hypothetical scenario) be likely to come to a similar 
conclusion to the EU courts’ findings, if it would have investigated AstraZeneca’s 
conduct in Europe. 
For the purposes of this analysis, section 6.1.1 provides a detailed 
explanation of the Walker Process Doctrine and its necessary requirements, before 
section 6.1.2 shows that the US doctrine and the General Court’s judgment should 
not be compared. Section 6.1.3 then identifies the FTC’s public antitrust 
enforcement policy as the appropriate policy for comparison, followed by a detailed 
examination of the prerequisites for the launch of an antitrust investigation into the 
type of conduct concerned in AstraZeneca. Section 6.1.4 undertakes a hypothetical 
application of the facts of AstraZeneca to the prerequisites for an FTC investigation. 
Based on the finding of this analysis, section 6.1.5 concludes by advocating for 
greater caution when undertaking comparative legal analyses in the field of 
antitrust, as similar conduct on both sides of the Atlantic does not necessarily have 
similar anticompetitive potential.  
 
6.1.1. The Walker Process Doctrine in the US jurisprudence 
The Walker Process Doctrine which has been developed by the US Supreme Court,95 
enables the defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit to counter-attack the 
plaintiff using the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held that a patent 
infringement lawsuit, since it is based on a patent obtained by ‘fraud’, could give 
                                                          
95 Walker Process Equipment (n 43). 
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rise to an antitrust infringement lawsuit of the patent infringement defendant 
against the plaintiff. The Walker Process claim is thus mostly used as an antitrust 
counterclaim in private patent litigation.96 In essence, the Walker Process Doctrine 
deprives the patent owner of its limited exception of section 2 of the Sherman Act97 
because of the fraudulent acquisition of the patent in question. The following 
paragraph provides a theoretical description of the circumstances under which the 
Walker Process Doctrine can be sought by the patent infringement defendant. 
Imagine a patent owner is suing an alleged patent infringer for patent 
infringement. If the defendant in this infringement lawsuit perceives the patent in 
question to be invalid, he might decide to bring a counterclaim arguing that the 
patent owner is constraining competition due to his invalid patent98 and therefore 
might be liable for antitrust infringement. In such a Walker Process counterclaim, 
the patent infringement defendant is arguing that the patent which is held by the 
patent owner is invalid because of its fraudulent acquisition. For such a 
counterclaim to be successful the patent infringement defendant must not only 
show that the patent owner has acquired the patent through fraudulent conduct in 
front of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), but also that the 
patent owner has enforced the patent with exclusionary intent. 
 
 
                                                          
96 The focus in this section will lie on case law, as the academic literature is limited. Herbert J 
Hovenkamp, ‘The Walker Process Doctrine: Infringement Lawsuits as Antitrust Violations’ (2008) 
University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-36; Christopher R. Leslie, ‘Patents of 
Damocles’ (2008) 83 Indiana Law Journal 133. Additionally a number of practitioners have 
contributed to the subject, writing case notes on new judgments referring to the doctrine. Robert A. 
Matthews, Jr, ‘A primer on US antitrust claims against patentees under Walker Process’ (2007) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 657; BD Daniel, ‘Walker Process Proof: The Proper 
Prescription’ (2009) 41 Rutgers Law Journal 105. 
97 As a general rule, private actors are immune from antitrust liability, if they petition the 
government, even if that petitioning has anticompetitive effects. The filing of patent application to 
the US Patent and Trademark Office is regarded as such a petition to the government. However, this 
antitrust immunity is waived if the petition is a sham or if the patent infringement defendant can 
successfully prove the requirements for the Walker Process Doctrine. Herbert Hovenkamp and 
others, IP and antitrust: An analysis of antitrust principles applied to intellectual property law (2nd 
edn, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business; Austin, 2010) §11.2b; This general rule is referred to as the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and is explained in detail infra sec. 6.1.3.1. 
98 A patent gives its owner the right to legally exclude competitors from manufacturing and 
marketing the product which is covered by the patent. Without this right such a practice could 
warrant antitrust scrutiny. 
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Generally speaking, every patent owner can defend his patent by challenging a 
potential infringer in a patent infringement lawsuit. The patent owner is also 
entitled to notify the customers of the alleged infringer about these circumstances. 
As a result of receiving this information, they might cease their business 
relationship with the alleged infringer. This also holds true for monopolists.99 Thus 
the patent owner can legally use his patent to raise barriers to entry in the market. 
He might also use his patent to exclude competitors directly, or even indirectly, by 
threatening the competitor’s customers which could lead to the competitor’s exit – 
a type of conduct which could violate the antitrust laws. The first legal consequence 
of a successfully litigated Walker Process claim is that the patent owner is deprived 
of this kind of immunity from the antitrust laws – the enforcement of a patent with 
exclusionary intent does not normally allow for antitrust scrutiny. However, success 
in the first stage of a Walker Process claim does not necessarily lead to immediate 
antitrust liability for the patent infringement plaintiff. In the next step, the initial 
patent infringement defendant has the burden of proving all prerequisites 
necessary for a section 2 Sherman Act violation. A Walker Process counterclaim 
therefore consists of two parts: (1) the necessity to prove the fraudulent acquisition 
                                                          
99 Hovenkamp (n 96) 1. 
Patent owner 
 
Patent infringement 
defendant 
Patent infringement lawsuit 
(2) 
Antitrust counterclaim (3) 
 Patent infringement 
(allegedly) (1) 
Fig. 9: The Walker Process Doctrine 
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and enforcement of a patent which, if successful, deprives the patent owner of its 
antitrust immunity; and (2) the proof of all elements for an antitrust violation. 
Success in part one is by no means an indicator for success in part two. This is 
highlighted by the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, which stated that ‘the 
fraudulent acquisition of the asserted patent strips the Walker Process defendant 
of its antitrust immunity, but that is the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry’.100 In 
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v Swift-Eckrich, Inc. the Court of Appeals of the Federal 
Circuit found that Unitherm had successfully shown that the patent owner had 
obtained the relevant patent by fraud, but the company failed to prove the 
necessary elements for an antitrust violation and the Court therefore dismissed the 
antitrust counterclaim.101 
The remainder of this section will focus on the specific requirements that 
need to be satisfied for a successful Walker Process claim; namely, (1) patent 
procurement by fraud, (2) the necessity of enforcement, and (3) the separate 
antitrust requirements following section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
 
6.1.1.1. Patent procurement by fraud 
Walker Process fraud is established if it can be shown independently by clear and 
convincing evidence that the misrepresentation or omission in front of the USPTO 
was material102 and that the patent applicant acted with deceptive intent103.104 This 
is the case if a patent would not have been issued by the USPTO “but for” the 
misrepresentation or omission.105 For example,  
 
                                                          
100 Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey (n 94) 1348. 
101 Unitherm Food Sys. Inc. v Swift-Eckrich, Inc. (n 94) 1363. 
102 Following the ‘reasonable examiner test’ there must be a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
examiner would have considered the omitted reference or false information important in deciding 
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 
Inc. 725 F.2d 1350 (C.A.Fed.1984) 1362. 
103 Such intent is warranted where the patent applicant acted grossly negligent, in other words 
where he knew or should have known that the withheld information would be material for 
consideration of the patent application by the USPTO. Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 542 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Del. 2008). 
104 Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey (n 94) 1348. 
105 FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co. Inc. (n 94) 936. 
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“for an omission such as a failure to cite a piece of prior art to support a 
finding of Walker Process fraud, the withholding of the reference must show 
evidence of fraudulent intent. A mere failure to cite a reference to the [US]PTO will 
not suffice.”106  
 
The Walker Process Doctrine should not be confused with the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct. 107  The inequitable conduct defence renders a patent 
unenforceable, even though it might be valid and infringed, if it can be established 
by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the omitted or false information was 
material to the patentability of the invention; (2) the applicant had knowledge of 
the existence and materiality of the information; and (3) the applicant intended to 
deceive the US Patent and Trademark Office.108 Further it was recognised that:  
 
‘questions of “materiality” and “culpability” are often interrelated and 
intertwined, so that a lesser showing of the materiality of the withheld information 
may suffice when an intentional scheme to defraud is established, whereas a 
greater showing of the materiality of withheld information would necessarily create 
an inference that its nondisclosure was “wrongful.”’109  
 
In other words, inequitable conduct could still be established even if a case shows 
hardly any evidence for intent, as long as it provides very convincing evidence for 
materiality and vice versa. However, the use of such a “sliding scale” for the degree 
of evidence for intent and materiality with regard to inequitable conduct was 
eliminated by the Federal Circuit in 2011, narrowing the standard of proof for 
inequitable conduct.110 Although one might argue that heightened standard of 
                                                          
106 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc. (n 94) 1071. 
107 This is a defence in US patent law which if granted renders a patent unenforceable even though it 
might be valid and infringed based on the fact that the patent has been fraudulently acquired from 
the USPTO. 
108 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals US (n 103). 
109 Digital Equipment Corp. v. Diamond 653 F.2d 701 (C.A.Mass. 1981) 716. 
110Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011) “this court now 
tightens the standards for finding both intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has 
been overused to the detriment of the public.”  
  
 II. AstraZeneca – The advent of EU pharmaceutical antitrust 
62 
 
proof for inequitable conduct might risk the conflation of the patent defence with 
the antitrust liability, the relevant standard of proof materiality is still different. 
Whereas the relevant standard of proof for the Walker Process Doctrine is a pure 
“but for” materiality, the standard of proof for inequitable conduct has been 
described as “but for plus”, as the Federal Circuit has recognised an exception in 
cases of ‘affirmative egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably 
false affidavit’.111 As a result, misconduct can be material for inequitable conduct 
purposes but still not give rise to Walker Process liability, ultimately keeping the 
patent defence and the antitrust liability as separate and distinct legal doctrines.112 
This difference can be explained by the different legal remedies which are sought 
by inequitable conduct and a Walker Process claim. Inequitable conduct is a 
defensive remedy which has the aim of rendering a patent unenforceable.113 It is a 
more inclusive concept which can encompass types of conduct that fall short of 
fraud and therefore constitute a lesser offence.114 A Walker Process claim aims to 
find an antitrust violation and ultimately a possible treble damages claim. This 
difference between the thresholds for the finding of inequitable conduct and for a 
Walker Process claim has repeatedly been highlighted by the courts have stated 
that the former is used as a “shield” in patent litigation, whereas the latter is used 
as a “sword”.115 
 
6.1.1.2. Enforcement 
In Walker Process the US Supreme Court concluded that an antitrust counterclaim 
is only viable as long as the patent infringement plaintiff attempts to enforce a 
patent which was obtained by fraud.116 A fraudulently procured patent alone, 
without any effort of enforcement, cannot serve as a foundation of a 
                                                          
111 Ibid. 1292. 
112 Christopher R Leslie, ‘Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct and the Intent to Deceive the Patent Office’ 
(2011) 1 UC Irvine Law Review 324, 344. 
113 Hovenkamp et al (n 96) §2-32. 
114 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc. (n 94) 1069. 
115 Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp. (n 94) 1578. 
116 Walker Process Equipment (n 42) 174. 
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monopolisation case.117 However, filing a lawsuit against the alleged infringer is not 
the minimum level of enforcement. Academics  have discussed whether the simple 
assertion of a patent and the subsequent warning of a potential competitor not to 
enter the market which is covered by the patent could still constitute a form of 
enforcement justifying a Walker Process claim.118 
In 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit extended the minimum 
level of enforcement by ruling that threatening customers of the alleged patent 
infringer with patent litigation fulfils the enforcement requirement.119 The Court 
thus broadened the enforcement requirement significantly and no longer regards 
only direct enforcement against the alleged infringer as sufficient, but also 
enforcement conduct that is directed against third parties that is still likely to have 
the same effect. 
 
6.1.1.3. Antitrust requirements 
Inasmuch as a successful Walker Process claim strips the patent owner of the 
above-mentioned antitrust immunity, the patent infringement defendant must 
prove that the plaintiffs had market power at the time of the conduct in front of the 
USPTO and that this conduct constitutes an act of monopolisation or the attempt to 
monopolise. The finding of a fraudulently obtained patent does not automatically 
constitute such an infringement of the antitrust laws. Establishing monopolisation 
or the attempt to monopolise under section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it 
necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of 
the relevant market for the product involved.120 
The exclusionary conduct is normally based on the filing of an infringement 
lawsuit regarding the fraudulently obtained patent by the patent owner; but it can 
also be based on other conduct, such as the sending of threatening letters to 
customers. Regardless of the type of exclusionary conduct, the behaviour must be 
                                                          
117 Cygnus Therapeutics Systems v. ALZA Corp (n 94) 1161. 
118 Hovenkamp (n 95)10. 
119 Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco supra (n 94)1350. Prior to this judgment the filing of a patent 
infringement lawsuit was necessary. 
120 Walker Process Equipment (n 94) 177. 
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evaluated as of the time it is asserted.121 To establish exclusionary conduct, it has to 
be proven that the conduct is reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or 
prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals. 122  The 
exclusionary force of the conduct must therefore be evaluated for its effect on price 
and output in an accurately defined antitrust market.123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having explained the Walker Process Doctrine, its requirements and its usage as an 
antitrust counterclaim in private patent litigation, and keeping in mind the General 
Court’s finding in relation to AstraZeneca’s abuse of its dominant position by 
providing misleading information to patent offices, the following section turns to 
the discussion of whether the US doctrine and the European approach are in fact 
comparable. 
 
6.1.2. Incomparability of the AstraZeneca judgment and the Walker Process 
Doctrine 
Drawing from the discussion of the General Court’s judgment and the Walker 
Process Doctrine, the European approach and the US approach seem to be 
contradictory in several aspects. The US approach requires a fraudulent acquisition 
of the exclusive right, the enforcement of the right to overcome the antitrust 
                                                          
121 Hovenkamp (n 95) 3. 
122 Herbert J Hovenkamp, “Exclusion and the Sherman Act” (2005) 72 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 147, 148. 
123 Hovenkamp (n 95) 3. 
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immunity and for the plaintiff to then prove a separate antitrust infringement. 
Europe does not require intent, bad faith, or enforcement. The European 
Commission has only to prove the abuse of a dominant position without having to 
overcome an antitrust immunity. On the face of it, the comparative argument of 
AstraZeneca’s counsel and its criticism of the judgment might seem legitimate.124 
Yet, if a comparison is to lead to robust comparative results, it is essential to start 
from a common ground.  
As discussed above, a Walker Process claim is based on an antitrust 
counterclaim in a private patent infringement lawsuit, whereas AstraZeneca’s 
infringement of Art. 102 TFEU for the abuse of its dominant position was publicly 
enforced by the European Commission and upheld by the EU courts. This is not 
simply a different choice of enforcement but, rather, the root of the 
incomparability of the two regimes. Successful private antitrust enforcement in the 
US entitles the plaintiff to the award of treble damages,125 which have generally 
been used as an incentive for private enforcement126 as well as a means of 
compensation and for the achievement of deterrence.  
However, the award of treble damages also has a significant impact on not 
only procedural antitrust law but on its substantive side. The possible over-
compensation presented by treble damages warrants the courts in the US to ensure 
that only viable antitrust claims, that have an adverse effect on competition, are 
successfully litigated. It could therefore be argued that the US courts over the last 
few decades have inadvertently heightened the substantive standards regarding 
antitrust litigation due to concerns about over-deterrence. As a consequence, they 
have actually limited the likelihood of successful antitrust damages actions.127 This 
phenomenon has already been described in 1985 by Stephen Calkins as 
‘equilibrating tendencies’, arguing that the award of treble damages has led not 
                                                          
124 Murphy (n 43).  
125  15 U.S.C. §15. 
126 Donald I Baker, ‘Revisiting History - What Have We Learned about Private Antitrust Enforcement 
That We Would Recommend to Others’ (2003) 16 Loyola Consumer Law Review 379. 
127 Leon Greenfield and David Olsky, ‘Treble damages: To what purpose and to what effect?’ (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, International Cartels – Comparative Perspectives on 
Practice, Procedure and Substance, London, February 2007) 13. 
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only to higher substantive standards but also to an adjustment of procedural 
standards, such as proof of damages and standing to accommodate for the 
potential over-deterrence following the award of treble damages.128  According to 
William E. Kovacic,  
 
‘A court might seek to correct the perceived infirmities in the antitrust 
system by recourse to means directly within its control – namely by modifying 
doctrine governing liability standards or by devising special doctrinal tests to 
evaluate the worthiness of private claims.’129 
 
Indeed, the US Supreme Court in Walker Process was also driven by the urge 
to equilibrate the legal standards with the potential gains from litigation for the 
patent infringement defendant filing a Walker Process counterclaim, when Justice 
Harlan stated that the heightened standard for deliberate fraudulent procurement 
compared to the one for inequitable conduct is necessary in the light of a Walker 
Process claim.130 This underlying rationale is enshrined in the subsequent case law 
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court repeatedly stated that the 
inequitable conduct standard is a shield in patent litigation whereas a Walker 
Process claim is a sword. Reversing this argument, the legal standards of proof for a 
Walker Process claim could be lower in the absence of the potential for treble 
damages. 
Based on these findings, it cannot be established whether the European 
Commission’s requirements for the finding of abuse, which were upheld by the 
General Court and the ECJ, are overly restrictive compared to the requirements set 
                                                          
128 Steven Calkins, ‘Summary judgment, motion to dismiss, and other examples of equilibrating 
tendencies in the antitrust system’ (1985) 74 Georgetown Law Journal 1065, 1080, 1100.  
129 William E Kovacic, ‘Private participation in the enforcement of public competition laws’ in Mads 
Andenas, Michael Hutchings and Philip Marsden (eds), Current competition law Vol.II (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 2004) 174. 
130 private actions could reach monopolies “practiced under patents that for one reason or another 
may turn out to be voidable under one or more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance 
of a patent, [and] might well chill the disclosure of inventions through the obtaining of a patent 
because of fear of the vexations or punitive consequences of treble-damage suits.” Walker Process 
Equipment (n 42) 180. 
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out by the Walker Process Doctrine.131 Such a comparison cannot lead to robust 
results, as the origin for the differences in the legal standards concerning the 
Walker Process Doctrine are rooted in the underlying principles that are unique to 
the US jurisprudence.  AstraZeneca’s comparative argument is thus not a valid one.  
However, this finding does not provide an answer to the more general question of 
whether the General Court’s judgment and approach to the anticompetitive misuse 
of procedural rights is overly restrictive in comparison to US antitrust enforcement.  
For this reason the judgment needs to be compared to a US antitrust enforcement 
policy that is more comparable, namely the public antitrust enforcement policy of 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
The following section first sets out the reason for the comparison with the 
FTC Act. It then identifies the FTC’s enforcement policy concerning the conduct of 
misrepresentation in front of governmental agencies and the necessary 
requirements for FTC investigations. These requirements have been set out in two 
previous investigations against Bristol Myers-Squibb and Union Oil Company of 
California. In the final part of the section, the facts of the AstraZeneca case are 
applied to the previously identified FTC requirements so that it can be established 
whether the FTC would have been able to hypothetically launch an investigation 
into AstraZeneca’s behaviour, scrutinising the anticompetitive potential of 
AstraZeneca’s conduct. 
 
6.1.3. Comparison to the public enforcement policy of the Federal Trade 
Commission 
The public antitrust enforcement policy of the FTC offers a much more feasible 
ground for comparison with the AstraZeneca judgment compared to the private 
antitrust enforcement following section 2 of the Sherman Act. Although the FTC has 
the power to publicly enforce conduct based on the violation of section 2 of the 
                                                          
131 See Kovacic (n 129) 176, 77 (arguing that EU competition policy has different liability standards 
and is more interventionist because of reduced private rights of action and the lack of treble 
damages). 
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Sherman Act,132 it can also base its enforcement activities on section 5 of the FTC 
Act. This provides it with the means to prosecute “unfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce”,133 enabling the FTC to scrutinise at least the same types of conduct as 
private parties using section 2 of the Sherman Act, yet lacking a provision awarding 
treble damages.134 The use of section 5 of the FTC Act could therefore address the 
court’s fear about the over-deterrence in private litigation, which spurs the felt 
need to adjust the liability standards as mentioned above.135 These procedural 
traits make the FTC Act more comparable to the General Court’s judgment in 
AstraZeneca. The comparison is not only based on two public enforcement regimes, 
but the FTC is also able to address the issue of possible anti-competitive conduct 
following the submission of misleading information to public authorities without 
having to comply with the high standards of proof of the Walker Process Doctrine, 
as this doctrine is only of concern following the private antitrust enforcement of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act.  
However, the FTC is constrained in its enforcement efforts by the previously 
mentioned Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, which bars certain behaviour from antitrust 
scrutiny. Before this section turns to the actual enforcement activities and the 
necessary requirements for a hypothetical investigation of AstraZeneca’s conduct 
under section 5 of the FTC Act, it briefly explains the characteristics of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine itself.  
                                                          
132 To the knowledge of the author the FTC has not legally challenged any unilateral conduct based 
on the theory of violation of Sec 2 of the Sherman Act in relation to question whether the 
submission of misleading information to public authorities would be barred from the antitrust rules. 
133 Commissioner Leibowitz has noted that ‘Section 5 was intended from its inception to reach 
conduct that violates not only the antitrust laws, but also the policies that those laws were intended 
to promote […] such as innovation.’ Also stating that ‘deceitful conduct has fallen within the Section 
5’s province for effects on competition from the FTC’s earliest days.’ Jon Leibowitz, Concurring 
opinion of Commissioner Leibowitz in the matter of Rambus,Inc.: Docket No. 9302 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802rambusconcurringopinionofcommissionerleibowitz.p
df> 1. 
134 Section 5 of the FTC Act was designed to have a broader scope than the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act enabling the FTC also to prosecute types of conduct which are not or not yet covered by 
these two acts, filling the gaps in antitrust enforcement. 
135 William E Kovacic and Marc Winerman, ‘Competition policy and the application od section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act’ (2010) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 929, 939. (also arguing that 
section 5 FTC Act might supply a means of avoiding the pitfalls that judges associate with the 
litigation of private antitrust disputes in the federal courts) at 947. 
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6.1.3.1. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
According to this doctrine any petition by an American citizen to the government 
should fall outside the scope of antitrust scrutiny.136 Generally speaking, the 
doctrine is based on the First Amendment of the US Constitution which states that 
“Congress shall make no law […] abridging […] the right to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances”. In other words, every citizen shall be free to “inform 
their representatives in government of their desires with respect to the passage or 
enforcement of laws”.137 This freedom does not only include the legislative process 
but also petitions to government agencies even with the sole intention of hindering 
competitors entering the market or of eliminating competition completely.138  The 
notion behind this doctrine is that the private entity itself is not engaging in anti-
competitive conduct. Rather, the private entity is asking either the government to 
enact legislation in its favour or for a governmental agency to decide or rule in its 
favour, which might have anti-competitive effects. In both cases, the potential anti-
competitive effect results from the governmental action. The US Supreme Court 
was concerned that the governmental decision-making process would be impeded, 
or at least rendered less efficient, if the citizens were not able to bring such 
petitions freely.139 This freedom would be undermined if antitrust laws were 
applicable in this context. The antitrust laws should only regulate business activity 
and not indirectly regulate political decisions.140  Private parties shall be able to put 
forward any proposal and leave it to the government to make a decision. Yet this 
antitrust immunity is not unlimited. Actions should not be covered by this antitrust 
immunity if they are “ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action 
[so that this] is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt 
                                                          
136 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference et al. Petitioners, v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. et al. 365 
U.S. 127 (1961) “the Sherman Act forbids only those trade restraints and monopolizations that are 
created, or attempted, by the acts of individuals or combinations of individuals or corporations.” (at 
135)[…]and “that where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental 
action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be made out.”(at 136) 
137 Ibid, 139. 
138 United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington 381 U.S. 657 (1965) 670. 
139 Federal Trade Commission, Enforcement perspectives on the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: An FTC 
staff report (2006) 14; Philip E Areeda and Herbert J Hovenkamp, Antitrust law: an analysis of 
antitrust principles and their application (2nd edn, Aspen Law & Business, New York, 2002) ¶203, 174. 
140 Federal Trade Commission (n 139)15. 
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to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”141 The other 
noted exception to the Noerr-Pennington immunity is conduct satisfying the 
requirements of the Walker Process Doctrine. 
 
6.1.3.2. The enforcement of section 5 of the FTC Act and the scope of the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
The scope of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is the yardstick for successful antitrust 
enforcement by the FTC in cases that concern potential anti-competitive conduct 
that does not directly stem from the investigated party, but from a governmental 
agency involved in the process. In the past, the FTC has filed administrative 
complaints twice: (1) in the matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb,142 and (2) in the matter 
of Union Oil Company of California;143 both dealing with anti-competitive effects of 
governmental actions caused by the submission of misleading information to the 
relevant public authorities. The FTC has successfully concluded these investigations 
by entering into consent agreements with the alleged infringers. After having 
analysed the FTC’s enforcement approach concerning the scope of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, it will be possible to apply it to the facts of the AstraZeneca 
judgment in a hypothetical FTC investigation in order to determine whether the 
European approach is indeed more restrictive than the US approach, as has been 
implied by AstraZeneca in its appeal. 
 
6.1.3.2.1.  In the matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb with regard to BuSpar 
Apart from other types of conduct which are deemed to have anti-competitive 
effects, 144  the US pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) had 
acquired a patent that allegedly covered its blockbuster drug BuSpar which was due 
                                                          
141 Eastern Railroad (n 136) 144. 
142 Federal Trade Commission, Administrative complaint in the matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb. FTC 
file No.0110046. < http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0110046/bristol-myers-
squibb-company-matter>. 
143 Federal Trade Commission, Administrative complaint in the matter of Union Oil Company of 
California Docket 9305 (4 March 2003) < http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/0110214/union-oil-company-california-matter> 
144  i.e. pay for delay settlement entered into with Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc. For the sake of the 
argument the focus of the analysis will only lie on conduct related to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. 
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to expire on 21 November 2000.145 Anticipating significant profit loss after patent 
expiry because of the huge success of BuSpar, BMS filed patent applications with 
the USPTO in 1999 with the aim of covering a method for creating a slightly 
different version of the core active ingredient ‘buspirone’. 146 After the rejection of 
this first patent application, BMS managed to receive a patent from the USPTO that 
solely covered the use of this slightly different version of buspirone instead of the 
method of creation. 147  This patent was submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and subsequently listed in the Orange Book, even though the 
patent did not satisfy the statutory requirements for an Orange Book filing.148 This 
is possible because the FDA is not examining the submitted patents. The FDA only 
has the ministerial role of listing the patents in the Orange Book and thus has to 
rely on the correctness of the information provided.149  Following the Hatch 
Waxman Act,150 every generic drug applicant has to notify the brand company 
whose drug the generic company attempts to receive a generic authorisation that it 
does not infringe any of the brand company’s patents that are listed in the Orange 
Book and cover the drug in question. The brand company can bring a patent 
infringement action against the generic applicant within 45 days after the 
notification. 151 The filing of such a lawsuit automatically triggers a 30-month delay 
of the generic approval by the FDA, regardless of the merits of the case.152 In doing 
so, BMS was able to artificially delay generic entry into the market and extended its 
monopoly for BuSpar.153 
                                                          
145 Federal Trade Commission, Analysis to aid public comment: In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company File Nos. 001 0221, 011 0046, and 021 0181 (2003) http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/ 
bristolmyersanalysis.htm; Federal Trade Commission (n 142) 37-45. 
146 In the year 2000 BuSpar sales were over $ 600 Million in the US. 
147 Federal Trade Commission (n 145); Federal Trade Commission (n 142) 37-45. 
148 Federal Trade Commission (n 142) 47, 50. 
149 68 Fed. Reg. 36676, 36683 (June 18, 2003). 
150  The Hatch Waxman Act is the common name for the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act 1984 whose aim was to encourage early generic entry into the pharmaceutical 
market by providing generic companies with the possibility of an abbreviated new drug application, 
in which they could largely rely on the long new drug application of the brand company.  
151 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(5)(B)(iii). 
152 21 C.F.R. §314.107 (b)(3)(i)(A). 
153 Federal Trade Commission (n 142) 48. 
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BMS argued that its submission of patent information to the FDA for the 
purpose of filing it in the Orange Book was to be regarded as petitioning to the 
state and, thus, barred from antitrust scrutiny.154 Opposing this argument, the FTC 
found that the conduct falls outside the scope of antitrust immunity.  “Petitioning” 
within the meaning of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is not achieved by every 
governmental process that leads to a governmental action. The petition must be 
directed to the state with the aim of obtaining a governmental action, indicating a 
process of argumentation, discussion, and finally persuasion of the government to 
act according to the petition. 155  This is only possible, if the government agency has 
discretion over the decision. Without any discretion the agency’s act is of mere 
ministerial nature.156  This argument was further underlined by the fact that the 
FDA has no possibility and thus no discretion to revoke its own filing of a patent in 
the Orange Book following the submission of the brand company.157 Finally, it was 
held that the boundaries of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine have to be drawn by 
distinguishing between discretionary governmental actions and mere ministerial 
decisions.158  
 
6.1.3.2.2.  In the matter of Union Oil Company of California 
In this case the FTC charged Union Oil for a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act, as 
Union Oil engaged in anti-competitive conduct by wrongfully obtaining monopoly 
power in the market for petrol sold in California.159 Union Oil participated in this 
standard setting process that led to the formulation of low-carbon emission 
standards for so-called “summer line” fuel mandated for sale in California for a 
                                                          
154 In re Buspirone Patent Litig./In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig. 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y 2002). 
155 Brief of the FTC as amicus curiae In re Buspirone Patent Litig./In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig. 185 F. 
Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y 2002) 8. 
156 Ibid, 9 also citing Litton Systems v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. 700 F. 2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983) filing of a 
new tariff to the Federal Communications Commission would not amount to “petitioning” to the 
State which would be protected by the doctrine due to the mechanical nature of the filing. 
157 21 C.F.R. §314.53(f); 68 Fed. Reg. 36676, 36683 (June 18, 2003). 
158 In re Buspirone Patent Litig./In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig.  (n 154) 369, 370. 
159 Federal Trade Commission (n 143). 
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period of up to eight months each year.160 The set standard overlapped significantly 
with the patent portfolio of Union Oil because of the company’s misrepresentation 
during the standard setting process and thus enabled Union Oil to acquire 
monopoly power. This conduct had a direct impact on competition and consumers 
due to the licensing agreements which the fuel refining industry had to enter into in 
order to be able to produce the “summer line” fuel.  The arising costs for royalties 
of 5.75 cents per gallon were almost entirely passed on to the consumer.161 “But for 
Union Oil’s fraud, [the standard setting body] would not have adopted regulations 
that substantially overlapped with Union Oil’s concealed patent claims.”162 
Union Oil asserted that its conduct was within the scope of antitrust 
immunity. It stated that the alleged conduct influenced the standard setting body in 
a quasi-legislative action instead of a quasi-adjudicative one and that only the latter 
would fall outside the scope of immunity and therefore result in antitrust 
liability.163 However, stating that “misrepresentations, condoned in the political 
arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process”,164 and that “in 
less political arenas, unethical and deceptive practices can constitute abuses of 
administrative or judicial processes that may result in antitrust violations”,165 the 
FTC held that the appropriate distinction to grant antitrust immunity must be 
between the political and non-political arena, taking into consideration the context 
of the proceedings and the nature of the relevant communication166 and not the 
distinction put forward by Union Oil.  
                                                          
160 Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Charges Unocal with Anticompetitive Conduct Related to 
Reformulated Gasoline, Press Release’ (04 March 2003) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03 
/unocal.shtm>. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Federal Trade Commission (n 143) 80. 
163 Federal Trade Commission, In the matter of Union Oil Company of California: Union Oil Company 
of California's Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and Memorandum in Support Based Upon 
Immunity Under Noerr-Pennington Docket 9305 (28 March 2003) <http://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/cases-proceedings/0110214/union-oil-company-california-matter>. 
164 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited 404 U.S. 508 (1972) 513. 
165 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492 (1988) 499. 
166 Federal Trade Commission, In the matter of Union Oil Company of California: Opinion of the 
Commission by Timothy J. Muris Docket 9305 (7 July 2004) <http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/0110214/union-oil-company-california-matter > 30. 
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Applying this distinction, the submission of misleading information is only 
protected by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine when it takes place in the political 
arena.  For the distinction between the political and non-political arena, the FTC has 
identified several factors: (1) the degree of governmental discretion, (2) the ability 
to determine causation should be taken into account, and (3) the extent of 
necessary reliance on the petitioner’s factual assertions. These factors can also be 
intertwined. The degree of discretion has a direct impact on accountability, the 
possibility of judicial review and ultimately on the scope of immunity. A 
misrepresentation is more likely to cause a certain governmental action if the 
governmental agency has no discretion regarding its decision. The lack of discretion 
is a strong indicator for the materiality of the misrepresentation to the 
governmental decision, as the decision would not have been made in the absence 
of the misrepresentation.167 In the case of a political decision, it can be impossible 
to establish whether a given misrepresentation caused the government to act as it 
did, as it entails unfettered discretion.168 The final factor of the necessary reliance 
on the factual assertions directly relates to the findings of the FTC in the case 
against BMS which has been discussed above. Only in areas where considerable 
discretion exist is it possible to assess given statements on their correctness. It is 
recognised that the political arena is based on contentious political opinions that 
are not necessarily based on true statements or might only contain the “partial 
truth”. However, political parties are aware of this fact and have the experience to 
balance these contending forces. 169  Agencies do not necessarily have this 
experience or might not even have any discretion170 and thus they have to rely on 
the correctness of the facts provided to them.171 This line of argumentation is again 
related to the FTC’s finding in the first case. The notion of the Noerr-Pennington 
                                                          
167 Areeda and Hovenkamp (n 139) ¶203, 186. 
168 Federal Trade Commission (n 166) 35. 
169 Areeda and Hovenkamp (n 139) ¶203, 175. 
170 See discussion of the ministerial role of the FDA in the case of Orange Book filings in section E2(a). 
171 Federal Trade Commission supra (n 166) 34, Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff 
Bureau, Inc. 690 F.2d 1240 (C.A.Cal. 1982) 1261 ‘the adjudicatory sphere is much different to the 
political sphere, in which the falsity of information could be revealed in debates, whereas in the 
adjudicatory sphere information must be reliable and thus accurate.’ 
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Doctrine is to cover only petitions which try to persuade an agency to act in a 
certain way.  
Finally, with regard to the nature of the relevant communication, the FTC 
states that a mere error that led to a decision in a non-political process is not 
sufficient for the conduct to fall outside the scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity. 
Without ‘knowing falsity’ there would be no abuse of a government process.172 The 
FTC advocates that the misrepresentation or omission must firstly be deliberate, 
secondly subject to factual verification and thirdly central to the legitimacy of the 
affected governmental proceeding.173 Thus any communication to the government 
or one of its agencies that is regarded as not being in the political arena and 
qualifies as misrepresentation is not protected by the antitrust immunity of the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.  
 
6.1.4. Application of the FTC approach to AstraZeneca’s conduct 
This section finally undertakes the hypothetical exercise of scrutinising 
AstraZeneca’s conduct in Europe by applying the FTC’s approach to the submission 
of misleading information to patent offices following section 5 of the FTC Act. Doing 
so makes it possible to establish whether the European approach is indeed overly 
restrictive in comparison to the United States or whether the FTC would come to a 
similar conclusion as the EU courts. 
In determining the hypothetical antitrust scrutiny following section 5 of the 
FTC Act it is necessary to establish the degree of discretion that the seven patent 
offices across Europe have had during the application procedure for the patent 
extensions by AstraZeneca. If the patent offices were to have had a mere ministerial 
role in granting the patent extension, AstraZeneca’s conduct would fall outside the 
scope of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine following the Bristol-Myers Squibb test, 
meaning they could have been scrutinised by section 5 of the FTC Act. In case of 
limited discretion, the conduct could still be scrutinised by the FTC provided the 
requirements of the Union Oil test are satisfied.  
                                                          
172 Areeda and Hovenkamp (n 139) ¶203, 183. 
173 Federal Trade Commission (n 166) 36. 
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6.1.4.1. Bristol-Myers Squibb test 
As discussed above, this test distinguishes between discretionary governmental 
action and a mere ministerial action. The level of discretion of the patent offices 
which have received AstraZeneca’s SPC applications must therefore be at issue. 
Such discretion refers to an at least partially subjective decision which is based on 
the judgment and the expertise of the relevant examiner at the patent office. This 
should not be the case if the examiner is adhering to rules and regulations, namely 
by simply applying the relevant provisions to the application at hand. Art. 3 of the 
SPC regulation174 provides that a SPC shall be granted if, at the time of the 
application for such an extension, the product is still protected by a basic patent, a 
valid market authorisation for the drug exists, the product has not been subject to 
such an application before and that the market authorisation provided is the first 
market authorisation to place the product on the market in the European Union. 
The criteria that have to be fulfilled in an SPC application are of an objective nature, 
compared to general patent application criteria such as ‘novelty’ and ‘non-
obviousness’ that might be subject to the personal judgement and expertise of the 
relevant patent examiner. If these objective criteria are met, the applicant is 
entitled to the patent extension. Were it to have been the intention of the legislator 
to give the patent offices the discretion to decide on these kinds of application, it 
would have phrased the provision differently by replacing ‘shall grant a SPC’ with 
‘may grant a SPC’. So it can be argued that the relevant patent offices had no 
discretion regarding the outcome of the SPC application but had to apply objective 
criteria to the facts of the case, which led to an entitlement to the patent extension, 
if these criteria were met. Although this conduct cannot be categorised as a mere 
“FDA style” ministerial role, given that the patent offices do not grant every 
application on receipt without scrutiny, this conduct should not be regarded as 
discretionary. 
Indeed, certain procedural rules of the regulation might have been 
ambiguous or interpreted ambiguously by AstraZeneca’s counsel during the 
                                                          
174 Council Regulation (EC) 469/2009 of the European parliament and the Council concerning the 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, [2009] OJ L 152/1. 
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application procedure,175 which led to different situations and outcomes in front of 
the patent offices. Some accepted the provided date of the effective market 
authorisation, whereas other patent offices considered this date to be false and 
regarded the technical market authorisation date as the correct one.176 Such 
ambiguity should be resolved by means of statutory interpretation and should not 
lead to any type of discretion. Discretion gives the agency who exercises it the right 
to rely on its own judgment and expertise in the field. Applying the same rule in 
different cases could therefore lead to different outcomes. These differences are 
intentional, as it is often necessary to apply laws or rules flexibly to accommodate 
certain types of conduct on a case-by-case basis.177 Ambiguity might also lead to 
different outcomes, but such an outcome is unintended and therefore warrants 
statutory interpretation. The aim of statutory interpretation is to decide which 
interpretation of an ambiguous rule is the correct one to be followed, thereby 
providing legal certainty.  
Hence, the reactions of the patent offices should be characterised as a form 
statutory interpretation and the differences between the outcomes of the 
application procedures in front of the different patent offices should not be 
mistaken as a form of “individualising discretion” of a general rule by the patent 
offices.178  The different outcomes are rather an inevitable by-product of an 
administrative interpretation of law by several national agencies made necessary 
due to the lack of judicial interpretation on supranational level at the time. The 
legislative intention for the introduction of supplementary patent extensions at a 
European level has been the harmonisation of national legislation to further 
promote the single European market.179 The argument can further be supported by 
                                                          
175 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 383. Instead of the actual date of the first market 
authorisation in the Union (technical market authorisation), AstraZeneca interpreted the correct 
date to be the effective first market authorisation, meaning the date of completion of all necessary 
administrative steps which are needed to launch the actual product. 
176 AstraZeneca (n 6)150-153. 
177 Charles H Koch Jr. ‘Judicial review of administrative discretion’ (1985) 54 George Washington Law 
Review 469, 472. 
178 Ibid, 471 et seq. 
179  “A uniform solution at Community level should be provided for, thereby preventing the 
heterogeneous development of national laws leading to further disparities which would be likely to 
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the fact that the ambiguous question of the correct statutory interpretation of the 
term ‘market authorisation’, within the meaning of the SPC regulation, has 
ultimately been referred to the Court of Justice by means of a preliminary 
reference.180 Following the preliminary reference, the Court ruled in favour of the 
technical market authorisation. It is therefore possible that the ambiguity of the 
SPC regulation at the time of AstraZeneca’s applications to the patent offices did 
not in fact lead to a discretionary decision by the offices. Indeed, each patent office 
applied objective criteria to the SPC applications which cannot be influenced by the 
applicant. Following the FTC’s distinction in the BMS test between a mere 
ministerial role and unfettered discretion, the centre of gravity of the agencies’ 
behaviour would now appear to lean towards the former rather than the latter, 
meaning it would not constitute a governmental action. AstraZeneca’s conduct 
would not be barred from a hypothetical antitrust investigation by the FTC, as the 
SPC would not be regarded as “obtained” by the patent offices within the meaning 
of the Bristol-Myers Squibb test. 
 
6.1.4.2. Union Oil test 
Even if one were to argue that AstraZeneca’s conduct does not fall within the scope 
of the Bristol-Myers Squibb test because of the patent offices’ ability to examine 
the applications and its right to reject applications that do not comply with the 
necessary requirements, AstraZeneca’s behaviour would nonetheless fall within the 
scope of the wider Union Oil test, leading to the same result. This conduct would 
not be regarded as petitioning to the state and would not be covered by the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine. 
Referring to the Union Oil case, it must be determined whether the 
misrepresentation has caused the grant of the patent extension. This would be 
possible if the patent office has only “limited discretion” in the application process, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
create obstacles to the free movement of medicinal products within the Community and thus 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market.” Regulation (EC) 469/2009 (7). 
180 Case C-127/00 Hässle [2003] ECR I-14781. Referral  by the German Federal Court of Justice 
following an appeal of a General Patent Court judgment regarding the validity of AstraZeneca’s 
patent extension in Germany. 
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which makes it necessary for the patent offices to rely on the presented facts. If this 
is the case, the application would not be regarded as petitioning within the scope of 
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. As seen above, the patent offices in question were 
able to examine the application at their own accord and request further 
information from the applicant. However, it is set out in the examination guidelines 
of several patent offices that the submitted date for the first valid market 
authorisation, which is necessary for the accurate calculation of the duration of the 
extension is not necessarily checked for its correctness. Checks are only made if 
there is reason to believe that the provided data is incorrect, which is largely due to 
the practical limitations of the patent offices who operate on limited resources.181 
Due to this very limited ability to verify the correctness of the provided date, a 
misrepresentation that is just aimed at this very factor is also likely to cause the 
relevant agency to grant a patent extension for a longer period of time or to grant 
an extension which the applicant would not be entitled to it at all.  AstraZeneca’s 
conduct before the patent offices in Germany, Finland, Denmark and Norway 
resulted in such an outcome.182To ultimately determine if AstraZeneca’s conduct 
would fall outside the scope of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, the nature of the 
communication would have to satisfy the misrepresentation requirements of the 
FTC. The European Commission has consistently stated: 
                                                          
181 Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, Richtlinien für das Prüfungsverfahren bei ergänzenden 
Schutzzertifikaten  <http://www.deutsches-patentamt.de/docs/service/formulare/patent/p2799.pdf> 
6: “Zur Überprüfung dieses Erfordernisses fehlen die entsprechenden vollständigen Überprüfungs- 
und Recherchemöglichkeiten.[…]Des Weiteren wird im Rahmen der Wahrheitspflicht des 
Antragstellers davon ausgegangen, dass seine diesbezüglichen Angaben den Tatsachen 
entsprechen.“; Österreichisches Patentamt, Richtlinien für die Prüfung von 
Schutzzertifikatsanmeldungen  <http://www.patentamt.at/Media/Richtlinen_Schutzzertifikat.pdf>, 
15: ‘Gemäß § 3 Abs. 1 SchZG 1996 erfolgt keine Prüfung darüber, ob die vorgelegte Genehmigung die 
erste Genehmigung für das Inverkehrbringen des Erzeugnisses in Österreich ist.’; Danish Patent and 
Trademark Office, Order on Patents and Supplementary Protection Certificates (2009) 
<http://www.dkpto.org/media/183780/order_patents-spc.pdf>, 24: “The [Danish] Patent Authority 
shall not verify whether the conditions in Article 3(d) of the Regulations are complied with.“; 
Intellectual Property Office, Supplementary Protection Certificates: Guide for Applicants (2009) 
<http://www.ipo.gov.uk/spctext.pdf>, 16: “Unless there appears reason to do so, at present the 
examiner will not normally investigate whether the authorization specified was in fact the first 
authorization to place the product on the market in the UK as a medicinal or plant protection 
product.“ 
182 This differentiated outcome of patent extension application roots in a transitional provision in 
Council Regulation No 1768/92/EEC which entitled applicants in these countries only with an 
extension, if the first market authorisation was after 1 January 1988.  In the case of AstraZeneca the 
correct date was 15 April 1987. 
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“that the behaviour at issue does not consist of simple mistakes or isolated 
incidents of negligence, but is, on the contrary, characterised by continuity and 
consistency, indicating ‘subjective intent’ and full knowledge of the misleading 
character of the representations.”183  
 
AstraZeneca’s conduct has also been central to the legitimacy of the relevant 
patent office’s proceedings. Although not every patent office has granted a patent 
extension on the basis of the provided misleading information, AstraZeneca has 
succeeded in Germany, Austria, Finland and Norway. But for the submission of the 
misleading information, no patent extension would have been granted at all in the 
cases of Germany, Norway and Finland and only for a shorter period of time in the 
case of Austria. 184  AstraZeneca’s conduct therefore also fulfilled the 
misrepresentation requirements of the FTC. 
As a result of this examination, it can be said, hypothetically, that the FTC 
would have been able to investigate AstraZeneca’s conduct for a potential 
infringement of section 5 of the FTC Act, engaging in acts that wilfully maintained 
its monopoly power. AstraZeneca’s misrepresentation would not have been 
covered by the antitrust immunity stemming from the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. 
Ultimately, the European approach to AstraZeneca’s conduct is not overly 
restrictive compared to US antitrust enforcement by the FTC. 
 
6.1.5. Concluding remarks 
In the first instance, this section has shown that AstraZeneca’s line of argument 
regarding the overly restrictive approach of the General Court was indeed an ill-
fated attempt to compare apples to oranges. The Walker Process Doctrine is not 
                                                          
183 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 338; also relying on AstraZeneca’s “Losec Post Patent 
Strategy” which stated the intention to “delay generic introduction through technical and legal 
hurdles because [e]very day of protected sales of Losec is worthwhile considering the huge sales 
volume projected at patent expiry and that [c]reating such barriers is a major priority.” AstraZeneca 
(n 6) 271. 
184 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 2) 592, 598. 
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comparable to the Court’s judgment because of fundamentally differing 
enforcement policies in the US and in Europe.  
The analysis of AstraZeneca’s conduct in front of the different patent offices 
across Europe under the standard set out by the FTC in its enforcement of section 5 
of the FTC Act has further shown that the FTC would be able to launch an 
investigation into AstraZeneca’s conduct as such conduct would not be barred from 
antitrust scrutiny following the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. AstraZeneca’s criticism 
of the General Court’s judgment is therefore not valid.  
In more general terms, this section is advocating that caution is exercised 
when conducting comparative analyses of US and European antitrust policy issues. 
Similar cases do not necessarily warrant similar treatment – or in other words, the 
agencies come to a different result for good reasons even though the facts or 
prerequisites appear similar. Substantive as well as procedural standards should 
always be set while keeping the history and the underlying principles of the 
relevant policy in mind.  
 
7. Conclusion 
On the one hand, the analysis has shown that the AstraZeneca judgment 
unfortunately fails to provide general guidance for the pharmaceutical business 
sector in relation to market definition. The application of the AstraZeneca market 
definition to a hypothetical market of antiepileptic drugs shows that the definition 
of the relevant market for Losec was highly fact-specific and should not be 
transposed to other markets. The General Court’s fundamental assumption that 
doctors’ prescribing inertia should be regarded as an exogenous factor to market 
definition is flawed. Not only has this assumption attracted criticism in the case of 
AstraZeneca itself, but the hypothetical analysis also provided evidence that 
doctors’ prescribing inertia can be a key factor to consider when defining markets in 
an appropriate way, so that the market definition reflects the market realistically. A 
robust market definition is essential not only for Art. 102 investigations but also in 
relation to the applicability of block exemption regulations to investigations under 
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Art. 101 TFEU. Without a robust market definition the likelihood of Type I errors 
increases, especially in the pharmaceutical sector which is highly regulated and 
heavily reliant on intellectual property rights. 
On the other hand, the detailed comparative legal analysis of AstraZeneca’s 
claim that the European approach to the abuse of a dominant position by means of 
the submission of misleading information to patent offices is overly restrictive in 
comparison to the US approach and the Walker Process Doctrine has shown that 
the European Commission and the EU courts were right to dismiss this claim and 
opt for a European approach instead. The comparative analysis regarding the 
Walker Process Doctrine has demonstrated that, despite the similarity of the 
investigated conduct, the European Commission should not develop an approach 
based on requirements that are similar to the US doctrine. The underlying antitrust 
principles in the United States are simply too different to rely on the Walker 
Process Doctrine as a comparison benchmark.  
This cautionary approach to comparative claims has important ramifications 
for analyses in subsequent chapters of this thesis, which discuss potentially 
anticompetitive types of conduct in the pharmaceutical industry that exist on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The fact that the pharmaceutical sector is highly regulated 
adds to the need to apply great care when undertaking comparative analysis. Even 
if the types of conduct were identical in the United States and Europe, their impact 
on the relevant sector could be very different due to the differences in the 
underlying regulatory regime.  
The general conclusions that can be drawn from this initial comparative 
analysis of the AstraZeneca judgment as well as the careful approach to the 
comparative legal analysis itself should therefore act as a cornerstone and constant 
reminder for the comparative analyses to come. The next chapter examines the 
possible anticompetitive effects that could arise from pay for delay settlements and 
early entry agreements in the European context and develops a European theory of 
harm for both types of agreements that take regulatory differences between the 
European Union and the United States into consideration. 
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III. A EUROPEAN THEORY OF HARM 
 
1. Introduction 
Pay for delay settlements in the pharmaceutical sector are one of the hot topics in 
pharmaceutical antitrust at this moment in time. Originating from the United States, 
these settlements refer to a generic company agreeing with the brand company not 
to challenge the underlying patent to enter the market of the brand drug in return 
for a payment by the brand company. These kinds of settlements have been heavily 
scrutinised by the US antitrust authorities due to the significant anticompetitive 
potential, as they are foreclosing the market for generic companies and protect the 
brand company from patent challenges relating to the drug in question. Similar 
settlements have been identified by the European Commission in its 
pharmaceutical sector inquiry which was launched on 15 January 2008 and in its 
final report published on 8 July 2009.1 At the same time, the pharmaceutical sector 
inquiry identified that the same parties also enter into so-called early entry 
agreements. In such a case, the generic company is allowed to enter the market of 
the brand drug while the brand drug is still patent protected.  In return for this 
“early entry”, the generic company has to accept terms to such an agreement 
which includes the acceptance of  the brand company’s control over the generic 
price, its  exclusivity regarding the sourcing and distribution of the drug and, 
furthermore, its final decision on market allocation of the generic drug.  
On the day of the final report’s publication, Commissioner Neelie Kroes 
stated that it was now clear what is wrong with the sector and that the time had 
come to act, insisting that the Commission would not hesitate to apply the antitrust 
rules to types of conduct that delay generic entry in an anticompetitive way.2 The 
European Commission subsequently opened formal antitrust investigations against 
several pharmaceutical companies that had been subject to the sector inquiry for 
conduct that delayed generic entry and it also closely monitored every patent 
                                                          
1 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report (2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html>. 
2 European Commission, Antitrust: shortcomings in pharmaceutical sector require further action 
(Brussels, 8 July 2009) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1098_en.htm>. 
  
 III. A European theory of harm 
84 
 
settlement that has been reached between a brand company and a generic 
company from 2009 to 2012.3 Following these monitoring exercises of pay for delay 
settlements, the number as well as the volume of the settlements has been 
reduced substantially which was welcomed by the European Commission, as it 
regards these settlements as potentially anticompetitive.4 In contrast, early entry 
agreements do not appear to be on the enforcement agenda of the European 
Commission, apart from having been identified in the pharmaceutical sector inquiry.  
The European Commission’s actions after the sector inquiry, in addition to the 
strong statement intent by Neelie Kroes, suggests that the European Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in the pharmaceutical sector are mainly on the scrutiny of 
pay for delay settlements – a type of conduct that has undoubtedly raised 
significant antitrust scrutiny in the United States and which led the US Federal 
Trade Commission to relentlessly warn of its anticompetitive potential in the United 
States. Yet the suggestion that pay for delay settlements in Europe should receive 
the same level of antitrust scrutiny as in the United States, due to their 
anticompetitive potential and effect in the United States should be rejected.  
Following the rationale derived from the careful comparative legal analysis 
in the previous chapter one has to consider that, despite looking similar to the ones 
in the United States, pay for delay settlements in Europe do not necessarily have 
the same anticompetitive potential as in the United States. The same holds true for 
early entry agreements; they are not common in the US pharmaceutical industry, 
but this should not lead to the conclusion that they do not have any 
anticompetitive potential.  
                                                          
3 European Commission, 1st Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: mid 2008 - end 
2009) (2010) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_ 
settlements_report1.pdf>; European Commission, 2nd Report on the Monitoring of Patent 
Settlements (period: January-December 2010) (2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ 
pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report2.pdf>; European Commission, 3rd Report on 
the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January-December 2011) (2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report3_en.pdf>; European 
Commission, 4th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January-December 2012) 
(2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements 
_report4_en.pdf.> 
4 European Commission (n 3). 
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This chapter argues for a shift in the enforcement priorities of the European 
Commission away from a sole focus on pay for delay settlements towards a more 
diverse enforcement agenda that includes early entry agreements. Section 2 
describes in detail the mechanisms behind pay for delay settlements, the incentives 
and benefits for the contracting parties in the United States and, most importantly, 
the differences in the European regulatory system. The section then proceeds to 
highlight the reduced anticompetitive potential of such settlements in Europe 
based on the rationale behind the antitrust enforcement in the United States. 
However, at the same time, a European theory of harm is proposed and developed, 
adapting the US rationale to the European framework and taking into consideration 
the fragmented nature of the European pharmaceutical sector. 
Section 3 then turns to early entry agreements and their anticompetitive 
potential. First, details about the agreements, their content and their length are 
provided, before the main focus is placed on the potential anticompetitive 
foreclosure effect that an early generic entrant might have on subsequent generic 
entrants. The developed theory of harm is predominantly based on the significant 
first-mover advantage of the early entrant and the high inter-brand switching costs 
due to the peculiar structure of the pharmaceutical sector and the switching 
behaviour of stakeholders and consumers.  
 
2. Pay for delay settlements  
Having originated in the United States, pay for delay settlements have only 
attracted the attention of the European Commission relatively recently. In the 
process of the pharmaceutical sector inquiry, the European Commission has 
identified patent settlement agreements that are similar to agreements known as 
“pay for delay settlements” which have been subject to longstanding scrutiny by 
the US Federal Trade Commission, US courts and various scholars. 5  These 
                                                          
5 Among many others Kevin D McDonald, ‘Patent Settlements and Payments that Flow the "Wrong" 
Way: The Early History of a Bad Idea’ (2002) 15 Antitrust Health Care Chronicle 2; Herbert J 
Hovenkamp, Mark D Janis and Mark A Lemley, ‘Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property 
Disputes’ [2003] 87 Minnesota Law Review 1719; Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust limits and patent 
settlements’ (2003) 34 Rand Journal of  Economics 391; Marc G Schildkraut, ‘Patent-splitting 
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agreements are entered into by brand companies and generic companies following 
patent infringement litigation between the two parties. It is seen by the European 
Commission as one of the brand companies’ ‘employed instruments of the “tool 
box” to block and delay the entry of competing generic products on the market’.6  If 
such settlements limit generic entry and include a value transfer from the brand 
company to the generic company then they should be regarded as potentially 
anticompetitive and, thus, afoul of competition law.7 The European Commission has 
identified 207 settlement agreements within the period of January 2000 to June 
2008. 99 out of the 207 settlements are deemed to impose limitations on generic 
entry and 45 of these include a value transfer from the brand company to the 
generic company which is regarded as a characteristic of pay for delay settlements.8 
These settlements included direct payments to the generic companies in excess of 
€200 million in total.9  
                                                                                                                                                                    
settlements and the reverse payment fallacy’ (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 1033; Thomas F Cotter, 
‘Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable 
Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship’ (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 1069; 
Thomas F Cotter, ‘Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes 
Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley’ (2003) 87 Minnesota 
Law Review 1789; Daniel Crane, ‘Ease over accuracy in assessing patent settlements’ (2004) 88 
Minnesota Law Review 689; Anne-Marie C Yvon, ‘Settlements between brand and generic 
pharmaceutical companies: A reasonable antitrust analysis of reverse payments’ (2006) 75 Fordham 
Law Review 1883; C. S Hemphill, ‘Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem’ (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 1553; Mark W Murphy, ‘Red 
flag or red herring? Reverse payments and the settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation’ (2008) 
4 European Competition Journal 541; C. S Hemphill, ‘An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New 
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition’ [2009] 109 Columbia Law Review; Michael A 
Carrier, ‘Unsettling drug patent settlements: A framework for presumptive illegality’ (2009) 108 
Michigan Law Review 37; Michael Kades, ‘Whistling Past the Graveyard: The Problem with the Per Se 
Legality Treatment of Pay-for-Delay Settlements’ (2009) 5 Competition Policy International 142; 
Michael A Carrier, ‘Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative Approach’ (2009) 41 
Rutgers Law Journal 83; Michael A Carrier, ‘A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: 
The Missing Dimension of Product-Hopping’ (2010) 62 Florida Law Review 1009; Aaron Edlin and 
others, ‘Activating Actavis’ (2013) 38 Antitrust Health Care Chronicle 16; Phillip E Areeda and 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust law : an analysis of antitrust principles and their application (2. ed. 
Aspen Law & Business, New York, NY 2013) ¶2046; Herbert J Hovenkamp, ‘Anticompetitive Patent 
Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision’ (2014) 15 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science 
and Technology 3. 
6 European Commission (n 1) 466. (hereinafter it is referred to the relevant paragraph of the 
pharmaceutical sector inquiry) 
7 ibid. 1573. 
8 ibid. 746, 759, 762. 
9 ibid. 768. 
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The anticompetitive potential of these settlements in the United States is 
rather apparent following extensive discussion by US agencies, the courts and 
scholars. Before being able to establish their anticompetitive potential in the 
European context, it is necessary to identify the parties’ incentives for entering into 
such settlements and the regulatory prerequisites that must be in place to achieve 
these incentives. This section therefore begins by explaining the mechanism behind 
pay for delay settlements and the theoretical economic incentives for both 
contracting parties. It then proceeds to describe how these incentives can be 
achieved in the context of the US regulatory system under the Hatch Waxman Act. 
Finally this section outlines the reasons why such conduct is not profitable under 
European pharmaceutical regulation (if one would only take the ‘US factors’ into 
consideration) and alludes to other factors like the competitive environment, which 
need to be taken into account in order to achieve market foreclosure under the 
European framework.  
 
2.1. The mechanisms of pay for delay settlements 
Settlements are a means to end litigation in court and are generally regarded as 
favourable, as they are cost-saving and provide legal certainty. 10  This holds 
especially true for patent infringement litigation. The validity of patents is a highly 
complex area of law which typically requires a variety of expert evidence, which is 
why most countries employ specialist courts to determine the validity of the 
challenged patent. This makes patent infringement litigation a very lengthy and 
costly process. It can therefore be in every party’s interest to end such litigation as 
quickly as possible.11 The fundamental factor for the outcome of a settlement is the 
perceived strength of the parties’ positions in the litigation and their likelihood of 
success. The pharmaceutical sector inquiry, however, brought to light the 
revelation that generic companies do not regard this factor as predominant. Their 
                                                          
10 Shapiro (n 5) 394. 
11 European Commission (n 1) 704. 
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major concern is actually the cost of litigation and the urge to avoid damages claims 
by the patent holder as these costs could be destructive for their business.12 
Oddly, in the case of pay for delay settlements in the pharmaceutical sector, 
such a settlement takes place between the brand company and a generic company 
that intends to enter the market before the brand company’s patent that covers 
the brand drug has expired. Entry or imminent entry usually leads to a patent 
infringement lawsuit of the brand company against the generic entrant. Such a 
lawsuit is a legitimate means by which the patent holder can defend its intellectual 
property rights. Patent settlements in general that end these litigation proceedings 
should have two possible outcomes, as they should mirror the likelihood of success 
in the litigation of the parties involved. Where a settlement is agreed, either: (1) the 
parties to the settlement regard the patent of the brand company as valid and 
therefore recognise the infringement of the generic entry prior to patent expiry, or 
(2) the parties regard the patent as invalid or not infringed, in which case the 
generic entrant should prevail. If the parties should agree to settle in both scenarios, 
it would be natural to expect in scenario (1) that the generic company would either 
refrain from entering the market before patent expiry or, alternatively, would agree 
to discontinue marketing the generic drug and most likely pay damages to the 
patent holder for the infringement of its intellectual proprietary rights. In scenario 
(2), the brand company would license the patent to the generic company enabling it 
to manufacture, market and sell the generic version on the market.  Depending on 
the applicable cost rules, the brand company might also agree as part of the 
settlement to pay the generic company’s legal costs or other costs that might have 
been incurred due to the lawsuit. Even a settlement in scenario (2) would be 
beneficial to the brand company as it only takes effect “inter partes”, whereas the 
invalidation of the patent by court judgment would take effect “erga omnes” 
allowing every other generic company to use the chemical substance or the process 
which was protected by the patent in question. 
In the case of pay for delay settlements specifically, aspects of each of these 
two scenarios can be observed, the generic company agrees not to enter the 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 721. 
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market until the patent has expired or even later than that. Under normal 
circumstances, “not entering the market” should indicate that the generic company 
has only a small probability of success in the anticipated outcome of the litigation. 
The litigated patent should be regarded as strong and valid.  Additionally, one 
would expect a payment from the generic company to the brand company which 
might cover the brand company’s legal costs or possible damages. However, this is 
not the case in a pay for delay settlement. Contrary to the intuition set out in the 
two scenarios above, the brand company makes a payment to the generic company. 
This could be seen as a payment that is going in the wrong direction.13 Effectively, 
the brand company pays the generic company for staying out of the market despite 
the fact that the generic company has accepted the validity of the brand company’s 
litigated patents in the same settlement agreement. In other words, the infringing 
party is being paid a considerable amount of money for staying out of the market – 
an outcome that the brand company should get for “free”. This can lead to the 
assumption that the exclusion of the generic company is not based on the strength 
of the patent, but simply on the amount of the payment which the companies 
agreed upon in the settlement. 
In fact, pay for delay settlements create a “win-win” situation for the brand 
company and the generic company, which can be highlighted by discussing the 
economic incentives for both parties to enter into such a settlement. 
 
2.2. Economic incentives of pay for delay settlements 
Initially, a patented drug enables the brand company that holds the patent(s) to 
reap monopoly profits for the period of patent protection. This changes following 
generic entry. The marginal cost of drug production is generally very low, whereas 
the research and development of drugs incurred by the brand company is very 
expensive. On the other hand, generic drugs only have to be bioequivalent, 
meaning that they have to be perfect substitutes by law. 14 Due to the fact that the 
                                                          
13 McDonald (n 5) 3. 
14 It has to be shown that the generic drug which is based on the same active ingredient as the 
branded drug has a rate and extent of absorption after the administration of the drug in the same 
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generic company can rely on the research and development of the brand company 
instead of having to invest in its own research and development of the drug, its 
production and marketing costs are minimal compared to the brand company, 
thereby enabling the generic company to sell the same drug at a significantly lower 
price. This is likely to result in a steep rise in market share for the generic company 
and significant profit losses for the brand company. It is therefore unsurprising that 
the brand company tries to delay such generic entry for as long as possible. 
Pay for delay settlements are a tool used to accomplish such delay, as they 
are creating a “win-win” situation for the brand company and the first potential 
generic entrant. The brand company pays the generic company a lump sum for not 
entering the market. The generic company will only be willing to enter into such an 
agreement if this payment is adequately compensating for the lost profits, taking 
into consideration factors such as the likelihood of success and saved legal costs. 
The brand company has to at least reimburse the generic company the expected 
profits of sales, if not more; thereby effectively sharing its monopoly profits 
proportionately. Compared to actual generic entry, such a payment is still beneficial 
for the brand company. In the case of actual generic entry the brand company loses 
a significant percentage of its market share to the generic entrant within a short 
period of time, thus facing a high loss in profits.15 The first generic entrant is gaining 
the market share, transforming the monopolistic market into a duopoly. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
molar dose that lies within predefined acceptable parameters. Satisfying these conditions shall 
ensure the similarity in terms of safety and efficacy. European Medicines Agency, Guideline on the 
investigation of bioequivalence (CPMP/EWP/QWP/1401/98 Rev. 1 2008) 
<http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/09/WC5000
03011.pdf.> 
15  Henry G Grabowski and John M Vernon, ‘Brand loyalty, entry and price competition in 
pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act’ (1992) 35 Journal of Law and Economics 331. ‘Generic 
prices fell to 78 percent of their initial value at the end of the first year and 65 percent at the end of 
the second year. This steep price decline together with the growing market share obtained by the 
generics is what causes overall market prices to decline’. Id at [336]; H. Grabowski and J. Vernon, 
‘Longer patents for increased generic competition in the US. The Waxman-Hatch Act after one 
decade’ (1996) 2 PharmacoEconomics 110 ‘Drugs that have come off patent since 1991 experienced 
unit sales losses to generics of over 50% during the first several months of generic competition. Id at 
[121]; Ernst R Berndt and Murray L Aitken, ‘Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Competition in 
Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century after the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation’ (2011) 18 
International Journal of the Economics of Business 177 have found that this trend has even 
increased over the last decades leading to ‘much deeper and more rapid declines now than 15 years 
ago following initial implementation of the Waxman-Hatch legislation’ Id at [187]. 
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its profit margins are considerably lower than those of the brand company. This 
makes the rapid increase in market share possible in the first place, but is also the 
reason for a comparatively low profit in relation to the market share. The brand 
company is therefore losing more profit than the generic company is able to gain, 
even though the combined market share stays the same. This profit loss, the extent 
to which might be unpredictable, can be limited and possibly controlled by the 
brand company when it enters into a settlement with the generic company. 
Additionally, the generic company is better off not entering the market and as a 
consequence customers cannot realise the potential gains of welfare which would 
have resulted from the competition between the two companies.16  
 
2.3. Pay for delay settlements in the regulatory context 
So far this section has set out the theoretical mechanism of pay for delay 
settlements and has explained why the parties are willing to enter into such 
settlements. However, the degree to which this mechanism is implemented and the 
aforementioned incentives are realised by the parties is highly dependent on the 
regulatory framework in which the pay for delay settlements take place – the prime 
example being use of pay for delay settlements in light of the US regulatory 
framework surrounding the Hatch Waxman Act. The US regulatory regime could be 
regarded as the cradle for pay for delay settlements. This section therefore 
discusses such settlements in relation to the Hatch Waxman Act, before attention is 
turned to the evaluation of the anticompetitive potential of pay for delay 
settlements in the European context. Doing so enables one to draw comparisons 
between the European and US frameworks and, therefore, to highlight important 
differences that are likely to have a significant impact on the potential for 
anticompetitive effects. 
 
                                                          
16 C. S Hemphill and Mark A Lemley, ‘Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-
Waxman Act’ (2011) 77 Antitrust Law Journal 947, 962. 
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2.3.1. The United States and the Hatch Waxman Act 
As has been mentioned above, pay for delay settlements are in essence patent 
settlements that end ongoing patent infringement litigation. In the United States 
this patent infringement litigation between the brand company and the generic 
entrant is triggered by the generic company’s drug approval application which it 
submitted to the FDA prior to the expiry of the brand company’s patent. 
According to the regulatory framework of the Hatch Waxman Act,17 the 
generic applicant can apply to the FDA for drug approval prior to the expiry of the 
brand company’s patents but must notify the brand company whose drug it wants 
to market as a generic version about the application. The so-called ‘Paragraph IV 
certification’ has to mention every related patent that was filed by the brand 
company in the FDA’s Orange Book.18 This gives the brand company the ability to 
challenge the generic application on grounds of patent infringement. 19  The 
requirement for the FDA to consider the listed patents in the Orange Book 
therefore creates a so-called patent linkage.20 If the brand company decides to 
challenge the generic application, the FDA’s decision on the generic approval is 
postponed by 30 months to enable the parties to resolve their patent dispute in 
court.21 Following this postponement, the FDA approval of the generic drug will be 
effective from the date on which: (1) the patent expires, (2) the court reaches a 
decision on the non-infringement or patent invalidity in the patent litigation, or (3) 
the 30 months from the date of notification have expired,22 whichever comes 
                                                          
17 The purpose of the Hatch Waxman Act is to incentivise generic companies to enter the market for 
a given drug prior to the brand company’s patent expiry by challenging the validity of the brand 
company’s patent. For a detailed description of the drug approval process for brand drugs and 
generic drugs in the United States please see Appendix sec. 1. 
18 The Orange Book is the FDA’s register of all patents in relation to every brand drug that is 
registered with the FDA. For a detailed discussion see Appendix sec. 1.1.2. 
19 Hemphill and Lemley (n 16) 952. 
20 For a detailed discussion of the patent linkage see Appendix sec. 1.1.2. 
21 The intention behind the combination of the 30 months stay and the grant of generic exclusivity 
was to strike a just balance between the brand company’s right to defend itself and its patents 
against unlawful infringement by a generic company that is seeking market entry prior to patent 
expiry and the need to incentivise the patent challenge by generic companies. 
22 Federal Trade Commission, Generic drug entry prior to patent expiration: A FTC study (2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study> 41. 
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first.23 Under normal circumstances, the court’s judgment should have either 
declared the patent invalid, enabling generic applicants to enter the market 
because they no longer have to obey this patent, or declared that the patent had 
not been infringed by the generic applicant leading to the start a period of 180 days 
of generic exclusivity.24 During this period of generic exclusivity, the FDA is not 
allowed to grant any further generic drug applications. After this period, as many 
generic companies as are willing to enter the market may do so simultaneously.  
Pay for delay settlements are, however, able to skew these incentives in 
favour of the parties to the settlement and to the disadvantage of the final 
consumer. As mentioned above, the 30-month stay triggered by the FDA’s approval 
decision of the generic application for market authorisation should allow the parties 
to litigate the patent infringement. Instead, the parties settle their patent 
infringement dispute. The generic company is nonetheless granted the 180 days of 
generic exclusivity, as the generic exclusivity is linked to the filing of the first generic 
drug approval application with the FDA and not to successful litigation.25 
Because the initial patent infringement lawsuit has not been concluded by 
means of a judgment, but rather by means of settlement, the start of the 180 day 
exclusivity period is set to the date of actual generic entry, which has been 
stipulated by the parties in the settlement agreement.  In doing so the parties can 
control and delay subsequent generic entry, as the FDA is not allowed to grant 
further generic drug approvals until the 180 generic exclusivity has elapsed. If the 
generic applicant agreed not to enter the market until 180 days prior to patent 
                                                          
23 Areeda and Hovenkamp (n 5) ¶2046c1. 
24 This exclusivity period was introduced by the Hatch Waxman Act with the intention to provide the 
first generic applicant with an incentive to incur the risk of patent infringement litigation and the 
costs that are associated with it. Elizabeth S Weiswasser and Scott D. Danzis ‘The Hatch-Waxman Act: 
History, Structure, and Legacy’ (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 585, 603. 
25 Another possible misuse of the Orange Book requirements was the so-called “evergreening”. 
Before the FDA changed its policy, which was confirmed by Congress in the Hatch Waxman 
Amendments in 2003, brand companies could file new patents in the Orange Book after the generic 
company had filed its Paragraph IV certification. This move required the generic company to file an 
additional Paragraph IV certification for the newly listed patent, which subsequently prompted a 
second 30-months stay. Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley (n 5) 1754; In the case of PAXIL this 
mechanism was used to extend the stay-period in which the FDA was not allowed to grant any 
generic applications for PAXIL by 65 months. C. S Hemphill and Mark A Lemley, ‘Earning exclusivity: 
Generic drug incentives and the Hatch Waxman Act’ (2011) 77 Antitrust Law Journal 947, 967. 
Nowadays, the brand company is only entitled to one 30-months stay. 
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expiry,26 the brand company’s patent monopoly is effectively unchallengeable for 
the entire duration of the patent life, as the generic exclusivity functions as a 
regulatory bottleneck.27 In return for this delayed entry of the first-filing generic 
company, the brand company typically compensates the generic applicant with a 
payment that is ideally larger than the estimated profits of the generic company. 
Prior to 2003, subsequent generic entrants were unable to overcome this 
bottleneck and had no choice but to wait until the generic exclusivity had elapsed, 
as a brand company’s patent could only be challenged by means of infringement.  
Compared to other sectors this fact is problematic in the pharmaceutical sector as a 
generic company cannot simply decide to enter the market with the aim of 
challenging a brand company through infringement. Entry requires market approval 
by the FDA. However, the FDA was not at liberty to accept any applications until the 
generic exclusivity of the first-filing generic company had elapsed.28 This enabled 
the brand company - as patent holder - to withdraw itself from any possible patent 
challenge by entering into a pay for delay settlement.29 
Having recognised this kind of regulatory bottleneck and the potential for 
the parties to a pay for delay settlement to foreclose the market up to a point that 
has been chosen by the parties, Congress amended the rules regarding the grant of 
the generic exclusivity in an attempt to mitigate this kind misuse of regulatory 
                                                          
26 Initially the parties to the settlement set the start date after the relevant patent had expired, thus 
exceeding the scope of the patent extending the pharmaceutical brand monopoly. However, this 
conduct has been found to be anticompetitive even by District Courts and the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, which apply the “scope of the patent test.” In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride 
Antitrust litigation  544 f.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2828 (2009); Valley Drug Co. 
v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc  344 F.3d 1294, (11th Cir. 2003); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litigation  466 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
27 Hemphill and Lemley (n 16) 963. 
28 Ibid. 963. 
29 In terms of patent law, this effect could be described as turning the rebuttable presumption of 
validity into effectively a non-rebuttable presumption, allowing the brand company to obtain a 
guaranteed legal patent monopoly. However, receiving a patent is not equivalent to an entitlement 
to exclude every competitor. The patent holder can only try to exclude its competitors and the 
probability of success is based on the strength of the patent itself. Shapiro (n 5) 395. Empirical 
evidence has shown that such a rebuttal of validity is not uncommon, especially in the 
pharmaceutical sector as the percentage of litigated valid patents is rather low. John R Allison and 
Mark A Lemley, ‘Emperical evidence on the validity of litigated patents’ (1998) 26 AIPLA Quarterly 
Journal 185. their dataset which includes 300 litigated patents of which 46% were actually 
invalidated by the courts. Federal Trade Commission (n 22) In the pharmaceutical sector this 
percentage is even higher. Between 1992 and 2002, 73% of the litigated patents have been 
invalidated. 
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procedures. The Medicare Act now limits the delay of the start-date of the 180 day 
generic exclusivity by the possible forfeiture of the generic exclusivity period.30 This 
forfeiture forces the first generic applicant to start using its generic exclusivity or 
risk losing it, if a later-filing generic applicant wins its own patent lawsuit.  However, 
the lawsuit has to be won in front of an appellate court.31 If this is the case, the first 
generic applicant has to start using its generic exclusivity within 75 days.32 An 
aggravating factor is that the later-filing generic applicant would have to be sued by 
the brand company in order to actually have the chance of winning the law suit. If 
the brand company refuses to do so, the later-filing generic applicant is still bottled 
up behind the first generic applicant that has been awarded with the generic 
exclusivity.33 What the later-filing generic applicant can do is to file for a declaratory 
judgment against the generic applicant who was awarded generic exclusivity to use 
the 180 day exclusivity. However, according to Hemphill and Lemley, 
 
 ‘a declaratory judgment […] is a chancy thing, because there is often dispute 
about whether the generic firm has standing to bring its suit.’34 
 
Even if the later-filing generic applicant is successful in either of the two possibilities 
above, the actual limitation of the delay is questionable. The generic company 
would have to file an ANDA application, win a patent lawsuit, win the appeal of this 
patent lawsuit, wait 75 days for the first-filing generic company to start using its 
generic exclusivity and then wait another 180 days until it can enter the market. 
This process can easily endure for several years and therefore can delay subsequent 
generic by a significant amount.  
Ultimately, the start-date of the period of generic exclusivity is no longer set 
in stone by the settlement agreement between the brand company and the first 
generic applicant. That said, the above-described delay is still of such magnitude 
                                                          
30 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 
117 Stat 2066. 
31 Carrier (n 5) 48. 
32 Ibid. 48. 
33 Hemphill and Lemley (n 16) 964. 
34 Ibid.  
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that it should not have a significant effect on the behaviour of the companies 
involved in pay for delay settlements and should not mitigate the significant 
anticompetitive potential that arises. Essentially, the brand company can still 
foreclose the market by paying off a single generic competitor. 
 
The Federal Trade Commission has found that pay for delay settlements have a 
direct effect on the American consumer, who is either the final patient who has to 
pay the price for the brand drug privately or a possible co-payment depending on 
his healthcare plan, or the US government that is purchasing the drug for the 
Medicare programme or military hospitals. In a recent report, the Federal Trade 
Commission has estimated the cost and the period of delayed entry of generic entry 
that is caused by pay for delay settlements.  According to this report, such 
settlements have delayed generic entry by an average of 17 months at a cost to the 
consumer of savings totalling US$ 3.5 billion for the period of 2004 to 2009.35  
 
In conclusion, a brand company can use a pay for delay settlement to foreclose the 
market itself until the generic exclusivity of the generic company that has entered 
into the agreement has expired. It can also ensure that its patents cannot be 
challenged by any potential competitor, thereby guaranteeing a legal monopoly – 
an outcome that might be within the technical boundaries of patent rights but 
which, at the same time, contradicts fundamental patent policy. This situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that the patent settlement itself is not based on the validity 
of the patent and the probability of success of getting the validity confirmed by a 
court’s judgment. Rather, it is based on a payment by the brand company to the 
generic company which reflects, at least the estimated profit of the generic 
company if it were to have entered the market. 
 Having discussed the mechanisms of US pay for delay settlements by which 
generic entry can be delayed, the following section now addresses European pay 
                                                          
35 Federal Trade Commission, Pay-for-Delay: How drug company pay-offs cost consumers billions. A 
FTC staff study (2010) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-
consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff>. 
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for delay settlements and establishes in what way similar generic delay can be 
achieved. 
 
2.3.2. Europe 
In its pharmaceutical sector inquiry, the European Commission has identified a 
number of settlement agreements between brand companies and generic 
companies which are regarded as problematic and in need of closer scrutiny. The 
questionable characteristics of these settlements are their potential to limit generic 
entry to the market and the fact that they include a value transfer from the brand 
company to the generic company,36 a situation similar to pay for delay settlements 
in the US. The question is whether these settlements also have a similar 
anticompetitive potential. In the US, the roots of the problem lie in the linkage of 
the approval for market authorisation with the economic consideration of patent 
protection as well as above-described effects of Hatch Waxman Act. With the 
settlement the brand company terminates its patent litigation against the generic 
company, including a value transfer in return for the preclusion of any possible 
patent challenge for the entirety of the patent life. 
The European regulatory framework lacks most of the “US factors” that 
facilitate market foreclosure. Firstly, the European drug safety regulators that 
approve brand and generic drugs and grant market authorisations do not take 
economic factors, such as patent rights of the brand company, into consideration. 
Under EU law, such a patent linkage is not permitted.37 Following European 
secondary legislation,38  no other criteria apart from those regarding public health - 
such as the safety, the quality, and the efficacy of the relevant drug - should be 
taken into consideration when deciding upon the application for a market 
                                                          
36 European Commission (n 1) Box p. 269. 
37 ‘In the interest of public health, authorisation decisions under the centralised procedure should be 
taken on the basis of the objective scientific criteria of quality, safety and efficacy of the medicinal 
product concerned, to the exclusion of economic and other considerations.’(emphasis added) 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the European parliament and of the council laying down 
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency (2004) OJ L 136 Recital 13. 
38 Ibid. Art. 81; Council Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (2001) OJ L 311, Art. 126. 
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authorisation.39 If it should be the case, that a market authorisation for a generic 
version of a drug interferes with the patent status of the originator drug, the issue 
should be resolved by means of private patent litigation in front of competent 
courts. The patent protection for a drug is an important issue for the 
pharmaceutical company, but separate from the safety and efficacy of the drug. 
Secondly, the European regulation does not provide a framework similar to 
the Hatch Waxman Act. Similar to the US, the generic applicant does not have to 
pursue the same lengthy application procedure as the brand company but can rely 
on an abbreviated application procedure. 40  However, there is no difference 
between the first filing applicant and any subsequent generic company that decides 
to enter the market prior to patent expiry. Due to the missing patent linkage, the 
European framework has not created a bottleneck similar to the FDA. The relevant 
agency is not prevented from approving several generic drugs prior to patent 
expiry. Yet every generic entrant runs the same risk of being sued for patent 
infringement by the brand company which might occur separately to the approval 
process. For this reason, it is also not necessary to incentivise the first filing generic 
applicant with a period of generic exclusivity, as this applicant is not the only party 
that can challenge the validity of the brand company’s patents that cover the drug 
in question. As a result the European drug approval regulation does not 
automatically create a type of temporary duopoly without potential for further 
entry within the market for a specific drug simply by granting the first market 
authorisation. 
As a consequence, it is only possible for the brand company to secure 
duopoly profits for a certain period of time, in return for payment to the first 
generic entrant, if the number of possible generic entrants is very limited. For 
example, if only one of the potential generic entrants has the necessary financial 
power to take the risk of being sued for patent infringement, it would be a viable 
option to pay off this competitor.  
                                                          
39 European Commission (n 1) 336. 
40 Directive 2001/83/EC (n 40) Art. 10 (1). 
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However, if several potential competitors are equally strong or equally 
willing to take the risk of possible patent infringement litigation, the viable options 
for the brand company to achieve market foreclosure become more complex. If two 
generic companies intend to enter at the same time, the brand company would 
have to pay off both competitors instead of just the first. It has been suggested that 
paying off multiple entrants at the same time might even be cheaper than paying 
off just one competitor due to the price development of the drug in question after 
the market entry of multiple generic versions of the drug.41 The entry of several 
generic companies will drive down the price of the drug faster and more 
significantly than just one entrant. Yet, if the overall output remains constant, the 
companies receive a smaller market share42 and therefore expect smaller profits 
which, in turn, will have an impact on the amount of the payment which the brand 
company would have to pay for the company not to enter the market. For this to 
work, it is vital for the brand company to know which generic companies plan to 
enter the market. However, such knowledge is not necessarily given. Whereas in 
the United States a generic applicant is obliged to notify the brand company of its 
intention to enter the market, no such mandatory notification is required in the 
European framework due to the missing patent linkage.43 Brand companies in 
Europe might anticipate generic entry by certain generic companies but only know 
for sure on the actual day of entry.  
Furthermore, paying off all potential entrants at the same time would only 
be possible if the generic companies decided to enter simultaneously. However, 
generic companies in Europe may not only have an incentive to enter sequentially 
but also to delay entry themselves. If generic companies that are willing to enter 
the market are not planning to enter at the same time but rather sequentially 
without the brand company knowing about this, the brand company would have to 
                                                          
41 Kades (n 5) 158. 
42 Richard G Frank and David S Salkever, ‘Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals’ (1997) 6 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 89, found that following generic entry the market 
share shifts from the brand company to the generic company without finding a large increase in 
overall demand. 
43 The notification requirement in the US frame work is based on fact that the generic company has 
to notify the brand company that the generic company does not intend to infringe the brand 
company’s patents or that it considers the patents as invalid. 
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enter into agreements with each of the generic entrants in turn. This could have a 
negative impact on the brand company’s strategy to foreclose the market by paying 
off competitors.  
As mentioned above, the incentive for the brand company is to retain its 
monopoly for a certain drug, despite sharing the profits with the first generic 
entrant who has agreed not to enter the market. A subsequent generic entrant is 
therefore still likely to have the same incentive to enter the market as the first 
generic entrant – to gain its share of the monopoly. Although the brand company is 
sharing part of its monopoly profit with the first generic entrant following the 
agreement, it is still the only company that is effectively selling the drug. The brand 
company would therefore have to pay off the second generic as well.  If the second 
generic entrant is equally as strong as the first entrant who has already been paid 
off, the payment which is included in the agreement between the brand company 
and the second generic entrant is likely to be equal or higher than the first 
agreement, as the ultimate goal of full market foreclosure comes closer with every 
generic entrant that is being paid off.   This game could theoretically be repeated 
“n” times, depending on the number of potential generic entrants to the market.  In 
fact, the brand company should have to pay the highest price to the last potential 
entrant that can enter the market, as this pay-off would finally lead to the 
foreclosure of the market. The actual cost for the full foreclosure of the market 
would therefore depend on the number of generic entrants that are sequentially 
entering the market, with the cost per potential entrant rising with each pay-off. As 
a result, the brand company would incur significantly higher costs compared to 
those observed in the United States, if the aim is to fully foreclose the market.  
In conclusion, it can be said that the incentives for brand companies to enter 
into pay for delay settlements with generic competitors in Europe must be different 
to the incentives in the United States. This is largely due to differences in the 
relevant regulatory framework. Brand companies in Europe cannot generally 
foreclose the market for a certain drug by paying off the first generic competitor. 
Furthermore, the brand company does not have exact knowledge about the 
intention of other potential generic entrant because of the lack of a mandatory 
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notification system, which makes the predictability of generic entry difficult. 
Although it might be efficient and cheaper to enter into agreements with all 
potential competitors at once, the scenario is only likely to be possible in a limited 
number of cases.  Generic companies might rather have an incentive to conceal and 
delay their point of entry to reap a higher pay for delay from the brand company. 
Finally, it can be said that the European regulatory framework alone and the 
ensuing lack of achievability of the economic incentives of pay for delay settlements 
as described in the case of the United States, do not explain the reasons for why 
brand companies in Europe choose to enter into such agreements. Therefore the 
next section establishes factors that make pay for delay settlements in Europe a 
feasible strategy. After all, the European Commission has identified 45 pay for delay 
settlements in its pharmaceutical sector inquiry.  
 
2.3.3. An alternative theory of harm for European pay for delay settlements 
Despite the lack of economic incentives for brand companies to enter into pay for 
delay settlements in Europe, these kinds of settlement have become increasingly 
more common in the EU. In its sector inquiry, the European Commission has 
identified 45 settlement agreements which are equivalent to US-style pay for delay 
settlements.44 Assuming that brand companies as well as generic companies are 
driven by profit-maximising strategies and rational management decisions, the fact 
that the parties enter into pay for delay settlements should lead to the 
presumption that such agreements are economically beneficial. The relevant 
factors that make such settlements viable might simply be different compared to 
the United States. 
The settlements identified by the European Commission mostly covered 
more than one Member State at a time. The highest number of such settlements 
was counted in Germany, the European Member State with the second highest 
pharmaceutical market value across all Member States. Surprisingly Austria, a 
Member State with a rather low market value, takes the second place whereas 
                                                          
44 European Commission (n 1) 762. 
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France, the Member State with the highest market value, is only midfield.45 This 
unexpected outcome of the correlations between the number of settlements and 
the value of the market in the relevant geographic area suggests that the value of 
the pharmaceutical market is not the only - and maybe not even the primary factor 
- that is considered in the parties’ decision about which Member States they enter 
into such a settlement agreement with.  
The actual structure of the relevant pharmaceutical market could, for 
instance, prove an influential factor when deciding whether or not to enter into a 
pay for delay settlement, in addition to factors relating to market value and the 
national pharmaceutical regulations of the Member State in question. Despite the 
fact that the regulatory regime in the EU does technically not provide the possibility 
to foreclose the market by means of a single agreement, the actual structure of a 
pharmaceutical market in a given Member State might nonetheless facilitate such 
foreclosure. This could be the case, if the market lacks diversity in the generic 
sector. Although generic companies appear to be independent entities, they could 
in fact be a “generic branch” of the brand company or a subsidiary of a larger 
generic company.46  Keeping this market consolidation in mind, an objectively 
diverse and competitive market - where there are a number of generic companies 
that have the potential to be future competitors in the after-market of a brand drug 
- could turn out to be a market with a lot less potential for competition due to the 
existence of a few pharmaceutical conglomerates that incorporate several generic 
companies or are at least majority shareholders of these companies. If this 
hypothesis holds true, it might be more feasible for the brand company to pay off 
all generic competitors that have actually the potential to enter the market, as their 
number would probably be a lot smaller compared to the number of generic 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 777. 
46 For example, the generic company Sandoz is the generic division of the brand company Novartis. 
Over the years, Sandoz itself has acquired a number of generic companies such as Lek 
Pharmaceuticals in 2002, Slovenia’s largest pharmaceutical company, and HEXAL in 2005, one of 
Germany’s biggest generic companies. Sandoz International GmBH, ‘Sandoz History’ 
<http://www.sandoz.com/about_us/sandoz_history.shtml>. 
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companies present at a national level.47 Alternatively, it might also be the case that 
only a few generic companies are capable of entering “at their own risk” prior to 
patent expiry despite a large number of generic companies being present in the 
pharmaceutical sector as a whole. This might be the case in the European 
Commission’s proceedings against the French pharmaceutical company Servier and 
its recent decision against Lundbeck.48 The Commission has sent a statement of 
objections to Servier and a number of generic companies taking the view that 
‘patent settlement agreements between Servier and the generic companies were 
aimed at delaying or preventing the market entry of cheap generic versions of 
perindopril’.49 In Lundbeck the European Commission has imposed a €146 Million 
fine on Lundbeck and a small number of generic companies because of the delay of 
generic entry of citalopram.50 
 
2.4. Concluding remarks 
Compared to the US experience, the analysis has shown that pay for delay 
settlements in Europe are only likely to have a similar potential for anticompetitive 
foreclosure if the actual market structure is conducive to such foreclosure. If there 
are a large number of potential generic entrants, it is unlikely that the brand 
company will achieve foreclosure and equally unlikely that pursuing foreclosure will 
be profitable endeavour. However, these findings should not suggest that pay for 
delay settlements do not warrant antitrust scrutiny in Europe – after all, these 
settlements have become more common in Europe and the parties to the 
settlements would not enter into such arrangements if they were not profitable. 
                                                          
47 It would be ideal to test this hypothesis empirically, however that has been proved to be difficult. 
The European Commission’s dataset which was acquired in the light of the pharmaceutical sector 
inquiry would be ideal, as it covers requested information about settlement from brand companies 
as well as generic companies regarding 217 active ingredients, the main chemical entity of a number 
of identified so-called blockbuster drugs, across Member States. Unfortunately, the author has so far 
been denied access to this dataset. 
48 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Lundbeck and other pharma companies for 
delaying market entry of generic medicines (Brussels, 19 June 2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-563_en.htm>. 
49 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections on perindopril to 
Servier and others (Brussels, 30 July 2012) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-
835_en.htm>. 
50 European Commission (n 48). 
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The focus of the antitrust scrutiny should be on the actual market structure, as it 
has been proposed by the alternative theory of harm.  
 
3. Early entry agreements  
Having set out a potential theory of harm for pay for delay settlements in the 
European context in the previous section, attention now turns to early entry 
agreements in Europe and their anticompetitive potential based on a novel theory 
of harm. Following a descriptive discussion of the early entry agreements identified 
in the European Commission’s sector inquiry, this section proceeds to set out the 
economic incentives for the two parties involved to enter into early entry 
agreements. Special focus is placed on the early generic entrant’s first-mover 
advantage over subsequent independent generic entry. The discussion of the 
generic first-mover advantage is largely based on empirical evidence from across 
the globe dealing with the risk aversion and switching behaviour of prescribing 
doctors, pharmacists and patients. This discussion finally leads to an outline of the 
potential anticompetitive effects that might arise from this first-mover advantage in 
connection with the structure of the pharmaceutical sector. These factors are then 
used to develop a theory of harm. 
 
In the course of its investigation into the pharmaceutical sector, the European 
Commission has identified 87 settlements between a brand company and a generic 
company which are regarded as early entry agreements.51 In contrast to the above-
mentioned pay for delay settlements, the brand company does not attempt to pay 
off the first generic entrant to stay outside the market, but rather “teams up” with 
the first generic entrant, even prior to the brand company’s loss of patent 
exclusivity for the brand drug concerned. Having a generic version of the brand 
drug enter the market, even prior to patent expiry, should generally be seen as pro-
competitive as it extends the monopolistic market to a duopoly. The creation of 
choice between the brand drugs and the generic one should have an impact on 
                                                          
51 European Commission (n 1) 808. 
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price. Additionally, there should not give rise to any concerns regarding quality 
given the strict drug approval regulations being in place and the necessity of 
bioequivalence between the brand drug and the generic.52  Nonetheless, the 
European Commission has launched an investigation into these kinds of settlement 
during its sector inquiry, requesting detailed information about these settlements 
from the parties involved. Following the information provided, these settlements 
do not entail consistent provisions of the same legal nature. It is rather a 
combination of different agreements and it is exactly this combination from which 
the need for antitrust scrutiny arises.  
Within the European Commission’s findings, the majority of early entry 
agreements (63 out of 87) included a supply agreement, in which the brand 
company agreed to supply the generic company with the required quantity of the 
drug in order for it to be resold by the generic company. In most of these, cases 
these supply agreements provided the generic company with the obligation to 
purchase the quantities exclusively from the brand company, as opposed to 
producing the quantities itself.53 For 45 of these 63 settlements, the supply price 
has been fixed by the parties for the entirety of the agreement or has been subject 
to renegotiations following material changes to the economic circumstances or 
following certain time periods.54 The exclusivity of these agreements did not only 
cover the sourcing of the drug but also the geographic region in which the generic 
company is allowed to sell the drug. This restriction was achieved either by explicit 
clauses that prohibited sales outside the agreed territory or by means of a transfer 
of a market authorisation to the generic company restricted to the territory 
concerned.55 In the scenario in which the market authorisation is restricted, the 
generic companies might still have the ability to apply for a market authorisation 
for other geographic areas, but are not assisted by the brand company in any way. 
                                                          
52 It has to be shown that the generic drug which is based on the same active ingredient than the 
branded drug has a rate and extent of absorption after the administration of the drug in the same 
molar dose that lies within predefined acceptable parameters. Satisfying these conditions shall 
ensure the similarity in terms of safety and efficacy. European Medicines Agency (n 14).  
53 European Commission (n 1) 843. 
54 Ibid. 822. 
55 Ibid. 849. 
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Thus, it is unlikely that such an application would be economically viable due to the 
incurred costs. Furthermore, 29 of the early entry agreements included a non-
compete obligation for the generic company, which prevents the generic company 
from marketing alternative products manufactured by different brand companies if 
the alternative drugs contains the same active ingredient or is regarded as a 
competing product to the brand company. 56  A possibly aggravating factor 
concerning the agreements that include non-compete clauses is the fact that brand 
companies try to enter into these agreements with generic companies that not only 
have the relevant expertise, but are also able to capture significant market shares 
using their distribution systems and customer contacts.57 If such generic companies 
enter into an agreement with the brand company, the possibilities for alternative 
products to enter the market might be limited as they would lack the usage of the 
superior distribution networks of the large generic companies. 
The final key point that warrants antitrust scrutiny is the timing and the 
duration of early entry agreements. At least half of the identified agreements were 
entered into by the parties one year prior to the loss of exclusivity of the brand 
company’s patent and, on average, the agreements exceeded the loss of exclusivity 
by two years;58 however, in the most extreme case, it was more than 14 years.59 
This fact leads to a questionable situation where early entry agreements are in 
force for several years despite the fact that the bases on which they were 
concluded no longer exist. The brand companies were able to stipulate the clauses 
concerning market allocation, exclusive dealing, distribution and price 
determination only because of the potentially excluding power of their patents. 
Upon patent expiry, it could be argued that any agreement based on the relevant 
patent should lose its validity. Yet it should at least warrant close antitrust scrutiny 
due to the possible anticompetitive nature of the concluded clauses within the 
agreements. 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 847. 
57 Ibid. 838. 
58 Ibid. Box p. 310. 
59 Ibid. 853. 
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Generally speaking, it can be said that early entry agreements and the 
potential problems arising from them are faced two ways. On the one hand, 
allowing a generic company to enter the market prior to patent expiry should 
accelerate generic competition in the market and should thus be regarded as pro-
competitive. On the other hand, early entry agreements consist of supply 
agreements with fixed prices, market allocation agreements and exclusive dealing 
agreements which exceed the patent life. Such a combination of factors should 
automatically raise suspicion of antitrust concern and, as such, demand scrutiny. 
Such agreements could have anticompetitive potential in the “post-patent market”, 
even if they do not exceed the patent life, by exploiting the pharmaceutical market 
structure and the inertia of the stakeholder in the market to switch from brand 
drugs to generics and between generics, thereby distorting the competitive 
process. 
However, before we come to the discussion of the anticompetitive potential 
of early entry agreements, the economic incentives of the generic company as well 
as the brand company need to be examined. 
 
3.1. Economic incentives for early entry agreements 
The parties to an early entry agreement only enter into such an agreement if it is 
economically sensible. Just as in the case of pay for delay settlements, the 
agreement must be more lucrative for the parties than litigating the patent 
infringement. This section therefore identifies the possible factors that influence 
the decision of the generic company to enter into an early entry agreement, before 
then proceeding to consider the incentives of the brand company. 
 
3.1.1. Incentives for the generic company 
Generic companies are likely to have a number of reasons for entering the 
concerned market by entering via an early entry agreement with the brand 
company, instead of trying to enter the market independently prior to patent 
expiry. For instance, the “agreed” entry prior to patent expiry eradicates the risk of 
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being sued for patent infringement by the brand company. An early entry 
agreement can also reduce the sunk cost that the generic company would incur 
during preparation for entry and, thus, would make the cost of entry and the 
anticipated revenues and profits more predictable. However, the predominant 
reason for entering into such an agreement with the brand company is most likely 
to be the first-mover advantage of the first generic entrant, which is the central 
argument in this discussion. This first-mover advantage is likely to be particularly 
significant in markets like the market for antiepileptic drugs, as described in the 
section on market definition in the previous chapter.60 
 
3.1.1.1. Incurred costs of production and marketing 
Before a generic company is allowed to market a generic version of a drug, it has to 
fulfil regulatory requirements just as the brand company did initially. Although the 
generic company does not have to undergo the very time-consuming procedure of 
clinical testing which is associated with the application of the brand company for 
the approval of a new drug including a novel active ingredient, the generic company 
must nonetheless file an abbreviated or abridged application with the relevant 
national medical regulator, proving the bioequivalence of the generic version in 
relation to the brand drug. Compared to the effort which the brand company has to 
undertake in order to receive approval, the generic approval has been designed to 
be significantly more time and cost-efficient. It is, however, still likely that the 
generic approval process takes up to 12 months to complete at a cost of several 
hundred thousand Euros.61 
Additionally, the generic company has to set up a production line for the 
new generic drug. All these costs are sunk costs which have to be recouped by the 
generic company before making any profit. 
Following an early entry agreement, the generic company does not 
necessarily produce the generic drug itself. In many cases, the brand company 
                                                          
60 See chapter II sec. 5.1.1.1. If patients are only switched once during their period of treatment to 
avoid the occurrence of epileptic seizures, it is essential for a generic entrant to be first.  
61  Susanne Keitel, The Procedures to Apply for a Marketing Authorisation in the EU, 
<http://www.cpier.pku.edu.cn/doc/06EU/EU%20(eng).pdf> 
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supplies the generic company with the finished product which is effectively the 
repackaged brand drug from the same production line.62 Also, the generic company 
does not necessarily have to apply for the necessary market authorisation. As part 
of the early entry agreement, the brand company provides the generic company 
with a copy of its own market authorisation. The usual sunk costs can therefore be 
avoided by the generic company that is entering into an early entry agreement with 
the brand company. Of course this comes at the price of paying royalties to the 
brand company, but also avoids the risks associated with investing in a generic 
version of a brand drug without the security of financial return.  
 
3.1.1.2. First-mover advantage 
The major incentive for the generic company to enter into an early entry agreement 
is likely to be the first-mover advantage. In the pharmaceutical sector especially, 
the generic first-mover advantage can be significant in light of potential switching 
inertia.63 Following a brief discussion of the general impact of switching costs on the 
first-mover advantage, this section focuses on the switching behaviour of (i) 
prescribing doctors and (ii) dispensing pharmacists separately and evaluates their 
impact on the switching costs of subsequent generic entrants, in order to highlight 
the significance for a generic entrant to consider the first-mover advantage. 
 
Under an early entry agreement, the generic entrant will be the first generic 
company that sells its drug in the market. Such a first-mover advantage is usually 
extremely beneficial for the first generic entrant,64 as - in theory - no further 
significant generic entry should be expected following the rationale behind 
                                                          
62 European Commission (n 1) 843. 
63 Doctors’ prescribing inertia has already been addressed specifically in relation to antiepileptic 
drugs in Chapter II 5.1.1.1. 
64 In the United States, “most generic drug companies estimate that 60% to 80% of their potential 
profit for any one product is made during [180-day generic] exclusivity period [granted by the Hatch 
Waxman Act].” Daniel F Coughlin and A. D Rochelle, ‘Hatch-Waxman Game-Playing from a Generic 
Manufacturer Perspective: From Ticlid® to Pravachol®, Apotex Has Difficulty Telling Who’s on First’ 
(2006) 25 Biothechnology Law Report 525, 525-26. 
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Bertrand competition.65 By law, generic drugs have to be bioequivalent to the 
brand drug. In the case of the above-described terms of early entry agreements, the 
distributed generic drug might even be identical to the brand drug, as it is produced 
by the brand company and only repackaged and distributed by the generic 
company. So because the brand drug and the generic drug are homogeneous 
products by law, the pharmaceutical companies should not compete on quality but 
simply on price. Such price competition should lead to a reduction of the price 
down to marginal cost and should dis-incentivise any other generic entry into the 
market, as two companies are sufficient to drive down price in a given market.  
Yet reality shows us that the first generic entrant might be safeguarded from 
further generic competition only until the patent protection of the brand company 
expires. By this point, multiple generic companies are entering the market.66 This 
fact contradicts the general logic of Bertrand competition, which assumes that two 
pharmaceutical companies selling a homogeneous product in the market should be 
sufficient to drive price towards marginal cost. Thus, it needs to be assumed that 
generic drugs are differentiated products compared to brand drugs and not 
homogeneous, although generic drugs are required to be bioequivalent to the 
brand drug.67  
Despite the fact that a given pharmaceutical market seems to be able to 
accommodate several differentiated generic versions of the same brand drug, the 
early generic entrant still has a significant first-mover advantage. One would expect 
an early generic entrant’s market share to decrease with the entry of further 
generic competitors after patent expiry, as the generic drugs are likely to compete 
fiercely on price. Yet, as has already been shown in the previous chapter, the first 
                                                          
65 Under Bertrand competition two firms supply a homogenous good and only compete on price. 
Both firms have the same fix costs and have the same marginal costs. If firm 1 undercuts the price 
set by firm 2 it maximises its profits as it is supplying the whole market. The same is true for firm 2 in 
relation to firm 1. For both firms it is therefore sensible to set the price at marginal cost as it is not 
sensible to undercut this price. Ultimately, this situation therefore leads to allocative efficiency. 
Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The economics of EC competition law: Concepts, application and 
measurement (University Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010). 2-027, 2-028. 
66 The pharmaceutical sector inquiry has provided evidence that on average 4-5 generic companies 
enter the market within the first year after the loss of patent exclusivity. European Commission (n 1) 
201. 
67 For the detailed discussion of bioequivalence see Chater II sec. 5.1.1.1.  
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generic entrant has a significant advantage over subsequent generic entrants in 
terms of market share.68 Such an impact on the independent generic profits can 
affect the long-run equilibrium in the generic market.69 
This significant impact on the first-mover advantage could be explained by 
the slow switching behaviour of consumers. The switching behaviour of consumers 
depends on the related switching costs in the relevant market. In pharmaceutical 
sectors across the world these costs are unusually high due to the unique structure 
of the sector. Such costs arise from the fact that the late entrant has to invest extra 
resources to persuade pharmacists and consumers to switch from the product of 
the first entrant to its own, in this case an identical product.70 Switching costs can 
be influenced and increased by a number of factors, such as the consumer’s 
imperfect information and uncertainty about the available choice in the market, as 
well as the quality of the product. These factors could have an impact on the 
perceived risk of switching of the consumer, and the possible brand loyalty towards 
the product of the first entrant. In the pharmaceutical sector, however, the 
perceived risk of the consumer is not the only thing at issue. Even more important 
is the perceived risk of the prescribing doctors and the dispensing pharmacists. 
In ordinary markets, the second entrant to a market has to persuade the 
final consumer to purchase its products instead of the product of the first entrant. 
Yet, in the pharmaceutical sector for prescription drugs the patient as the final 
consumer is not the one making the decision on which product to purchase. The 
actual choice lies with the prescribing doctor who decides which drug is most 
appropriate to treat the patient’s condition. Moreover, another player that has an 
impact on the actual distributed drug is the pharmacist. Particularly in the generic 
pharmaceutical market, the pharmacist might have the ability to substitute the 
prescribed drug with a cheaper generic drug.  
                                                          
68 Richard E Caves, Michael D Whinston and Mark A Hurwitz, ‘Patent expiration, entry, and 
competition in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry’ (1991) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1; 
Grabowski and Vernon (n 15); Aidan Hollis, ‘The importance of being first: evidence from Canadian 
generic pharmaceuticals’ (2002) 11 Health Economics 723. See chapter II sec. 5.1.1.1. 
69 David Reiffen and Michael R Ward, 'Branded Generics' as a Strategy to Limit Cannibalization of 
Pharmaceutical Markets’ (2007) 28 Managerial and Decision Economics 251, 255. 
70 Marvin B Lieberman and David B Montgomery, ‘First-mover advantages’ (1988) 9 Strategic 
Management Journal 41. 
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By analysing empirical evidence, the remainder of this section therefore 
addresses the factors of imperfect information, perceived risk and brand loyalty. 
These factors have to be considered in relation to the decision making process of 
the prescribing doctor and the distribution process of the pharmacist, as well as the 
patient as the final customer. Although the patient cannot choose the drug himself, 
he is likely to be able to influence the decisions taken by the doctor and the 
pharmacist.  
 
(i) Prescribing doctors 
This section discusses the possible inertia of prescribing doctors to switch their 
patients from a brand drug to a generic drug. From a theoretical point of view, 
imperfect information about the availability and the uncertainty about the quality 
of a generic drug should not have a significant impact on prescribing doctors. 
Doctors should generally be aware of the different choices of drugs and they should 
not be concerned about the quality of generic drugs. By means of pharmaceutical 
approval regulations for generic drugs, the generic company has to prove to the 
relevant pharmaceutical regulatory body that a generic version is bioequivalent to 
the brand drug. The generic drug might not have the same colour or the same 
shape as the brand drug, but the generic drug has to be equally safe and efficient. 
In the chemical sense, the brand drug and its generic version must be identical. 
Having knowledge of this regulatory prerequisite, a doctor’s prescription decision 
should be based predominantly on price. Generic drugs are known to be 
significantly cheaper compared to their brand counterparts. With further generic 
entry, the price for a generic drug should be driven down - faster and further.71 It 
should be in the doctor’s interest to prescribe the cheapest generic version of a 
drug as it reduces the price or the co-payment for the drug which the patient has to 
pay depending on the relevant pharmaceutical market’s reimbursement scheme.   
                                                          
71 Berndt and Aitken (n 15) 187. 
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However, empirical evidence shows that doctors do not necessarily 
prescribe a new generic drug as soon as it enters the market, even if it is cheaper.72 
Doctors rather seem to wait a longer period before prescribing a generic drug, if 
they are uncertain about the generic drug’s quality.73 This finding implies that even 
doctors who are aware of the bioequivalence of generic drugs have a “learning 
experience” concerning the drugs’ safety and efficiency. 
This lack of trust by the doctors regarding the identical nature of generic 
drugs and the relevant brand drug, especially in the United States, might well have 
found its origins in a bribing scandal of FDA officials that occurred in 1989.74 It has 
been shown by an interview study that this scandal has had a negative impact on 
the confidence of generic drugs.75 Although Europe is short of such a scandal, the 
actual method that is used to measure bioequivalence for generic approval and the 
guidance set out by the European Medicines Agency (EMEA)76 arguably have an 
impact on a doctor’s decision to delay prescribing  a new drug until it has been tried 
and tested by other doctors. The EMEA guideline states that bioequivalence is to be 
determined by statistical analysis using a group of healthy volunteers between the 
age of 18 and 55 and that the participants should be non-smokers, without a 
history of alcohol and drug abuse and should have a normal Body Mass Index.77  
This design of bioequivalence studies has been subject to criticism as a successful 
study only shows limited side effects and the equivalent effectiveness to the brand 
drug is not necessarily a good indicator for the effectiveness and safety of every 
                                                          
72 Jörgen Hellström and Niklas Rudholm, ‘Uncertainty in the generic versus brand name prescription 
decision’ (2010) 38 Empirical Economics 503. (using a panel data set of 17,821 prescriptions across 9 
different substances in a Swedish county from 2001 to 2003, with mandatory generic substitution 
rules being introduced in October 2002. Pharmacists had to substitute unless the prescribing doctor 
expressly prohibited a substitution) 
73 Ibid. 518. 
74 Pola B Gupta, ‘Survey of pharmacists: Impact of the generic drug scandal and implications for 
marketing generic drugs’ (1996) 13 Health Marketing Quarterly 109, 112. Generic companies in the 
United States bribed FDA examiners and obtained market authorisations for their generic drugs 
which were based on false data. The submission of this data violated the good manufacturing 
practice, which ensures the safety, purity and effectiveness of generic drugs. 
75 Ibid. 117. 
76 European Medicines Agency (n 14). 
77 Ibid. 7. 
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patient.78 The tested group consists of a selection of healthy average male and 
female subjects. This may not mirror society and the potential patients for a given 
drug. Patients do not necessarily have only a single medical condition and they are 
not necessarily in good physical shape, non-drinking and non-smoking. All of these 
variables could have a considerable effect on the absorption rate of a drug and 
therefore its effectiveness.79  Prescribing doctors are therefore likely to delay 
switching to a new generic drug until evidence has shown that the generic drug 
does not cause adverse effects to their patients whose medical condition falls 
outside the characteristics of the tested group.80  
Another factor that needs to be considered is the possible persistence of 
doctors in their prescription behaviour which might build a brand loyalty of the 
patients towards one specific product. Empirical evidence suggests that doctors are 
not indifferent across generic versions of a brand drug although they are 
bioequivalent.81 Even in the absence of price differentiation, doctors show a 
preference for the generic version which their patients are accustomed to.82 The 
longer a patient is being prescribed a certain generic drug the less likely it is that 
this patient will be switched to another generic drug by his doctor. The above-
discussed risk aversion of doctors is likely to feed into this factor. The switch to a 
generic drug is delayed due the “learning process” of doctors. They only prescribe a 
generic drug if they are fully aware of all possible side effects and the drug’s 
effectiveness. The longer this process takes the less likely it is that a doctor switches 
a patient to a new generic drug because of the patient’s preference and possible 
brand loyalty. 
 
 
 
                                                          
78 Peter Meredith, ‘Bioequivalence and Other Unresolved Issues in Generic Drug Substitution’ (2003) 
25 Clinical Therapeutics 2879. 
79 Ibid. 2879. 
80 Hellström and Rudholm (n 72). 518. 
81 Andrea Coscelli, ‘The importance of doctors' and patients' preferences in the prescription decision’ 
(2000) 48 The Journal of Industrial Economics 367. (using a patient-level data set of over 75000 
observations in relation to prescription for anti-ulcer drugs by 350 doctors in Rome) 
82 Ibid. 363. 
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(ii) Dispensing pharmacists 
Prescribing doctors are not the only players that have an impact on switching costs 
in the process of generic drug substitution. The doctor prescribes the relevant drug, 
but the patient receives the drug from the pharmacists. The pharmacist can 
therefore be seen as the middle man who is also likely to have an impact on the 
actual drug distribution. Most Member States have enabled the pharmacist to 
influence the drug distribution by affording them the ability to substitute a 
prescribed drug with a generic version of the brand drug or a different version of 
the generic drug itself.83 So even if the doctor prescribes a brand drug, the 
pharmacist can or must substitute the prescription with a generic drug. In the 
Member States where generic substitution is not mandatory, the question has to be 
asked of how willing the pharmacist is to substitute a prescription, if the prescribing 
doctor has not done so due to the risk aversion and the above-described learning 
process. On the one hand, the pharmacist could act as a counterbalance to a risk-
averse doctor and thus reduce the switching costs for the new generic entrant. This 
would be the case if the pharmacist would take the switching decision for the 
prescribing doctor who was unwilling to switch the patient. On the other hand, the 
pharmacist could also retain the level of switching costs. This would be the case if 
the pharmacist also showed a propensity towards risk aversion. The pharmacist 
might simply distribute the prescription of the risk-averse doctor, even though he 
might have the opportunity for substitution. 
As is the case with the prescribing doctor, pharmacists are also aware of the 
bioequivalence of generic drugs compared to brand drugs, as well as other generic 
versions of the same brand drug. So in theory they should be indifferent to the 
generic version of the same brand drug. The predominant factor in their 
distribution decision should be price. However, the pharmacists’ drug choice could 
also be influenced by their customers at the point of sale and it depends on the 
                                                          
83 ‘Some Member States explicitly lay down this right for pharmacies in their legislation. In this case, 
pharmacists will make substitutions if they are incentivised to do so either by being able to make 
bigger margins or because of their regulated tariff structures. Others go further and make it 
mandatory for pharmacies to substitute. In such cases the pharmacies must dispense the cheapest 
version of the active substance available.’ (emphasis added) European Commission (n 1) 367. 
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pharmacists’ reaction to this kind of influence. Most patients/customers will 
probably not have realised the switch to a new drug at the “prescription stage” but, 
rather, at the pharmacy when exchanging the prescription for the actual drug. If 
such an influence is present at the point of sale, the preference and/or risk aversion 
of the customer would be closely related to the pharmacists’ drug choice.  
Empirical evidence has shown that customers/patients are not necessarily 
aware of generic drugs and the fact that generic drugs are bioequivalent to the 
brand drug.84 According to an interview study, this lack of awareness causes 
confusion, if not suspicion and mistrust.85 Customers were confused that they were 
being offered a different drug than the one they were being prescribed by their 
doctors and suspicious about the pharmacists’ underlying motive to offer a 
different drug. They questioned the safety and efficacy of the drug and wanted to 
check this with their prescribing doctor.86 This misconception of generic drugs and 
the role of the pharmacist have a direct effect on pharmacists’ behaviour. 
According to the same evidence, pharmacists feel frustrated due to the lack of trust 
of their customers and the need to educate the customers about the efficacy and 
safety of generic drugs.87 Due to these difficulties, some pharmacists mentioned 
that they do not even attempt to offer the customer other generic drugs instead of 
the ones the customer has previously been prescribed.88  
This suggests that the behaviour of pharmacists can have a big impact on 
the substitution of generic drugs when they have discretion regarding the actual 
choice of drug depending on the prescription of the doctor, the generic availability 
and the national pharmaceutical regulatory scheme in place.  
                                                          
84 Reeta Heikkilä et al., ‘Customers’ and physicians’ opinions of and experiences with generic 
substitution during the first year in Finland’ (2007) 82 Health Policy 366, 373. (interview study based 
on questionnaires hand out to pharmacy customers who had rejected substitution (n=1243), 
customers who had accepted substitution (n=453)  and interviews with prescribing doctors (n=49)) 
85 Liz Gill and others, ‘How do customers and pharmacists experience generic substitution?’ (2010) 4 
International Journal of Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Marketing 375, 386. (interview study 
conducted in Australia, Italy and Finland, using unstructured interviews to explore subjective 
experience of 15 pharmacists and 30 customers in relation to generic substitution. The interviewees 
provided similar responses across the three different countries.) 
86 Ibid. 386. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 384. 
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In summary, it can be said that generic substitution on the pharmaceutical 
market is likely to be influenced by three different players – the prescribing doctors, 
the pharmacists and the patients/customers themselves. The behaviour of all three 
players is interdependent and cannot necessarily be separated.  Doctors are 
reluctant to switch their patients to new generic drugs soon after the drugs have 
entered the market, due to risk aversion. The learning process that doctors undergo 
can be time-consuming. Yet the longer the process lasts the less likely it is that 
doctors will switch their patients to a new generic drug because of the patient’s 
preference and habit.89 The second potential opportunity for generic substitution is 
at the point of sale of the drug in the pharmacy. The pharmacist has the ability to 
amend the doctor’s prescription and to sell a different generic version of the brand 
drug to the customer. This does, however, depend on the pharmacist’s willingness 
to do so. This willingness is again influenced by worried customers who are not 
aware of the reasons behind generic substitution which can lead to mistrust against 
the pharmacist and resistance against new generic drugs. It is not suggested that 
generic substitution ceases to occur as soon as patients have developed a 
preference for a certain drug, but it is likely to take time to inform them about a 
newly available generic drug, its efficacy and safety. Such a delay in the actual 
distribution of a new generic drug to the customers can increase the switching costs 
significantly, raise the barriers to entry for future generic competition and 
ultimately, contributes to the generic first-mover advantage. 
 
3.1.2. Incentives for the brand company 
After having discussed the incentives for the generic company to enter into an early 
entry agreement and in particular the generic first-mover advantage, the discussion 
now turns to the brand company’s incentive. Compared to the generic company, 
the brand company ought to have incentives to enter into an early entry agreement 
which are of a different nature and of higher value.90 By allowing a generic 
                                                          
89 Coscelli (n 81) 367. 
90 Following the generic entrant, the brand company loses more of its monopoly profits than the 
generic company can gain, which leads to consumer surplus. This has been one of the key arguments 
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company to enter early, the brand company waives its monopoly profits and agrees 
to transform a monopoly into a duopoly despite not having to do so due to patent 
protection of its brand drug. The predominant reason for this behaviour is likely to 
be the brand company’s attempt to mitigate the dramatic loss of profits that is 
anticipated after patent expiry, which is discussed in the following section. 
However, it is this attempt to mitigate the anticipated losses from generic 
entry, where one has to differentiate between, one the one hand, the brand 
company’s business acumen to create new revenue on the “post-patent market” 
and, on the other hand, types of conduct that have the potential or are 
intentionally used by the brand company to distort the competitive process of the 
market and thus extend the brand company’s profits in an anticompetitive way. 
 
3.1.2.1. Capturing generic profits 
A legitimate incentive for the brand company to enter into an early entry 
agreement based on its business acumen could be to capture generic profits. The 
brand company is likely to be able to extend its profits by agreeing to an early 
generic entrant. Undoubtedly, the brand company loses market share and revenue 
following the arrival of the generic entrant, but these losses are mitigated by the 
royalties that the generic company has to pay due to the early entry.  
Indeed, losing market share and revenue close to the perceived patent 
expiry date can actually be beneficial for the brand company, as these factors are 
important determinants for the amount of generic entry. For example, the higher 
the hospital sales of a brand drug one year prior to patent expiry the larger the 
number of generic entrants.91 The theory that the loss of market share and revenue 
is mitigated by the use of an authorised generic is given weight by an FTC study on 
authorised generics.92 The interim findings have shown, using retail quantities as a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
for pay for delay settlements, discussed above in section 2.2. Because the brand company has more 
to lose, its incentives to enter into early entry agreements should theoretically be higher than for the 
generic company. 
91 Fiona M Scott Morton, ‘Barriers to entry, brand advertising, and generic entry in the US 
pharmaceutical industry’ (2000) 18 International Journal of Industrial Organization 1085, 1102. 
92 Authorized generics are generic versions of brand drugs that are marketed by the relevant brand 
company itself. 
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measure to show the impact of authorised generics on the market, that the 
combined quantities of the brand drug plus the authorised generic dispensed by the 
brand company is higher than the market share of the brand company alone, 
following subsequent generic entry. Although the market share of the brand drug 
initially decreases due to the authorised generic, the combined market share of the 
brand company after independent generic entry is higher in comparison to the 
brand company’s market share without the authorised generic when faced by 
independent generic entry.93 Using authorised generics in the United States is seen 
by the brand companies as a strategy to ‘capture value after the brand drugs lose 
exclusivity without cannibalising the brand business.’94  
This “recapturing effect” is another likely result of early entry agreements, 
despite the fact that authorised generics in the United States are largely marketed 
by brand companies themselves and, thus, do not result from an agreement 
between a brand company and a generic company. Parts of the generic profits are 
captured indirectly through the royalties which the generic company has to pay in 
return for the early entry. 
However, concern for anticompetitive potential arises when the brand 
company is effectively able to control the early generic entrant, as shall be shown in 
the next two sections. 
 
3.1.2.2. Control over the first generic entrant 
The biggest incentive for the brand company to enter into an early entry agreement 
with the first generic entrant is likely to be the brand company’s effective control 
over the generic entrant. It has been established by the European Commission’s 
sector inquiry that the early entry agreements impose a number of restrictions on 
the generic company. The majority of the agreements identified constitute supply 
agreements. The brand company agreed to supply the generic entrant with the 
                                                          
93 Federal Trade Commission, Authorized Generics: An interim report (2009) <http://www.ftc.gov/ 
reports/authorized-generics-interim-report-federal-trade-commission> 16. 
94 Federal Trade Commission, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact 
(2011) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-long-term-impact-
report-federal-trade-commission> 67. 
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drug.95 These exclusive sourcing agreements were mostly combined with provisions 
relating to price setting and territorial restrictions. In some agreements, the price 
for supplied drugs was fixed at up to 90 per cent of the price charged to 
wholesalers.96 Additionally, the generic companies were only allowed to re-sell the 
drug in a specific territory, stated in the agreement or as a condition of the market 
authorisation which the generic company was provided with by the brand 
company.97 In doing so, the brand company can indirectly control the price as well 
as the quantity of the distributed drugs. One could say that the brand company is 
keeping its own “pet competitor”, as the generic company can only compete on the 
terms set out by the brand company in whose interest it is to keep the generic 
company on “a short leash”. 
 
3.2. Anticompetitive potential of the “pet competitor” 
I argue that it is the creation of this kind of “pet competitor” which harbours the 
anticompetitive potential of early entry agreements.  
As has been mentioned before, a number of the early entry agreements 
identified contain non-compete obligations.98 These obligations not only prevent 
the generic company from competing with the brand company in certain 
geographical areas, but also prevent the generic company from marketing the 
generic drugs of other competing brand companies. The generic company is thus 
deprived of the opportunity to decide which drug from which brand company it 
wants to sell. This kind of “freedom of choice” has been repeatedly stressed by the 
EU courts to be an important factor in the finding of abuse as it suffices to 
constitute the requirements for showing an exclusionary effect.99 This non-compete 
obligation not only restricts the generic company in its business acumen but can 
                                                          
95 European Commission (n 1) 843. 
96 Ibid. 823. 
97 Ibid. 849. 
98 Ibid. 827. 
99 Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v EC Commission [. 2007] ECR I-2331. at [67] reciting the 
judgment in Michelin I where it was held that one has to consider whether the granting of certain 
discounts restricts or removes the buyer’s freedom of choice when determining whether a pricing 
practice is abusive. Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Baden-Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] 
ECR 3461.  at [85]. Pinar Akman, ‘The role of ‘freedom’ in EU competition law’ (2013) Legal Studies 1. 
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also act as a barrier to the generic entry of competing brands. Brand companies 
have stated during the pharmaceutical sector inquiry that they prefer to enter into 
early entry agreements with generic companies that have a large distribution 
network.100 So if a generic company with a large distribution network is not allowed 
to market generic versions of other competing brand drugs, then this constellation 
is likely to distort the market and to raise barriers to entry. Regarding such 
exclusivity agreements, the General Court held in Tomra that such agreements, 
 
‘are incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition within the 
[internal] market, because they are not based on an economic transaction which 
justifies this burden or benefit but are designed to remove or restrict the purchaser’s 
freedom to choose his sources of supply and to deny producers access to the 
market.’101 
 
However, the “freedom of choice” of the generic party to the early entry 
agreement is only one side of the coin. On the other side, the brand company can 
strategically use the first-mover advantage of the generic company coupled with its 
large distribution network to significantly raise the barriers to entry for other brand 
competitors which could have an exclusionary effect, as these competing brand 
companies are prevented from dealing with this generic company due to the 
imposed non-compete obligation. This foreclosing effect could be exacerbated by 
rebate schemes offered by the generic company with the large distribution network 
that rewards pharmacies for purchasing all needed generic drugs across all 
therapeutic classes that are in the product range of the generic company.102 Not 
only would the generic company supply a large number of pharmacies because of 
its distribution network, it would also incentivise the pharmacies to not buy their 
                                                          
100 European Commission (n 1) quoting a brand company’s strategy document: "Launch [product 
name] via an early entry agreement with main players in the distribution channel, thus preventing 
disproportionate discounting of non-original [API name] containing products." Id. at [825]. 
101 Case T-155/06 Tomra Systems ASA and Others v European Commission [2010] ECR 00 at [209]. 
102 i.e. TEVA’s rebate scheme offers pharmacies the nett-price for all its products that are included in 
the scheme, if the pharmacy spends at least £2500 per months. Teva also offers additional discounts 
of 3% and 5% once the pharmacy reaches certain expenditure thresholds  (£4500+ and £6000+ 
respectively). TEVA UK Limited, TevaTwo, <http://tevascheme.tevauk.com/pharmacy/tevatwo>. 
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supplies from other generic competitors.103 So even if a competing brand company 
uses a different smaller generic company to distribute its competing drugs at the 
pharmacy level, the generic version might find it difficult to enter the market, as a 
large number of pharmacies decide to deal only with the large generic company to 
maximize the potential rebates. 
 
Such non-compete obligations should not be justifiable by the exclusionary power 
of the patent on which the early entry agreement is based, as this exclusionary 
power should only cover conduct that is directly related to the brand drug itself. 
Yet, in this case, such a causal link would be missing. If the non-compete obligation 
in relation to third party brand drugs were to be covered, the exclusionary power of 
the patent would go beyond the patent’s scope. The aim of patent protection 
should be to safeguard an adequate return of profits for the innovator and should 
increase the incentive to innovate, but it should not have an excluding effect on the 
innovations of other parties which are not covered by the same patent.104 
In addition to raising barriers to entry for competing brand companies, an 
early entry agreement is also likely to create barriers to entry for subsequent 
independent generic companies. In the European pharmaceutical market, generic 
companies can gain market approval for their generic version of a brand drug prior 
to the expiry of the brand company’s patent protection and enter the market “at 
risk” – the risk being sued for patent infringement by the brand company. A generic 
company is likely to take this risk, if the incentive of potential profits is big enough. 
But this incentive is drastically reduced by the early generic entry and the 
associated first-mover advantage. Without the prospect of considerable extra 
profits from entering “at risk” prior to patent expiry, subsequent generic entrant 
are likely to wait until the relevant patent has expired and entry has become “safe”. 
                                                          
103 Such a rebate scheme in itself could potentially constitute an infringement of Art.  102 TFEU, 
depending on the nature of the rebates. The detailed discussion of the rebate scheme itself is 
however outside the scope of this article.  
104 According to Art. 69(1) of the European Patent Convention, ‘the extent of the protection 
conferred by a European patent or a European patent application shall be determined by the claims.’ 
Although the breadth of the claim can be subject to interpretation (see Art.1 of the Protocol on the 
interpretation of Article 69 EPC) the protection of the patent cannot be extended to related patents 
that are owned by other proprietors.  
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This effect can be exacerbated by the brand company, if it signals to generic 
companies that it will aggressively defend its patents. Ultimately, this could lead to 
an outcome whereby the brand company can retain the entirety of the drug’s 
patent protection and prevent further entry, regardless of the merits or the validity 
of the concerned patents, simply by significantly reducing the incentive for such 
additional entry. 
 
The creation of a “pet competitor” could also distort the competitive process on the 
relevant market beyond the patent life. Normally, one would expect prices to drop 
very quickly once the patent has expired.  However, the brand company can control 
the generic company beyond the patent life, if the early entry agreements is 
entered into within a period of time that exceed the period of patent protection.105 
Coupled with the aforementioned first-mover advantage of the first generic entrant 
and the potential foreclosing effect of early entry agreements, the brand company 
could be able to prevent or at least delay the expected price drop and extend the 
period of time during in which brand company controls the supra-competitive price 
for the first generic entrant.  
 
3.3. Countering potential criticism of the theory of harm 
The proposed theory of harm in this chapter is fundamentally based on the first-
mover advantage of the first generic entrant and a potential deterrence or delaying 
effect on the switching from one generic drug to another. Some might argue that 
for such delay in switching to be viable, the conduct would have to delay 
subsequent generic entry itself, which is empirically proven to not always be the 
case.106 
 
                                                          
105 Some of the identified early entry agreements in the pharmaceutical sector inquiry where 
entered into 2 years before patent expiry and lasted on average 3.5 years, thereby exceeding the 
patent life. See supra section 3. 
106 Silvia Appelt, ‘Entry and Competition in the Pharmaceutical Market following Patent Expiry, 
Evidence from Macro and Micro Data’ (2011) < http://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13108/> showing 
empirically that subsequent generic entry in Germany is not necessarily deterred or delayed. 
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However, immediate entry of subsequent generic companies should not be 
confused with actual switching between generic drugs and nor should it give any 
indication of the actual magnitude or impact of the subsequent entry. 
 
Firstly, a potential lack of deterrence or delay despite the decreased financial 
incentives could be explained by the fact that the generic company’s decision to 
enter the market is taken before the decision on early generic entry. Early entry 
agreements are usually entered into within the last year of patent protection. 
However, if generic companies have to decide to enter a specific market several 
years before patent expiry, they are likely to have already invested in the 
preparation of the entry. The preparation of entry involves a number of issues: (i) 
The patent documentation of the brand company informs the generic company of 
the composition of the molecule, but not necessarily the process of how to achieve 
this specific composition. Depending on the complexity on the molecule, this 
process of identifying the correct composition can be lengthy;  (ii) Prior to the 
application for marketing authorisation, the generic company has to prove the 
bioequivalence of the generic drug by conducting human clinical trials, which is the 
most expensive requirement for the application process.107 The application fee for 
the marketing authorisation itself exceeds €100,000 with the European Medicines 
Agency108 or over £100,000 with the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA).109 These requirements are not only costly, but are also lengthy in 
process and have to be achieved prior to entry. Assuming that the generic company 
would then decide not to enter because of the existing generic competition by the 
early generic entrant, it would mean that the costs incurred would be sunk and un-
recoupable. So it might be viable for the generic company to enter the market 
despite the existing competition and the reduced anticipated revenue and market 
                                                          
107 Information obtained through a discussion with a Professor of the School of Pharmacy at the 
University of East Anglia. 
108 European Medicines Agency, ‘Explanatory note on fees payable to the European Medicines 
Agency, EMA/283580/2011’ (2011) <http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/ 
Other/2011/03/WC500104380.pdf> 5. 
109  Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, ‘Marketing authorisations’ 
<http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Howweregulate/Medicines/Licensingofmedicines/Marketingauthorisatio
ns/index.htm#l6>. 
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share, simply to recoup the cost incurred. However, such entry is not necessarily 
evidence for added competitive pressure in the market. 
Secondly, the entry of generic companies into the market after patent expiry 
should not be seen as ultimate proof that strategic entry deterrence does not occur 
or might not be viable. The scope of the actual entry might be limited. The brand 
drug does not only exist in a single version which is then sought to be substituted 
by a single generic version of the drug. The brand company rather markets a range 
of different dosages and different forms of the drug, referred to as drug 
‘presentation’. For example,  
 
‘[t]he tranquilizer Haldol […] is sold in 1/2, 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20 milligram 
tablets, as a concentrated liquid in bottles, and as a solution for intravenous use in 
vials, ampules, and disposable syringes.’110 
 
 Thus, generic entry alone and the presence of generic companies in the market 
should not be seen as a decisive indicator for the level of competition in the 
market. Generic companies may only market some of the brand presentations and 
therefore, do not cover the entire market. Depending on the generic substitution 
laws applicable in the different Member States, the limited range of generic 
presentations could be used to limit actual drug substitution and ultimately to 
reduce competition. According to Ellison,  
 
‘if a doctor has prescribed that a patient takes one 100mg tablet per day, 
then the pharmacist may be prevented from dispensing 50mg tablets and 
instructing the consumer to take two tablets per day.’111 
 
Thirdly, the subsequent generic entrant might exit the market early. If it holds true 
that subsequent generic companies enter the market despite the strong 
competition of the early entrant, due to the fact that the entry decision is taken 
                                                          
110 Glenn Ellison and Sara F Ellison, ‘Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical 
Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration’ (2011) 3 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1, 16. 
111 Ibid. 16. 
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prior the early entry, the companies may decide to leave the market following the 
low revenues that are to be expected due to the reduced market share. 112 As such, 
the impact would not only be on the entry of subsequent generic companies but 
also on the period of market presence of these generic companies.  
 
Following the discussion of the possible factors that could limit the magnitude of a 
generic entry, one can ultimately argue that the possible lack of delay of 
subsequent generic entry post patent expiry should not be used as an argument to 
negate the existence of a generic first-mover advantage. The important factor is not 
the generic entry itself, but rather the extent of such entry and its impact on the 
switching behaviour between generic drugs.  
 
4. Conclusion  
In light of the discussion of pay for delay settlements and early entry agreements in 
the European pharmaceutical sector, several conclusions can be drawn regarding 
the enforcement priorities of the European Commission. Pay for delay settlements 
that have attracted extensive antitrust scrutiny in the United States are less likely to 
have an equally anticompetitive potential in Europe. Nonetheless, they might have 
an anticompetitive effect based on the competitive market structure, the 
peculiarities of the European pharmaceutical sector, its regulation and the 
manifoldness of similar but slightly different national pharmaceutical regimes. Still, 
the vast experience of US antitrust authorities is only likely to have limited 
applicability in Europe and it is key to take the actual market structure into 
consideration. 
In contrast to pay for delay settlements, early entry agreements did not give 
rise to significant antitrust scrutiny in the United States and to the extent they did, 
largely as a form of value transfer in pay for delay settlements. This should not lead 
                                                          
112 Hollis (n 68) 729 showing for Canada that the first generic entrant has a stable increase in market 
share in the first 4 years after entry at an average of 34 per cent, whereas the second entrant only 
has a 10 per cent increase in market share in the same period. It has also been predicted that the 
first generic entrant has on average, a 35 per cent higher market share than it would otherwise 
enjoy as a result of the early entry. Id. at 731. 
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to the conclusion that early entry agreements cannot have anticompetitive 
potential in Europe. Despite the similarity of conduct, the underlying regulatory 
regime in Europe is different and more complex than in the United States. If a brand 
company can foreclose the market by paying off a single generic entrant there is no 
need for early entry agreements. However, if a brand company cannot foreclose 
the market, the second best option could be to “team up” with one generic entrant 
to exploit the peculiarities of the markets, the risk aversion of the prescribing 
doctors, pharmacists and patients and the resulting delay or lack of switching 
between generic drugs. The anticompetitive potential warrants particular scrutiny 
given their pro-competitiveness in the short-run. A multinational corporation that is 
focussed on profit maximisation is unlikely to be willing to share profits with a 
competitor without any long-run incentive to do so.  Thus the European 
Commission should broaden its enforcement agenda. Pay for delay settlements 
should not be removed from the Commission’s focus. Such settlements might still 
pose an anticompetitive threat in Europe, relying on different regulatory 
mechanisms than those observed in the United States. However, the Commission 
should also review early entry agreements, as they could represent the “weapon of 
choice” for pharmaceutical companies, if market foreclosure through a kind of 
value transfer to the generic entrant is not viable. 
Based on the developed theories of harm the following two chapters 
examine pay for delay settlements and early entry agreements under EU 
competition law and will determine whether these types of agreements can be 
addressed by applying Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 102 TFEU. 
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IV. PAY FOR DELAY SETTLEMENTS 
 
1. Introduction 
Pay for delay settlements are in essence patent settlements between a brand 
company and a generic company, in which the brand company makes a value 
transfer to the generic company for which the generic company in return agrees to 
exit the market or to abstain from entering the market in the first place. In the EU 
experience, most of these settlements have been reached to end on-going patent 
litigation, but some were concluded in out-of-court disputes or during patent 
opposition proceedings.1 In its 2009 pharmaceutical sector inquiry, the European 
Commission established that 45 out of the 207 settlements investigated were 
restricting generic entry and, in addition, were based on a value transfer from the 
brand company to the generic company. The value transfers in the 45 pay for delay 
settlements took place in a number of different ways. In some cases, the value 
transfer consisted of a direct monetary payment to the generic company, whereas 
in other cases it consisted of a licence granted to the generic, a distribution 
agreement, or a  so-called “side deal” which provides royalty-free licences to the 
generic company or enables the brand company to purchase generic stock at a 
fixed price.2  
As these settlements are likely to constitute agreements between 
competitors, one would be inclined to scrutinise this concerted conduct under Art. 
101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, one should 
also consider antitrust scrutiny under Art. 102 TFEU. Pay for delay settlements are 
based on a patent owned by the brand company. Such patent protection confers a 
temporary regulated monopoly upon the brand company. Although one would 
need to consider market definition before determining whether such a legal patent 
monopoly translates into a dominant position of the brand company it is possible to 
                                                          
1 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report (2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html> para 740. (hereinafter it is referred to 
paragraphs) 
2 Ibid. 762-768. 
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assume that the conferred patent is likely to significantly contribute to the 
dominant position of the brand company. By deploying Art 102 TFEU, a competition 
authority would also be able to address unilateral conduct by the brand company 
that is facilitated by a pay for delay settlement with a potential generic competitor. 
In this situation, an Art. 102 analysis might also be of strategic advantage to the 
competition authority. It could possibly rely on assistance from the generic 
company in its investigation, as the generic company that is a party to the pay for 
delay settlement is not subject to the investigation itself. Indeed, the European 
Commission has opened formal proceedings in a number of cases against both 
brand companies and generic companies in relation to the delay of generics based 
on Art. 101 TFEU as well as Art. 102 TFEU.3 
The chapter is therefore structured as follows. Section 2 addresses pay for 
delay settlements as agreements between competitors in the general remit of Art. 
101 TFEU. From an additional point of view, section 3 then focuses on the broader 
unilateral conduct of the brand company, which is facilitated or at least made 
possible through the use of a pay for delay settlement. The discussion in section 3 is 
not therefore complementary to the section 2 analysis of pay for delay settlements 
under Art. 101 TFEU but, rather, investigates a different type of abuse that 
encompasses such settlements. For the purpose of section 3, the brand company is 
assumed to be in a dominant position. 
 
2. Agreements between competitors  
In June and December 2013, the European Commission handed down two decisions 
against two brand companies and a number of generic competitors with regards to 
the delay of entry for generic competition. Both investigations were based on Art. 
101 TFEU.  
                                                          
3 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission opens formal proceedings against Les Laboratoires 
Servier and a number of generic pharmaceutical companies (Brussels, 8 July 2009) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-322_en.htm?locale=en>; European Commission, 
Antitrust: Commission opens formal proceedings against pharmaceutical company Lundbeck 
(Brussels, 7 January 2010) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-8_en.htm>. 
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In its Lundbeck decision, the European Commission imposed for the first 
time a fine on a brand company, Lundbeck, and a number of generic companies for 
delaying the market entry of a cheaper generic version of citalopram, an 
antidepressant drug.4 The total of the fine imposed was in excess of €152 million. 
Although it is clear from the press release that the conduct in question constituted 
a pay for delay settlement and was investigated under Art. 101 TFEU, the 
Commission has yet to provide any details regarding its analysis. In a second 
decision, the European Commission has imposed a fine of €16 million on Johnson & 
Johnson and Novartis for the delay of a generic pain-killer based on fentanyl.5 In the 
case of Lundbeck, the parties have since appealed the decision to the General 
Court.6 The scene is therefore set for a period of uncertainty as we await the 
publication of the European Commission’s approach to pay for delay settlements 
and for the General Court to hand down its first judgment with regards to pay for 
delay settlements in the European context.  The aim of this section is to bridge this 
temporary uncertainty by devising and discussing an approach that the European 
Commission should take or should have taken, depending on the actual analysis 
used in the European Commission’s decisions.  
As part of the analysis of pay for delay settlements under Art. 101 TFEU, this 
section establishes whether a European approach to pay for delay settlements can 
be based on the EU courts’ existing case law relating to trademark delimitation 
agreements and no-challenge clauses. Due to the lack of legal guidance offered by 
previous judgments and decisions on pay for delay settlements, the analogous 
application of this alternative body of case law may assist in establishing a 
European approach to these settlements. The analysis that follows, however, shows 
that neither set of alternative case law is “fit for purpose” with regard to the 
                                                          
4 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Lundbeck and other pharma companies for 
delaying market entry of generic medicines (Brussels, 19 June 2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-563_en.htm>. 
5 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Johnson & Johnson and Novartis € 16 million for 
delaying market entry of generic pain-killer fentanyl (Brussels, 10 December 2013) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1233_en.htm>. 
6 Case T-460/13 Ranbaxy Laboratories and Ranbaxy (UK) v Commission [28 August 2013] OJ C 325/71; 
Case T-472/13 H Lundbeck and Lundbeck v Commission [28 August 2013] OJ C 325/76; Case T-470/13 
Merk v. Commission [30 August 2013] OJ C 325/74; Case T-471/13 Xellia Pharmaceuticals and Zoetis 
Products v Commission [30 August 2013] OJ C 325/75. 
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assessment of pay for delay settlements under Art. 101TFEU.  This section therefore 
goes beyond the boundaries of the European case law relating to anticompetitive 
agreements between competitors and develops a novel test for an investigation of 
pay for delay settlements, which is inspired by the recent US Supreme Court 
judgment in FTC v Actavis.7 Following a cautious analysis of the rationale behind the 
US Supreme Court’s judgment – taking into consideration the regulatory differences 
between the US and Europe, which have been established in the previous chapter – 
a structured effects-based analysis is proposed. The exercise of analysing the FTC v. 
Actavis judgment and adapting it to the European framework is not only motivated 
by the fact that it is a judgment of the highest judicial authority in the United States 
regarding pay for delay settlements. Furthermore, Alexander Italianer, Director 
General for Competition in the European Commission, has made the following 
statement in relation to the Lundbeck decision during a conference at the Fordham 
Competition Law Institute in New York City. 
 
 ‘Incidentally, to those of you who are familiar with the Supreme Court’s 
Actavis opinion, the factors taken into consideration by the Commission will sound 
familiar. Indeed, the Supreme Court looked at the same factors, in particular the size 
of the payment including as compared to the expected profits of the generic 
producer, and the lack of any other convincing justification.’8 
 
It should thus not be too far-fetched to consider the rationale behind the US 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Actavis for the analysis of pay for delay settlements in 
the European context. 
This section is structured as follows. Section 2.1.1. discusses whether patent 
settlements are to be considered as agreements in general, before examination is 
then afforded to whether the EU courts’ case law relating to trademark delimitation 
                                                          
7 FTC v. Actavis  133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013). In this judgment, the US Supreme Court ruled for the first 
time on pay for delay settlements and gave guidance to the lower courts. For a detailed discussion 
see infra sec. 2.1.2.2.1. 
8 Alexander Italianer, Competitor agreements under EU competition law: 40th Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Competition Law Institute (New York 2013) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_speeches_by_the_dg.html. 
  
 IV. Pay for delay settlements 
132 
 
agreements and no-challenge clauses can be used as guidance for the analysis of 
pay for delay settlements under Art. 101 TFEU. Section 2.1.2. examines the possible 
prevention or distortion of competition through pay for delay settlements and 
rejects the notion that such settlements should be scrutinised as restrictions by 
object. The effects-based analysis then discusses and considers the US Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Actavis, including the FTC’s amicus curiae brief in Effexor XR, as 
possible sources of guidance. Following this discussion, a novel “structured effects-
based” approach to pay for delay settlements is developed, which acknowledges 
the general need for patent settlements and, as such, is not considered to be over-
inclusive.  
 
2.1. Analysis of EU pay for delay settlements under Art. 101 TFEU 
The first part of this chapter scrutinises the pay for delay settlement between the 
brand company and the generic company under Art. 101 TFEU. It addresses the 
nature of the settlement as an agreement and questions whether the prevention or 
distortion of competition should be regarded as a restriction by object or by effect. 
It does not question whether the brand company and the generic company are 
separate economic entities and, thus, undertakings in the sense of Art. 101 TFEU – 
this fact is assumed. 
 
2.1.1. Agreements within the scope of Art. 101 TFEU 
This section first sets out the definition of an agreement following the relevant case 
law. Having set out and established that a pay for delay settlement constitutes an  
agreement, the section then turns to the question of whether the EU courts’ case 
law in relation to trademark delimitation agreements and no-challenge agreements 
could be used as guidance to address pay for delay settlements.  
The definition of an agreement and the type of conduct that determines an 
agreement within the meaning of competition law has had to be established 
through case law, as no statutory definition has been provided.  In Bayer v 
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Commission,9 the General Court provided what is now regarded as the “classic 
definition” of what constitutes an agreement. 10 In summarising the relevant case 
law, the General Court stated that 
 
 ‘in order for there to be an agreement within the meaning of Article [101](1) 
of the Treaty it is sufficient that the undertakings in question should have expressed 
their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way’.11 
 
The concept is therefore based on the concurrence of wills between the parties. Yet 
not every “concurrence of wills” between two-or-more undertakings constitutes an 
agreement in the sense of Art. 101 TFEU. It has to have the purpose to “tie down 
the future”.12 The agreement has to bind the contracting parties to act or abstain 
from acting in a certain manner on the market in the future. Agreements lacking 
this “future component”, such as commercial spot transactions, typically fall 
outside the scope of Art. 101 TFEU.13 
It was also held that the form in which the concurrence of wills is expressed 
is irrelevant and it need not have to constitute a valid and binding contract under 
national law,14 as long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties’ 
intentions.15 In a string of cases, the European Commission and the EU courts have 
                                                          
9 Case T-41/96 Bayer AG v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383. 
10 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU competition law: Text, cases, and materials (5th edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2014) 150. 
11 Case T-41/96 Bayer AG v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383. para.67 relying on Case 41/69 ACF 
Chemiefarma v Commission  [1970] ECR 661 para. 112; Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 
Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125 para. 86; Case T-7/89 Hercules Chemicals 
v Commission  [1991] ECR II-1711 para. 256 
12 Okeoghene Odudu, The boundaries of EC competition law: The scope of Article 81 (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2006) 82. 
13 Eric Gippini-Fournier, The Notion of Agreement in a Vertical Context: Pieces of a Sliding Puzzle  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1892742, 4. 
14 Case C-277/87 Sandoz prodotti farmaceutici SpA v Commission of the European Communities 
[1990] ECR I-45. In Sandoz the sending of invoices to customer bearing the words “export prohibited” 
on the back was regarded as a tacit agreement. It was held that the export ban formed an integral 
part of the continuous contractual relationship between Sandoz and its distributors. Due to the 
continuous nature of this relationship, the distributors’ lack of protest against this restriction and the 
repeated orders despite the export ban were found to be the tacit acquiescence of the agreement.  
15 Case T-41/96 Bayer AG v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383, 69. 
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found “apparently unilateral conduct” which amounts to an agreement within the 
meaning of Art. 101 TFEU.16 
However, in the case of a pay for delay settlement, identifying a 
concurrence of wills between the two parties should be straightforward. Under 
these settlements, the brand company and the generic entrant agree that the 
generic company will not enter the market for a pre-determined period of  time, 
which is stipulated in the settlement in exchange for a value transfer, ie a lump sum 
of money. Such a settlement clearly constitutes an agreement which binds the 
contracting parties to act in a stipulated way in the future.  
Nonetheless, the parties could argue that the settlement should not be 
regarded as an agreement in the sense of Art. 101 TFEU, but rather as a judicial 
order which led to the definite disposal of a legal dispute in front of a court. The 
European Court of Justice, however, has rejected this line of argument. It found 
that a settlement, despite being a judicial act that disposes of a legal dispute, must 
comply with substantive law principles applicable to every contract.17  In Bayer v 
Sülhöffer, the European Court of Justice found again that with regard to the 
 
 ‘prohibition of certain 'agreements' between undertakings, Article [101(1)] 
makes no distinction between agreements whose purpose is to put an end to 
litigation and those concluded with other aims in mind.’18 
 
According to the settled case law, pay for delay settlements should therefore be 
regarded as agreements in the sense of Art. 101 TFEU and are not shielded from 
antitrust scrutiny as they might also constitute judicial acts.  
Having therefore established that pay for delay settlements constitute 
agreements within the scope of Art. 101 TFEU, the discussion now turns to the 
                                                          
16 The conduct largely consisted of the systemic sending of invoices, orders or pricelists which 
included sales conditions imposed by the seller which were accepted by the buyers through 
acquiescence. E.g. Joined Cases 25 and 26/84 Ford Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc. v Commission 
of the European Communities  [1985] ECR 2725; Case 107/82 AEG-Telefunken v. Commission  [1983] 
ECR 3151; Joined Cases 32/78, 36/78 to 82/78 BMW Belgium v Commission  [1979] ECR 2435.  
17 Case C-258/78 Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v. Commission (Maize Seed), [1982] ECR 2015, 84. 
18 Case C- 65/86 Bayer AG and Maschinenfabrik Hennecke GmbH v. Heinz Süllhöfer, [1988] ECR 5249, 
paras 14-15. 
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trademark delimitation agreements and no-challenge agreements in order to 
establish the possibility of extracting potential guidance for the scrutiny of pay for 
delay settlements under Art. 101 TFEU. 
 
2.1.1.1. Trademark delimitation agreements 
According to Marc van der Woude,19 one possible approach could be to adopt an 
analogous application of the ECJ’s case law on trademark delimitation agreements. 
These agreements are entered into in order to settle disputes which are caused by 
confusingly similar trademarks. Just as in the case of patent settlements, such 
agreements may be allowed in order to end time-consuming and expensive 
intellectual property litigation.20 However, they are not immune to the application 
of Art. 101 TFEU and have attracted antitrust scrutiny in the past where they 
concerned parties from different Member States, as such settlements have to 
potential to amount to market allocation agreements, which would again be 
contrary to the European Union’s common market imperative.21 Although these 
settlements concern a different intellectual property right, they nonetheless deal 
with the possible antitrust scrutiny of otherwise permissible settlements. The 
discussion of the relevant case law could therefore be insightful for the European 
approach to pay for delay settlements. The approach to this kind of settlement was 
developed by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union over the course of several investigations.22 
The case of Sirdar/Phildar concerned a trademark dispute between a French 
supplier and a UK supplier of knitting yarn. The two parties agreed not to use their 
respective trademarks in the opposing party’s country. Apart from the UK and 
                                                          
19 Marc Van der Woude has been a judge at the General Court since 2010 and is the president of the 
7th Chamber. Although the article discussing the possible application of trademark delimitation 
agreements and no-challenge clauses precedes his election in 2010, his comments are a good 
starting point in order to develop a European approach to pay for delay settlements.  
20 European Commission (n 1) para 707. 
21 Mark van der Woude, ‘Patent Settlements and Reverse Payments Under EU Law’ (2009) 5 
Competition Policy International 182, 187. 
22 Toltecs/Dorcet (IV/C-30.128) Commission Decision 82/897/EEC [1982] OJ 1982 L 379/19; Case C-
35/83 BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v Commission of the European Communities  [1985] ECR 363; 
Sirdar-Phildar (IV/27.879) Commission Decision 75/297/EEC [1975] OJ L 125/27; Penneys (IV/29.246) 
Commission Decision 78/193/EEC [1978] OJ L 60/19. 
  
 IV. Pay for delay settlements 
136 
 
France, the two trademarks coexisted across the European Union. This very fact led 
the European Commission to find that the agreement constituted a market 
allocation agreement which had the object of restricting competition in the 
European Union.23 In the case of Penney’s, the European Commission found that 
the trademark delimitation agreement represented a restriction of competition but 
did not amount to an appreciable restriction. It was again stated that such an 
agreement could be contrary to Art. 101(1) if it constituted the means of a market 
sharing agreement. However, in the current case the parties could have prevented 
each other from using their respective trademarks by applying national trademark 
law.24 It was therefore found that the parties had sought the “least restrictive 
solution possible”.25 
In its Toltecs/Dorcet decision, the European Commission again applied the 
“least restrictive alternative test”. The case concerned two trademarks for tobacco 
products in Germany. Dorcet had been successfully registered by BAT Cigaretten-
Fabriken GmbH as a trademark in Germany. Despite the fact that the trademark 
“Dorcet” had never been used in Germany, BAT opposed the application to register 
the trademark of “Toltecs” by Dutch company Segers. The dispute was resolved by 
way of a delimitation agreement in which BAT agreed to withdraw its opposition to 
Segers’ application but, at the same time, prohibited Segers from using the 
trademark Toltecs without BAT’s approval in Germany. Segers also agreed not to 
challenge the validity of BAT’s German registration for Dorcet. 
The European Commission found in its decision that the delimitation 
agreement infringed Art. 101(1) TFEU as the parties did not adopt the least 
restrictive alternative with regard to the use of the trademark in question across 
the common market. Furthermore,  the no-challenge clause prohibiting Segers from 
challenging a trademark that was not in use for more than five years, also 
                                                          
23 Sirdar-Phildar (n 22) 29. 
24 Penneys (n 22) 24, 25. 
25 Ibid. 25. The parties “must seek the least restrictive solution possible, such as incorporating 
distinguishing marks, shapes or colours to differentiate the products of the two enterprises which 
bear identical or confusingly similar marks. A contractual obligation for the parties to assign or waive 
their trademark and trade name rights which would make it necessary for them to re-establish 
goodwill under other names may, under certain circumstances, have restrictive effects.” 
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amounted to a violation of Art. 101(1).26 In order to be able to determine the least 
restrictive alternative to avoid confusion between two trademarks, the European 
Commission had to make its own assessment of the trademark dispute. It held that 
the  
 
‘Commission cannot find any serious risk of confusion between the word 
mark Dorcet and the word/device mark Toltecs. There is still no serious risk of visual 
or phonetic confusion if the pictorial component registered and used by Mr Segers (a 
wooden shovel lying across four tobacco leaves depicted within a distinctively-
shaped gold ground) is disregarded, and the words Dorcet and Toltecs are 
compared. BAT's assertion that the marks sound similar and are therefore likely to 
be confused does not change this finding.’27 
 
In the case at hand, the Commission not only made its own assessment of the 
trademark dispute but also directly opposed German trademark law, as the 
delimitation agreement reflected national trademark law.28 Thus it is unsurprising 
that BAT appealed the decision to the Court of Justice.29 
Despite acknowledging that trademark delimitation agreements are ‘lawful 
and useful if they serve to delimit, in the mutual interests of the parties, the spheres 
within which their respective trademarks may be used, and are intended to avoid 
confusion or conflict between them’,30  the Court of Justice stated that such 
agreements can be subject to antitrust scrutiny by the competition authority if the 
agreement in question also has the aim of dividing the market. ‘The Community 
system of competition does not allow the improper use of rights under any national 
trade mark law in order to frustrate the Community's law on cartels’.31 This suggests 
that the European Commission has the authority to scrutinise trademark 
agreements even if they comply with national trademark law and, in doing so, the 
                                                          
26 Toltecs/Dorcet (n 22) 20, 21.  
27 Toltecs/Dorcet (n 22) 25. 
28 Ibid. 21. 
29 Case C-35/83 BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v Commission of the European Communities (n 22). 
30 Ibid. para 33. 
31 Ibid.  
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Commission can make its own assessment of the risk of confusion and the dispute 
itself, bearing in mind that this is only the case if the agreement does not concern a 
genuine dispute.32 
 
If one would apply this “least restrictive alternative test” by analogy to the situation 
of pay for delay settlements, the alternative would have to be measured against the 
outcome of the actual patent litigation. If the patent owner were to fully succeed in 
defending his patent, generic competition would not occur until patent expiry. So 
any settlement that would result in less restrictive effects compared to the 
judgment on the merits would not infringe Art. 101 TFEU.33 The strength of the 
relevant patent would be at the core of the European Commission’s investigation 
and, should the Commission’s decision be appealed, at the core of the decision by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Commission and the Court would 
therefore have to undertake their own assessments regarding the strength of the 
patent at issue and, ultimately, second-guess the decision of a specialist court, 
assuming that the parties have fought to the end of trial instead of settling the 
dispute. Following the decisional practice of the European Commission and the 
judicial precedent regarding trademark delimitation agreements, such an approach 
could be broadly envisioned. Yet the question remains whether such an approach 
would also be desirable.  
The former Head of the Pharma Task Force of the European Commission, 
Dominik Schnichels, has repeatedly stated that it is not the intention of the 
European Commission Directorate General for Competition to second-guess the 
patent courts or doubt their judgments.34 This position is understandable. Despite 
the fact that trademarks and patents are both classed as intellectual property rights, 
the level of assessment that was undertaken by the European Commission and the 
Court of Justice in the case of trademarks is rather different – and arguably 
straightforward – in comparison to the hypothetical assessment of a patent which 
                                                          
32 van der Woude (n 21) 188. 
33 Ibid. 194. 
34 Dominik Schnichels, Keynote Address: GCR Conference "Settlement Agreements and Patent Abuse 
in the Pharmaceutical Sector 2010" (Brussels 2010). 
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would need to take place in the case of pay for delay settlements. In its previous 
trademark assessments, the European Commission has had to decide whether 
actual labels or product names were too similar in terms of their appearance or 
sound and therefore likely to cause confusion for customers.35 In contrast, the 
assessment of a highly technical patent, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, 
seems not only more difficult but impossible to achieve without expert advice.36 
The evaluation of a patent’s validity in the pharmaceutical sector often involves the 
consideration of pharmacological and pharmaceutical properties as well as a 
comparison of the chemical structure of other compounds which have the 
maximum level of resemblance 37 and leads to divergent findings by specialist 
patent courts across Europe and in the United States.38 
In light of these considerations, it does not seem appropriate for the 
European Commission to analogously apply the “less restrictive alternative test” to 
the case of patent settlements in the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
2.1.1.2. No-challenge clauses 
Pay for delay settlements could also be addressed by drawing from the ECJ’s case 
law regarding no-challenge clauses. These clauses are contractual provisions that 
prevent the licensee in a licensing agreement from challenging the validity of the 
underlying intellectual property right.39 Thus, they are likely to be an integral part of 
pay for delay settlements. So pay for delay settlements could possibly be addressed 
with the following case law, if the case law regards no-challenge clauses as being 
within the scope of Art. 101 TFEU. 
 
                                                          
35 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 (IV/C-30.128 - Toltecs/Dorcet)  (n 22) 25 the pictorial 
component […] a wooden shovel lying across four tobacco leaves depicted within a distinctively-
shaped gold ground […]and the words Dorcet and Toltecs [were] compared. 
36 The assessment would have to determine whether the patent at issue can be regarded as novelty, 
constitutes an inventive step and can be used in industrial application. At the core of the 
determination of the “inventive step” criterion lies the question whether it can be differentiated 
from prior art. European Commission (n 1) 262-264. 
37 Israel Agranat and Silvya R Wainschtein, ‘The strategy of enantiomer patents of drugs’ [2010] 15 
Drug Discovery Today http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1359644610000310.167. 
38 ibid. 169. 
39 Jones and Sufrin (n 10) 904. 
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Originally, no-challenge clauses were considered in relation to contractual 
provisions in licensing agreements rather than patent settlements and it is fair to 
say that the European Commission, as well as the ECJ, was rather hostile towards 
them. In AOIP/Beyrard, Mr Beyrard, a self-employed inventor, granted AOIP an 
exclusive patent licence to manufacture and market certain types of rheostats 
which were used in various types of electric motors, control and switching devices. 
This licence included, amongst other clauses, a no-challenge clause regarding 
Beyrard’s patents. In its decision, the European Commission found a no-challenge 
clause to be contrary to the public interest – the interest being the revocation of 
patents which should not have been granted in the first place.40 In the case of 
Windsurfing, the Court of Justice shared the European Commission’s sceptical view 
of no-challenge clauses. The Court held that such a clause ‘constitutes an unlawful 
restriction of competition between competitors’.41 Licences that prevent patent 
challenges clearly do not fall  
 
‘within the specific subject matter of the patent, […] as it is In the public 
interest to eliminate any obstacle to economic activity which may arise where a 
patent was granted in error’.42 
 
In 1988, the Court of Justice had its first opportunity to discuss no-challenge clauses 
in relation to patent settlements. In Bayer v Süllhöfer, the parties cross-licensed 
patents held for construction panels and Bayer also agreed not to challenge the 
validity of Süllhöfer’s patents.43 Having reached the Court of Justice by means of 
preliminary reference from the German Federal Court of Justice, the European 
Commission offered a more liberal opinion towards no-challenge clauses, compared 
to the previously discussed case law. It argued that such a clause should not fall 
within the scope of Art. 101 TFEU, if the agreement has the purpose 
 
                                                          
40 AOIP/Beyrard (IV/26.949) Commission Decision 76/29/EEC [1976] OJ L6, 12. 
41 Case 193/83 Windsurfing International Inc v Commission [1986] ECR 611 para. 93. 
42 Ibid. para. 92. 
43 Case 65/86 Bayer AG v Maschinenfabrik Hennecke GmbH & Heinz Süllhöfer  (n 18). 
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‘to put an end to proceedings pending before a court, provided that the 
existence of the industrial property right which is the subject-matter of the dispute is 
genuinely in doubt, that the agreement includes no other clauses restricting 
competition, and that the no-challenge clause relates to the right in issue.’44 
 
The Court of Justice, however, rejected this opinion in the very next paragraph of 
judgment, remarking that no distinction should be made between the aims of 
agreements. The purpose to end litigation should be regarded as no different to any 
other aim. No-challenge clauses could thus fall within the scope of Art. 101 TFEU. 
The Court seems to suggest that the anticompetitive potential of such a clause 
should be determined in isolation from the agreement, even in the case of a patent 
settlement.45 This not only contradicts the Court’s finding in the same judgment, ie 
that the legal and economic context in which the agreement takes place should be 
considered,46 but also seems barely reconcilable with the possibility of regarding a 
no-challenge clause as an ancillary restraint to the patent settlement.  
Ancillary restraints are those kinds of restraints which are necessary to 
conclude lawful contracts and whose importance is subordinate to the latter.47 In 
Remia v Commission, the Court of Justice had to consider a situation in which the 
undertaking selling the business and the undertaking purchasing the business 
remained competitors on the relevant market. It was therefore necessary to discuss 
whether non-competition clauses could be part of a lawful sales contract for a 
business. The Court held that, in this situation, it would be relatively easy for the 
selling party to “win back” its former customers due to its detailed knowledge 
about the business and the goodwill which developed a relationship with its 
customers.48 If successful, this conduct would not only contradict the very reason 
for the sale of the business but could potentially also drive the purchaser out of the 
market, which would in turn actually reduce the number of competitors in the 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 14. 
45 Ibid. 19; van der Woude (n 21) 192. 
46 Case 65/86 Bayer AG v Maschinenfabrik Hennecke GmbH & Heinz Süllhöfer  (n 18) 16. 
47 Pietro Manzini, ‘The European rule of reason - crossing the sea of doubt’ (2002) 8 European 
Competition Law Review 392, 399.  
48 Giorgio Monti, EC competition law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 33. 
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market. Following this rationale, the Court found that non-competition clauses can, 
in principle, have the merits to ensure the intended effect of a business sales 
contract.49 Nonetheless, such non-competition clauses must also be strictly limited 
to that purpose in terms of duration and scope.50 The general principle of ancillary 
restraints was applied by the Court of Justice in a number of other instances. In 
Pronuptia de Paris, a case concerning the compatibility of a distribution franchising 
agreement with Art 101(1), restrictive provisions in the franchising agreement – 
which concerned the know-how, reputation and common identity of the franchise 
itself, as well as the protection of its intellectual property rights – were deemed 
adequate measures to avoid the risk of free-riding by competitors. Hence, the 
provisions were regarded as ancillary and thus fell outside the scope of Art. 101 
TFEU. 51  The Court came to the same conclusion in Gøtrup-Klim. 52  The case 
concerned statutes of a cooperative purchasing association which prevented its 
members from participating in a competing   association. Such a restriction would 
not necessarily restrict competition, as it was regarded as necessary for ensuring 
the proper functionality of the cooperative and its ability to maintain its contractual 
power in relation to producers.53 In Métropole Télévision, the General Court 
dismissed the ancillary nature of exclusivity clauses to a joint venture.54 What is 
noteworthy in this case is not the rejection of the claimant’s argument itself, but 
rather the General Court’s approach to the ancillary restraint doctrine. The Court 
discussed the concept of ancillary restraints in detail, holding that ‘it covers any 
restriction which is directly related and necessary to the implementation of the 
main operation’.55 Any restriction that is to be regarded as ‘directly related’ has to 
be subordinate to the implementation of the main operation and has to have an 
                                                          
49 Case 42/84 Remia v. Commission  [1985] ECR 2545 para. 19. 
50 Ibid. para. 20. 
51 Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris  [1986] ECR 353. 
52 Case 250/92 Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab  
[1994] ECR I-5641. 
53 Ibid. para. 40. 
54 Case T-112/99 Métropole Télévision (M6) & Co. v. Commission  [2001] ECR II-2459. 
55 Ibid. para 104. 
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evident link with it’.56 To establish whether a restriction is necessary for such 
implementation, the General Court devised a two stage test.  
First, the restriction has to be “objectively necessary” for the 
implementation of the main operation and, secondly, the restriction has to be 
proportionate to the main operation. It is important to note that the condition of 
objective necessity should not be interpreted as a means by which to weigh 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects against each other and is therefore not 
to be regarded as the introduction of a ‘rule of reason’-type  analysis within Art. 
101(1).  The General Court has expressly stated in the judgment that such an 
analysis can only take place in the specific framework of Art. 101(3).  
 
 ‘[This] approach is justified not merely so as to preserve the effectiveness of 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty, but also on grounds of consistency. As Article 101(1) of 
the Treaty does not require an analysis of the positive and negative effects on 
competition of a principal restriction, the same finding is necessary with regard to 
the analysis of accompanying restrictions.’57 
 
The question is, therefore, not whether the restriction is indispensable to the 
commercial success of the competitive situation on the relevant market, but rather 
whether it would be difficult or even impossible to implement the main operation 
without the restriction, which has to be judged in the specific context of the main 
operation.58 The analysis itself must therefore  be relatively abstract.59 
After this condition has been satisfied, the proportionality of the restriction in 
relation to the main operation has to be examined. The restriction is proportionate 
if it does not exceed what is necessary to implement the main operation. 
 
                                                          
56 Ibid. para 105.  
57 Ibid. para 108. 
58 Ibid. para 109.  
59 Ibid. para 112. 
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‘If the duration or the [material and geographic] scope of the restriction 
exceed what is necessary in order to implement the operation, it must be assessed 
separately under Article 101(3) of the Treaty’.60 
  
In light of this two-stage test, it has to be established whether it would generally be 
possible for a patent owner and an alleged patent infringer to conclude a patent 
settlement without a no-challenge clause. In reality, it is highly doubtful that they 
could. The parties to a patent settlement enter into such an agreement to end 
costly and time-consuming patent litigation. Yet a patent settlement also creates 
legal certainty. The patent owner will only enter into a settlement if he is assured 
that the alleged patent infringer adheres to the agreement, accepts the relevant 
patent’s validity and is unable to challenge the relevant patent yet again in the 
future. One could argue that a patent settlement that lacks a no-challenge clause 
defeats the very purpose of the agreement itself.  The European Commission’s 
statement concerning patent settlements in its technology transfer guidelines is 
therefore not surprising: 
 
‘In the context of a settlement and non-assertion agreement, non-challenge 
clauses are generally considered to fall outside Article 101(1). It is inherent in such 
agreements that the parties agree not to challenge ex post the intellectual property 
rights covered by the agreement. Indeed, the very purpose of the agreement is to 
settle existing disputes and/or to avoid future disputes.’61 
 
This statement arguably recognises that no-challenge clauses are an integral part of 
patent settlements, which satisfies the first condition of the ancillary restraints test. 
In the second step, the no-challenge clause has to be proportionate to the patent 
settlement. It has already been established that the clause is necessary to the main 
operation. To satisfy the proportionality requirement, the focus has to be on the 
                                                          
60 Ibid. para 113. 
61 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology 
transfer agreements OJ [2004] C 101/2 para. 209. 
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duration and the scope of the no-challenge clause, which should not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the patent settlement itself. 
In terms of duration, the no-challenge clause should not go beyond the life 
of the patent in question. The patent could not have been challenged until the end 
of the patent life if the patent’s validity had been fully litigated and the patent 
owner had prevailed. One could also consider determining the proportionate 
duration of the no-challenge clause, according to the likelihood of the patent 
owner’s success in patent litigation.62 The assessment of this likelihood is, however, 
inherently difficult and should generally be avoided by competition authorities as it 
would involve the “second guessing” of the patent courts.  
With regard to its scope, the no-challenge clause should only cover the 
patents that have been subject to the initial patent litigation. In addition, the 
geographic scope of the clause should be limited to the scope of the actual patent 
litigation that has been resolved by the patent settlement. In a case where all these 
requirements are fulfilled, one should still continue to regard a no-challenge clause 
as an ancillary restraint to a patent settlement, which should not therefore fall 
within the scope of Art. 101(1) TFEU. 
 
2.1.2. Prevention or distortion of competition 
So far, the old European precedents in relation to trademark delimitation 
agreements and no-challenge clauses have been discussed and it has been shown 
that the case law is not suitable for addressing pay for delay settlements under 
European competition law. It is therefore necessary to go back to square one and 
consider whether a pay for delay settlement has the object or effect of preventing 
or distorting competition.  
 
 
 
                                                          
62 I.e. if the patent owner’s probability of success in front of the court would be by 70 per cent, one 
could regard a no-challenge clause as proportionate that does not exceed 70 per cent of the 
remaining time until patent expiry and then grants a royalty-free licence to the patent challenger.  
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2.1.2.1. Restriction by object 
Under European competition law, Art. 101(1) TFEU is only infringed if the 
agreement has as its ‘object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market’. Indeed, the question of whether a pay for 
delay settlement is to be regarded as an infringement by object or by effect is one 
of the core issues to determine. These two are alternative requirements and should 
be read disjunctively.63 The answer to this question determines the level of proof 
that the European Commission needs to satisfy in order to find an infringement. 
Agreements that are a restriction by object always fall within the scope of Art. 
101(1) TFEU without the need for the European Commission to take into account 
the actual anticompetitive effects of the agreement.  Restrictions by object are 
those that, by their very nature, have the potential to restrict competition within 
the meaning of Article 101(1).64  
 
‘These are restrictions which in light of the objectives pursued by the 
Community competition rules have such a high potential of negative effects on 
competition that it is unnecessary for the purposes of applying Article [101(1)] to 
demonstrate any actual effects on the market. This presumption is based on the 
serious nature of the restriction and on experience showing that restrictions of 
competition by object are likely to produce negative effects on the market and to 
jeopardise the objectives pursued by the Community competition rules.’65 
 
Although an agreement can be restrictive by object, even if its object is not solely 
anticompetitive but also serves legitimate aims,66 it is according to the Court of 
Justice now settled case law that ‘regard must be had inter alia to the content of its 
provisions, the objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal context of 
                                                          
63 Case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH  [1966] ECR 337 p.249. 
64 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd  [2008] ECR I-8637 
para. 17. 
65 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 
101/97 para. 21. 
66 Case C-551/03 General Motors BV v Commission [2006] ECR I-3173 para. 64. 
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which it forms a part’.67 If these factors are considered, it is sufficient to show that 
the conduct in question is merely capable of resulting in the prevention, restriction, 
or distortion of competition within the relevant market.68 Furthermore, there is no 
requirement to consider whether the potential negative effect on competition will 
deprive the final consumer of competitive advantages in terms of supply and 
price.69   
Where an agreement is found not to be a restriction by object, the 
European Commission has to conduct an extensive analysis of the restrictions by 
effect on the market, which is a much more onerous task.70 The effects need to be 
established in the context of factual and legal circumstances which cause it to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition.71   
 
With regard to pay for delay settlements, it has been argued that such settlements 
should be regarded as restrictions by effect and not by object, as they are by their 
very nature settlements of patent litigation. 72  It is generally accepted that 
settlements are a legitimate means by which to end disputes, especially in patent 
litigation which is costly and time-consuming.73 Further consideration has been 
given to the fact that the settlements concern patents which constitute exclusive 
rights that entitle the holder to exclude infringing products. It would therefore be 
                                                          
67 Joint cases C-501/06, C-513/06, C-515/06 and C-519/06 GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v 
Commission and Others  [2009] ECR-I 9291 para.58 citing Joined Cases C-96/82 to C-102/82, C-
104/82, C-105/82, C-108/82 and C-110/82 IAZ International Belgium and Others v Commission  [1983] 
ECR-I 3369 para.25 and Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society 
Ltd  [2008] ECR I-8637 para. 16 and 21. 
68 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR I-4529 para. 31 
69 Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others [2009] ECR I-9291. 
The ECJ rejected this finding by the General Court by stating that ‘there is nothing in that provision to 
indicate that only those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an 
anti-competitive object. […] Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not only the interests of competitors 
or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.’ Id. at 
[para. 63]. 
70 Richard Whish, Competition law (7th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 120. 
71 Case C-23/67 Brasserie De Haecht v Wilkin  [1967] ECR 407 p. 415; Case C-234/89, Delimitis v 
Henninger Bräu  [1991] ECR I-935 para.14. 
72 van der Woude (n 21). 
73 European Commission (n 1) para 707. 
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difficult to categorise such settlements as restrictions by object.74 Furthermore, a 
large number of settlements identified in the pharmaceutical sector inquiry were 
found not to restrict generic entry into the market; some even had procompetitive 
features,75 and only a minority gave rise to competition concerns.76 It seems that 
these considerations led the European Commission to state in its final report that, 
 
 ‘any assessment of whether a certain settlement could be deemed 
compatible or incompatible with EC competition law would require an in-depth 
analysis of the individual agreement, taking into account the factual, economic and 
legal background’.77 
 
However, in spite of the abovementioned consideration and the European 
Commission’s quoted statement from its final report of the pharmaceutical sector 
inquiry - suggesting the application of an effects-based analysis - does not 
guarantee that the Commission is not opting for a “by object” analysis after all. 
Despite having proclaimed the more effects-based approach to Art. 101 TFEU for 
more than a decade in its regulations and guidelines,78 the European Commission 
has framed almost every infringement decision since January 2000 in “object” 
terms.79 The underlying reason for this kind of approach is likely to be based on 
                                                          
74 Pat Treacy and Sophie Lawrance, ‘Intellectual property rights and out of court settlements’ in 
Steven D Anderman and Ariel Ezrachi (eds), Intellectual property and competition law: New frontiers 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 293. 
75 European Commission (n 1) para 750, 751. 
76 Ibid. para 743. 
77 Ibid. para 1530. 
78 Commission Regulation 772/2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of 
technology transfer agreements (2004) OJ L 123; European Commission, Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements [2011] OJ C 11 
; European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) (n 65); European Commission, 
Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements [2004] 
OJ C 101/2; European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/01; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices (1999) OJ L 336 ; Commission Regulation (EC) 
2659/2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and 
development agreements  (2000) OJ L 304; Commission Regulation 2658/2000 on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements (2000) OJ L 304. 
79 Damien M Gerard, ‘The Effects-Based Approach Under Article 101 TFEU and its Paradoxes: 
Modernisation at War with Itself?’ in Jacques Bourgeois (ed), Ten years of effects-based approach in 
EU competition law: State of play and perspectives (Bruylant, Bruxelles op. 2013) 38. 17 out of 18 
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strategic considerations, as it is a lot easier to bring a successful case when there is 
no requirement to show the anticompetitive effects of an agreement. The 
European Commission regularly justifies this approach by stating that an “object” 
restriction should not be seen as a “per se” style infringement as in the United 
States. Even an “object” restriction would allow for justifications which make the 
presumption a rebuttable one. Yet it has been correctly stated that such an 
argument is only valid if a rebuttal is a ‘reality rather than a theoretical possibility’.80 
Although the European Court of Justice has previously considered that object 
restrictions should be theoretically open to justification, it has ‘never in recent 
memory overturned a finding that they were not’.81 
The European Commission seems to have reverted to this modus operandi 
in its Lundbeck decision – the first European decision in relation to pay for delay 
settlements.  Although the press release issued by the European Commission 
remains silent with regards to the type of restriction that the Commission has 
found, it became evident on 9 November 2013 that the decision was based on 
restrictions by object. On this day, a number of generic companies and Lundbeck 
itself appealed the decision to the General Court, with one of the main arguments 
being that the European Commission had committed a manifest error of 
assessment by finding that the pay for delay settlement constituted a restriction of 
competition ‘by object’.82 In another pay for delay case, the European Commission 
imposed a fine of €16 million on Johnson & Johnson and Novartis.83 According to 
trade press, it seems that a restriction by object was also found in this case, but the 
parties have decided not to appeal the decision.84 Thus, it remains to be seen 
whether it can be justifiable to find a restriction by object with regard to the actual 
                                                                                                                                                                    
infringement decisions were regarded as object restrictions which included all vertical cases and 8 
out of 9 horizontal cases. 
80 Alison Jones, ‘Left behind by modernisation? Restrictions by object under Art. 101 (1)’ (2010) 6 
European Competition Journal 649, 663. 
81 Gerard (n 79) 40. 
82 Case T-460/13 Ranbaxy Laboratories and Ranbaxy (UK) v Commission (n 6); Case T-472/13 H. 
Lundbeck and Lundbeck v Commission (n 6); Case T-470/13 Merk v. Commission (n 6); Case T-471/13 
Xellia Pharmaceuticals and Zoetis Products v Commission (n 6). 
83 European Commission (n 5). 
84 Dechert LLP, ‘OnPoint: A legal update from Dechert's Antitrust/Competition Group’ (2013) 
http://sites.edechert.com/10/2122/december-2013/pay-for-delay-agreements-do-not-pay-
off.asp#page=1. 
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agreement based on the legal and economic context of the actual market in 
question.  
 
In light of the aforementioned, the European Commission should generally resist 
the temptation to regard pay for delay settlements as restrictions by object. It is 
important to keep in mind that the anticompetitive potential of pay for delay 
settlements in Europe is likely to be reduced when compared to the United States. 
As has been pointed out above,85 there does not exist in Europe a regulatory 
bottleneck akin to the Hatch Waxman Act which facilitates market foreclosure. In 
contrast, in the United States, even with the increased anticompetitive potential 
the US Supreme Court has opted in its pay for delay judgment FTC v. Actavis86 for a 
rule of reason approach, which is discussed in detail in the next section. 
Regarding pay for delay settlements in Europe as restrictions by object also 
increases the potential for Type I errors and over-enforcement.  Depending on the 
actual definition of pay for delay settlements, patent settlements with a value 
transfer from the brand company to the generic company which are followed by 
the exit of the generic company from the market could fall foul of Art 101(1) TFEU. 
Such a payment could, however, be perfectly reasonable. It might settle litigation 
costs or may constitute a payment for services rendered by the generic company. 
An indicator for anticompetitive conduct could be the level of the payment. 
However, such an evaluation cannot take place for object restrictions. 
Two exceptions to this general rule could nonetheless be considered. One is 
the case when the agreement clearly exceeds the scope of the patent; for example, 
when the agreement prevents the generic company from entering the market after 
the protection of the relevant patent has elapsed. This type of conduct has also 
been accepted as being anticompetitive by the US jurisprudence prior to the US 
Supreme Court’s decision in Acatvis.87 The second exception could be a situation in 
                                                          
85 See chapter III sec. 2.3.2. 
86 FTC v. Actavis  133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013). 
87 The Federal Circuit which applies the “scope of the patent test” regarded such settlements that go 
beyond the patent life as anticompetitive. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride Antitrust litigation  544 
f.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2828 (2009); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
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which the parties are aware of facts that would remove the uncertainty regarding 
the outcome of patent litigation to the point at which the European Commission 
would no longer have to second-guess the validity of the patent at issue. One 
possibility could be the discovery of internal documents that provide evidence that 
the patentee was aware of patent’s invalidity.88 Apart from these noted exceptions, 
pay for delay settlements should not be subjected to a “restriction by object” 
analysis. 
 
2.1.2.2. Restriction by effect 
In light of this finding, this section therefore analyses pay for delay settlements by 
employing an effects-based approach. After having set out the basic principles of 
such an analysis based on the European Commission’s relevant guidance papers 
and the relevant case law, the section addresses what has so far been regarded as 
the major legal issue of an effects-based analysis of pay for delay settlements; 
namely, the need to evaluate the validity of the underlying patent. Acknowledging 
this legal issue, it will be established whether the US Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Actavis can be used as guidance to overcome this hurdle in the European context, 
as the Supreme Court addressed the very same issue – the antitrust scrutiny of pay 
for delay settlements without an inquiry into the validity of the underlying patent. 
Following a detailed description of the US judgment, the remainder of this section 
develops a novel structured effects-based analysis inspired by the rationale of the 
US Supreme Court’s judgment in Actavis that circumvents this issue of patent 
validity, without being over-inclusive with regard to patent settlements that lack a 
value transfer from the brand company to the generic company.  
 
Determining whether an agreement amounts to a restriction by effect requires 
proof of the likely negative impact of the agreement on inter- or intra-brand 
competition. According to the European Commission’s Guidelines, the agreement:  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Pharmaceuticals, Inc  344 F.3d 1294, (11th Cir. 2003); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation  466 
F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
88 Bill Batchelor, ‘EC tones down its final report into the pharma sector, but ramps up enforcement 
activity’ (2010) 31 European Competition Law Review 16; Treacy and Lawrance (n 74) 293. 
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‘must affect actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the 
relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or 
quality of goods and services can be expected with a reasonable degree of 
probability’.89 
 
In order to find that an agreement has an actual or potential anticompetitive effect, 
the European Commission must determine whether the parties to the agreement 
have a degree of market power and whether the agreement contributes to the 
strengthening or maintenance of this market power. 90  This requires the 
consideration of the economic and legal context in which the agreement takes 
place.91 In addition, the Guidelines also provide for a counterfactual analysis, 
questioning whether the restriction to competition would not have existed without 
the agreement.92  
 
This counterfactual analysis has so far posed the question of what the outcome 
would have been without the settlement agreement. Treacy and Lawrance argue 
that this would require the assessment of the probable outcome of the settled 
patent litigation and, thus, an estimation of the strength of the litigated patent.93 
Such an inquiry by the European Commission would not only pre-judge the finding 
of specialist patent courts,94 but would also be inherently difficult. The European 
Commission would only be able to infer generic entry but for the pay for delay, if 
the disputed patent is weak. The definition of “weakness” also raises difficulties as 
                                                          
89 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) (n 65) para. 24. 
90 Ibid. para. 25. 
91 Cases T-374/75, 384, 388/94 European Night Services v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141 para. 136; 
Case T-328/03, O2 (Germany) GmBH & Co OHG v Commission [2006] ECR II-1231 para. 66. 
92 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) (n 65) para. 18; Case Case C-
234/89, Delimitis v Henninger Bräu  [1991] ECR I-935 para. 23; Case T-328/03, O2 (Germany) GmBH 
& Co OHG v Commission (90) para. 68. 
93 Treacy and Lawrance (n 74) 295. 
94 Ibid. 295. 
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the European Commission would have to decide at which probability of success the 
companies would have to refrain from settling.95 
 
These considerations and arguments are not unique to the European context. The 
very same issues had to be addressed by the US Supreme Court in its Actavis 
judgment. The following subsection therefore discusses the US judgment itself in 
order to establish whether inspiration can be drawn from Supreme Court’s analysis.  
 
2.1.2.2.1. FTC v Actavis and the FTC’s amicus curiae brief in Effexor XR 
This section discusses the recent US Supreme Court decision in Actavis and the 
FTC’s amicus curiae brief in Effexor XR, in which the FTC argues that the Actavis rule 
should be extended to non-cash payments as a form of value transfer. Drawing 
conclusions from the judgment and the amicus curiae brief might help to develop a 
European approach to pay for delay settlements. 
In Actavis, the US Supreme Court for the first time examined the legality of 
pay for delay settlements. The FTC had applied for writ of certiorari96 in earlier pay 
for delay settlement cases but the US Supreme Court had refused to grant it until 
the present case.97 The reason for the Supreme Court’s change of heart was the 
fact that the Federal Trade Commission managed to create a so-called “split circuit”. 
This refers to a situation where several circuit courts come to different decisions on 
the same issue. In the case of pay for delay settlements, the split was achieved 
between, on the one side, the Second Circuit,98 Eleventh Circuit99 and Federal 
                                                          
95 Ibid. 298. 
96 Writ of certiorari is a petition for judicial review of an important matter by the US Supreme Court. 
The petition is granted by judicial discretion and US Supreme Court considers such review, if for 
example ‘a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of 
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an important 
federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure 
by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power.’ Rule 10(a) of the Rules 
of the United States Supreme Court. 
97 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride Antitrust litigation 544 f.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S.Ct. 2828 (2009). 
98 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation  466 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
99 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride Antitrust litigation  (n 97). 
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Circuit100  who essentially applied the so-called “scope of the patent” test and, on 
the other side, the Third Circuit101  who treated pay for delay settlements as 
“presumptively unlawful”. According to the “scope of the patent” test, 
 
 ‘absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a pay for delay 
settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall 
within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.’102 
 
The finding that pay for delay settlements should be immune from antitrust liability 
was based on the assumption that such liability would undermine the patent 
incentive and would stifle innovation.103 Additionally, the courts stressed the 
general importance of the settlements, especially in patent infringement 
litigation.104 The only noted exception under which the court has to consider the 
patent’s validity in an antitrust analysis is in the case of fraud in front of the patent 
office or in the case of sham litigation.105 In the event of such conduct, the 
agreement’s restrictive effect on competition would be regarded as beyond the 
exclusionary scope of the patent.106 
 
The Third Circuit expressly rejected the “scope of the patent” test, holding pay for 
delay settlements to be a prima facie unreasonable restraint of trade. The Court 
based this finding on a number of reasons. First of all, it rejected the notion that the 
statutory presumption of validity in patent law is a substantive right of the patent 
holder; rather, it constitutes a procedural device which puts the burden of proof on 
                                                          
100 Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc.  677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
101 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation  686 F. 3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
102 Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc.  (n 100) 1312. 
103 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc  344 F.3d 1294, (11th Cir. 2003) 1311 & n.2, 
affirmed in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC  402 F.3d 1056, (11th Cir. 2005) 1065-66. 
104 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC  402 F.3d 1056, (11th Cir. 2005) 1072-73; In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrocloride Antitrust litigation  (n 98) 1333. 
105 For a detailed analysis of this type of conduct see chapter II sec. 6.1.1 discussing the Walker 
Process Doctrine. 
106 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride Antitrust litigation (n97) 1336; Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals (n 103) 1308 & n.21; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation (n 98) 213; 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC  (n 104) 1068. 
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the party that is challenging patent validity. 107  Furthermore, pay for delay 
settlement cases do not concern patent validity but rather patent infringement, in 
which case the burden of proof is on the patent holder – hence, the argument 
based on the presumption of validity is misguided. 108  Secondly, the Court 
emphasises public policy considerations on which not only the patent system is 
based109 but also the Hatch Waxman Act, which is aimed at providing incentives to 
increase competition in the pharmaceutical sector through patent challenges by 
generic companies. The Court directly quoted congressional statements made in 
relation to the Bill which underlines the intention of Congress to provide consumers 
with cheaper generics by encouraging generic companies to challenge patents that 
they regard as weak or invalid.110 This public policy consideration is undermined by 
the “scope of the patent” test.111  Following these considerations, the Court 
remanded the case and directed the District Court to:  
 
‘apply a quick look rule of reason analysis based on the economic realities of 
the pay for delay settlement [regarding a reverse payment] as prima facie evidence 
of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the 
payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-
competitive benefit.112 
 
The US Supreme Court’s majority decision written by Justice Breyer, however, 
rejected both propositions, the scope of the patent test and the quick look rule of 
reason approach and instead struck the middle-ground, ruling that a full rule of 
reason analysis would be appropriate in the case of pay for delay settlements.  
                                                          
107 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation (n 101) 214. 
108 Ibid. 
109 ‘‘It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system and […] the right to challenge [a 
patent] is not only a private right to the individual, but it is founded on public policy which is 
promoted by his making the defence, and contravened by his refusal to make it.’’ In re K-Dur 
Antitrust Litigation (n 101) 216. 
110 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation  (n 101) 217. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 218. 
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The decision strongly dismissed the “scope of the patent” test. First of all 
the Court accepted the 11th Circuit’s finding that the agreement’s ‘anticompetitive 
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent’,113 but it 
disagreed with the suggestion that this fact could also ‘immunize the agreement 
from antitrust attack’.114 It further indicated that patent and antitrust policy are 
both relevant in determining the “scope of the patent monopoly” – and 
consequently antitrust immunity – that is conferred by a patent.115 Yet, with regard 
to pay for delay settlements which according to the FTC tend to have significant 
adverse effects on competition, the “scope of the patent” test simply refers to what 
the holder of a valid patent can do and does not answer the antitrust question. The 
Court therefore found that: 
 
 ‘it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the 
settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy rather than by 
measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.’116 
 
At the same time, the Court rejected a “quick look” analysis proposed by the FTC 
which would have been based on a presumption of illegality. The Court cited its 
decision in California Dental and held: 
 
‘that abandonment of the “rule of reason” in favour of presumptive rules (or 
a “quick look” approach) is appropriate only where “an observer with even a 
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in 
question would have an anticompetitive effect on consumers and markets.”’117  
 
Applying these findings to the case at hand, the Court decided that the criteria for a 
“quick look” analysis of pay for delay settlements had not been met, as the 
                                                          
113 Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc.  (n 100) 1312. 
114 FTC v. Actavis  (n 86) 2230. 
115 Ibid. 2231. 
116 Ibid. 2230-31. 
117 Ibid. 2242; quoting California Dental Ass'n v. FTC  526 U.S. 756 (1999) 770. 
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likelihood of anticompetitive effects arising from pay for delay settlements depends 
on a number of factors such as ‘[the] size [of the payment], its scale in relation to 
the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services 
for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing 
justification.’118 The Court opted for a full rule of reason analysis because of this 
complexity. 
 
A full-scale rule of reason analysis traditionally requires definition of a relevant 
market, proof of market power and the existence of anticompetitive effects, 
meaning the existence of a restraint that threatens to reduce output or increase 
prices without being justified by efficiencies or some other redeeming virtue.119 The 
burden of proof in a rule of reason analysis is on the plaintiff. However, the Court 
determined at length the level of evidence the plaintiff would have to provide in 
order to satisfy the burden of proof.120 It found that because of the circumstances 
surrounding pay for delay settlements the plaintiff would only be required to 
provide more abbreviated proof than normally required by a rule of reason 
analysis121 – thereby also addressing the question of how to evaluate the antitrust 
concern without having to rule on the relevant patent’s validity. The Court found 
that this kind of abbreviated proof was sufficient in relation to market power as 
well as the anticompetitive effect of pay for delay settlements. 
Addressing the market power issue the Court found that the  
 
‘size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective 
generic is itself a strong indicator for power – namely the power to charge prices 
higher than the competitive level’.122  
 
                                                          
118 Ibid. 2242. 
119 Herbert J Hovenkamp, ‘Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis 
Decision’ (2014) 15 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 3. 6 
120 FTC v. Actavis  (n 86) 2234-7. 
121 Ibid. 2238. 
122 Ibid. 2236. 
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A firm without such power would not be likely to pay ‘large sums to induce others 
to stay of the market’.123 This finding is based on the rationale that, in a competitive 
market, the incentive of keeping a competitor out of the market should be close to 
zero. In a highly competitive market, price-cost margins are very low and this 
situation cannot be improved by keeping competitors out of the market.124 
However, this incentive rises with the increase in price-cost margins. A firm with 
market power typically enjoys high profit margins and therefore has an incentive to 
defend these by excluding competitors from the market.125  In the case of a time-
limited monopoly, such as patents, the rational patentee would pay no more than 
the anticipated monopoly return over the remaining period of patent protection.126 
Thus the level of market power is a function of the size of the payment made to the 
generic - The bigger the size of the payment, the higher the market power. 
Furthermore, the Court also noted that the size of the payment can also be 
an indicator for the anticompetitive harm caused by the pay for delay settlement 
and can act as ‘a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness’.127 According to the 
Court, it was therefore also unnecessary to evaluate the validity of the patent itself 
as part of the rule of reason analysis. It agreed with the FTC that the rationale 
behind a payment of this size cannot in every case be traditional settlement 
considerations.128 It should rather be seen as evidence that the patentee is not 
confident in the strength of the patent in question and seriously doubts that it 
would prevail in patent litigation.129 According to the Court, a settlement in such a 
situation reduces the extent or likelihood of competition.  The Court also indicated 
that a small reduction of likely competition is sufficient by stating that: 
 
 ‘the owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that 
even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it may, the 
                                                          
123 Ibid. 2236. 
124 Aaron Edlin and others, ‘Activating Actavis’ (2013) 38 Antitrust Health Care Chronicle 16. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Hovenkamp (n 119) 24. 
127 FTC v. Actavis (n 86) 2236. 
128 Ibid. 2233. 
129 Ibid. 2236. 
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payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. 
And, as we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive 
harm.’130 
 
Nonetheless, the Court conceded that payments might reflect legitimate settlement 
considerations, such as avoiding litigation costs or attaining fair value for services 
provided.  Yet this possibility should not prevent the FTC from scrutinising the 
settlement. Ultimately, a district court should be able to examine the size of the 
payment, its likely anticompetitive effects and its potential justifications in the 
future.131 
Judging by these considerations, it is possible to set out the following test to 
determine whether a pay for delay settlement restricts competition:132 
 
(1) The plaintiff has to prove that the relevant payment to the generic company is 
large by: 
a. Valuing the consideration flowing from the patentee to the alleged 
infringer, and 
b. Deducting the avoided litigation costs for the patentee. 
If this net payment is positive it may be understood as a prima facie 
restriction of competition by means of delaying entry. 
(2) The defendant then has the burden of proof for showing that this net payment 
can be explained as payment for services or goods rendered by the alleged 
infringer to the patentee as part of the same transaction. 
 
In the wake of the US Supreme Court’s judgment in Actavis, the Federal Trade 
Commission has now sought to extend the Actavis rule to non-cash payments. In 
recent months, the FTC has filed two amicus curiae briefs; one in the District Court 
                                                          
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 2236. 
132 Edlin and others (n 124) 17, 18. 
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for the district of New Jersey,133 and one in the District Court for the eastern district 
of Pennsylvania.134  Both cases concern patent settlements between a brand 
company and a first-filing generic company that do not involve pay for delays in 
monetary terms but rather in terms of non-cash contributions for the generic 
company. The respective brand companies agreed as part of the settlement not to 
launch an authorised generic version of the brand drug during the period of generic 
exclusivity granted by the Hatch Waxman Act. In the case of Effexor XR, a “no-
authorized-generic commitment”135 by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals induced TEVA, a 
generic manufacturer, to abandon its patent challenge and refrain from selling its 
generic version of Effexor XR for a two-year period.136 According to the FTC, this 
lack of generic competition during the generic exclusivity period has a significant 
impact on the generic company’s profits.137 The FTC therefore argues that the 
Supreme Court in Actavis did not limit the applicability of the Actavis rule to 
monetary payment and claims that: 
 
 ‘accepting the defendants' claim of immunity whenever patentees use 
vehicles other than cash to share the profits from an agreement to avoid 
competition elevates form over substance, and it would allow drug companies to 
easily circumvent the ruling in Actavis, at great cost to consumers.’138 
 
                                                          
133 In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation, Lead case no.: 3:11-cv-05479 (14 August 2013) Federal Trade 
Commission brief as amicus curiae. 
134 In re: Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, Case no.: 2:08 –cv-2431, 2433 (26 September 2013) 
Federal Trade Commission brief as amicus curiae. 
 
135 Authorised generics do not need separate drug approval from the FDA, as they are identical to 
the brand drug. Thus brand companies can compete with the first-filing generic company even 
during the period of generic exclusivity.  
136 In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation (n 133) 1. 
137  Federal Trade Commission, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term 
Impact(2011) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-long-term-
impact-report-federal-trade-commission>  “[d]ue to market share and pricing erosion at the hands 
of the authorized player, we estimate that the profits for the ‘pure’ generic during the exclusivity 
period could be reduced by approximately 60% in a typical scenario.” Id. at [ 81]. In another case it 
was estimated that an authorised generic reduced the generic company’s revenues by 
approximately $400 million. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation (n 133) 12. 
138 In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation (n 133) 2. 
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In the light of this argument the FTC proposes in its briefs as amicus curiae to 
extend the Actavis rule to non-cash payment by asking: 
(1) Whether the alleged payment is something that a generic challenger could 
not have obtained had it won the litigation, and 
(2) Whether the parties are sharing monopoly profits preserved by avoiding 
competition.139 
 
A “no-authorized-generic commitment” is a benefit that a generic company could 
not obtain by prevailing in patent litigation. Even if the generic company were to 
win the patent litigation, the brand company would nonetheless have the right to 
compete against the generic company by entering the market with an authorised 
generic, as patent invalidity or non-infringement does not affect the right to market 
an FDA-approved drug.140  
This extension of the judgment in Actavis seems to be sensible. However, it remains 
to be seen how the District Courts will decide this.  
 
2.1.2.2.2. Application of the rationale in FTC v Actavis in the European context 
Following the discussion of the majority opinion of the US Supreme Court, the 
question is whether the issues surrounding patent validity, including the pre-
judging of patent courts, could also be avoided in the European context by applying 
the rationale of the US Court. As set out above, the Supreme Court infers not only 
market power but also the anticompetitive effect from the size of the payment that 
is directed from the brand company to the generic company and, therefore, it 
avoids an assessment of the validity of the patent in question.  
Taking the same approach with regard to market power in the European 
context should not be problematic. Market power as a concept is defined as the 
ability to profitably raise prices to a supra-competitive level,  to profitably maintain 
output in terms of product quantities, product quality and variety, or to innovate 
                                                          
139 Ibid. 8; In re: Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation (n 134) 6. 
140 In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation (n 133) 15; In re: Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation (n 134) 12. 
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below competitive levels for a period of time.141 Similarly to the situation in the 
United States, the brand company should only be willing to make a payment to the 
generic company that exceeds litigation costs and costs for services rendered, if the 
brand company’s intention is to protect its high price-cost margins. However, such 
high price-cost margins are only likely to occur in markets that are not competitive. 
It should therefore be possible, by implication, to infer market power through the 
willingness to defend high price-cost margins by way of assessing the size of the 
payment. 
However, inferring anticompetitive effects from the size of the payment is 
more problematic in the European context and must therefore be discussed in 
detail. It is important to consider the regulatory context in which pay for delay 
settlements take place on both sides of the Atlantic and factor in the regulatory 
differences. In the United States, the relevant market can be effectively foreclosed 
by a single pay for delay settlement. As has been explained above, the Hatch 
Waxman Act has created a regulatory bottleneck. 142  The FDA, which grants 
pharmaceutical marketing authorisation, is only allowed to grant subsequent 
generic applications once the first-filing generic company has marketed its generic 
version of the brand drug for 180 days.  It is thus possible for the brand company to 
foreclose the market by inducing the generic company not to market its generic 
drug for x-amount of time while also postponing the period of generic exclusivity 
which is, in turn, the trigger for subsequent generic applications to the FDA. In light 
of this regulatory bottleneck, it is acceptable to infer anticompetitive effects from 
the size of the payment, due to the causal link between the size of the payment 
from the brand company to the generic company and the delay of generic entry 
which leads to the foreclosure of the market.   
However, such a regulatory bottleneck does not exist in the European 
context. Pharmaceutical regulators in Europe base their decision of generic 
approval solely on health and safety considerations and do take economic factors 
such as patents into account. The regulator is not limited in the number of generic 
                                                          
141 European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (2011) para. 39. 
142 For the discussion of the peculiarities of the Hatch Waxman Act see chapter III sec. 2.3.1. 
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drug approvals it can issue for the same brand drug prior to patent expiry, as long 
as all applications are compliant with the relevant health and safety regulations. 
Paying off a single generic company does not therefore guarantee that the brand 
company will be protected from competition for the duration of that agreement. 
Other generic companies are not prevented from entering the market, although 
they run the risk of being sued for patent infringement by the brand company. 
Ultimately, this also means that one cannot presume that an anticompetitive 
foreclosing effect results from the agreement between the brand company and a 
single generic company that agrees not to enter the market or to delay its entry. It 
is therefore also not appropriate to infer an anticompetitive effect solely on the 
basis of the size of the payment within this agreement, just as in the United States.  
That said, this should also not lead to the conclusion that the 
anticompetitive effects of pay for delay settlements in Europe can only be shown by 
means of examining the validity of the patent. The assessment of the regulatory 
framework in Europe does not suggest that it is impossible for a single pay for delay 
settlement to result in anticompetitive foreclosure effects. The lack of a regulatory 
bottleneck similar to the Hatch Waxman Act should not be equated with a lack of 
potential for anticompetitive foreclosure in Europe. The manifestation of such an 
effect is, rather, dependent on the actual market structure and the competitive 
environment in the relevant market.  Imagine a scenario where a number of generic 
companies are present in a given market, but only one of these companies has the 
financial and technical means to realise the  economies of scale that are necessary 
to profitably market the generic version of a branded drug. In this case, the 
remaining generic companies would not be able to enter the market to exert 
competitive pressure on the brand company despite the lack of any legal or 
regulatory absolute barriers to entry and the ability to apply for market 
authorisation. In effect, this scenario would lead to at least the same level of 
anticompetitive effects witnessed in the United States. Indeed, the situation could 
be even more detrimental to competition due to the lack of potential competitors 
which are foreclosed by the agreement. 
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It should therefore be possible to infer anticompetitive foreclosure effects from the 
size of the payment in addition to an assessment of the competitive environment 
within the relevant market (ie the number of potential generic competitors). 
 
Such an analysis would not be dissimilar to the ECJ’s judgment in Delimitis v 
Henninger Bräu,143 which epitomises the EU court’s approach to restrictions by 
effect. In this case, the Court had to assess whether exclusive beer supply 
agreements between a brewery and public houses amounted to a restriction by 
effect because of their potential to foreclose the market. Having highlighted the 
general pro-competitive features of such beer supply agreements,144 the Court set 
out a test to establish whether the beer supply agreement in question led to an 
anticompetitive foreclosure of the relevant market. In order to establish the 
potential foreclosure, the Court deemed it necessary to define the relevant market. 
The Court then went on to examine whether it was difficult for competitors to gain 
access to the market in the light of the economic and legal context of the 
agreement at issue.145 The market in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu was comprised of a 
multitude of similar beer supply agreements, which led the Court to find that these 
agreements could have a cumulative effect on competition. Because of this 
cumulative effect on competition, it was therefore necessary to assess whether the 
agreement in question had made a significant contribution to the foreclosure of the 
market brought about by the totality of those agreements in their legal and 
economic context. In general terms, the judgment in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu has 
thereby established that even vertical agreements with pro-competitive features 
can potentially give rise to significant anticompetitive effects when considered in 
their legal and economic context in the relevant market.  
The Court’s judgment in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu therefore shows that it 
is possible to have a “structured approach” to an effects-based analysis under Art. 
101(1) TFEU. In addition, it has been suggested that it should generally be possible 
to have a truncated analysis in “restriction by effect” cases, in which the actual 
                                                          
143 Case C-234/89, Delimitis v Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935. 
144 Ibid.  para. 10,11. 
145 Ibid.  para. 27 
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anticompetitive effects are not measures but inferred by an evaluation of 
circumstantial evidence.146  
The structured analysis in in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu and the fact that the 
EU courts are familiar with the possibility of employing a truncated analysis lend 
themselves well to the situation of pay for delay settlements in Europe. The 
discussion of the theory of harm of pay for delay settlements above has shown that 
a single pay for delay settlement in a European market that includes a number of 
potential generic competitors is likely to have a significantly lower anticompetitive 
potential than the same scenario in the United States. 147 A viable option would be 
for the brand company to pay-off all possible generic entrants so that they do not 
enter the market at the same time, thereby foreclosing the market. Yet this 
scenario might change in light of the actual competitive environment of the 
relevant market. 
 
This thesis therefore proposes to extend the Actavis test by an additional criterion 
to accommodate the regulatory differences in the European setting. Additionally, it 
would also appear sensible to follow the FTC’s approach in its amicus curiae briefs 
regarding the extension of pay for delay settlements to non-cash payments. Due to 
the increased scrutiny of the pharmaceutical sector and the attention that pay for 
delay settlements receive in Europe, it is likely that the companies will try to hide or 
disguise the value transfer. Monetary payments are likely to decrease, whereas the 
focus will shift to other types of value transfers such as  
 
‘distribution agreements or a "side-deal" in which the originator company 
grants a commercial benefit to the generic company, for example by allowing it to 
                                                          
146 See Andreas P Reindl, ‘Resale price maintenance and article 101: Developing a more sensible 
analytical approach’ (2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1300, 1309-1313 highlighting this 
point by reference to the European case law on information exchange among competitors and the 
analytical framework used by the courts.  E.g. in the case of Case C-7/59 John Deere, Ltd. v. 
Commission [1998] ECR I-3111. the ECJ accepted the evidence for actual anticompetitive effects 
might not be required, if a careful evaluation of circumstantial evidence in relation to information 
exchange between competitors can be provided; at [para 78, 90] 
147 See discussion in chapter III sec. 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. 
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enter the market before patent expiry in another geographical area or by allowing 
market entry with another product marketed by the originator company.’148 
 
The European Commission also confirms that the list of possible value transfers is 
non-exhaustive,149 which is understandable. A set list of possible value transfers 
would only provide the opportunity to circumvent such a transfer. For the same 
reason, it is sensible to broaden the proposed test to non-monetary value transfers 
from the brand company to the generic company. 
 
The proposed test is the following: 
 
(1) The European Commission has to define the relevant market and examine 
the competitive environment within the market. 
(2) The European Commission must also prove that the relevant value transfer 
to the generic company is large either: 
(a) In the case of a monetary payment by – 
(a) Valuing the consideration flowing from the patentee to the alleged 
infringer, and 
(b) Deducting the avoided litigation costs for the patentee,  
OR 
(b) In the case of a non-monetary value transfer by – 
a. Valuing the consideration flowing from the patentee to the alleged 
infringer, and 
b. Determining whether this value transfer could have been achieved 
by successful patent litigation. 
(3) There is to be a presumption of a prima facie restriction of competition by 
means of delaying entry, if: 
                                                          
148 European Commission, 3rd Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January-
December 2011) (2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_ 
settlements_report3_en.pdf> recital 9. 
149 Ibid. 
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(a) this net payment is positive or the value transfer could not have 
been achieved by means of patent litigation, and  
(b)  the agreement at issue has made a significant contribution to the 
actual or potential foreclosure of the market based on the economic 
and legal context. 
 
(4) The investigated companies then have the burden of proof to show that this 
net payment or the value transfer can be justified as a payment for 
goods/services rendered by the alleged infringer to the patentee as part of 
the same transaction. 
 
 
This test is not believed to be over-inclusive. It takes into consideration the 
efficiency considerations of patent settlements and the actual conditions on the 
relevant market. It does not dis-incentivise patent settlements and does not 
condemn settlements that have no appreciable anticompetitive effect on the 
market. Even if the two parties enter into a pay for delay settlement that included a 
positive net payment, the agreement is not likely to produce anticompetitive 
effects if a number of equally efficient generic competitors are able to enter the 
market – hence the need to cumulatively satisfy the criteria under (2)(a) in order to 
infer anticompetitive effects from the positive net payment.  The test is also not 
over-burdening the parties involved as it is assumed that the parties have the best 
knowledge of the competitive environment within the relevant market and are 
therefore well-equipped to determine whether the agreement in question is likely 
to have a foreclosing effect on the market.  Furthermore, the test can also be 
applied to a situation where the brand company enters into pay for delay 
settlements with a number of generic companies in order to foreclose the market.  
It is not suggested that the proposed test, and more precisely the 
evidentiary burden of the European Commission to quantify the value 
considerations from the brand company to the generic company, is straightforward 
to satisfy. Quantifying the cost of litigation is only one aspect. Although it might 
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sound more challenging to put a “price tag” on an exclusive licence that is granted 
as part of a side deal for other services rendered  in relation to drug distribution or 
the provision of back-up manufacturing capacity, its complexity has been 
downplayed given that these services are routinely sold in a broad market.150 The 
European Commission should therefore have a number of reference points in the 
market. The alternative to the quantification of the value transfer would be an 
investigation into the validity of the underlying patent, which is not only more 
onerous but also more problematic for the European Commission. This is due to the 
fact that the assessment of patent validity by a competition authority leads to the 
“second-guessing” of patent authorities and the potential judgment of a patent 
court. Such a judgment is not, however, a quantitative exercise but rather a 
subjective value judgment with regard to the relevant prior art of the patent and its 
“non-obviousness” or “inventive step”. Judges in one jurisdiction might hand down 
a judgment that contradicts judgments regarding the same patent in another 
jurisdiction. Thus, it is regarded as a lot more sensible and much less onerous for 
the competition authority to undertake the quantitative exercise to evaluate the 
consideration flowing from the brand company to the generic company than 
delving into the subjective assessment of patent validity. Ultimately, this approach 
therefore enhances legal certainty. 
 
3. Abuse of a dominant position 
Pay for delay settlements have already been scrutinised under Art. 101 TFEU under 
the previous section. It has been shown in the theory of harm chapter that pay for 
delay settlements are used as a vehicle to foreclose the relevant market by paying 
off potential generic entrants.151 In return for this value transfer, the potential 
generic entrant agrees not to enter the market before a certain date that has been 
stipulated in the settlement agreement. 
                                                          
150 Hovenkamp (n 118) 27, 28. 
151 See chapter III. 
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  However, a situation could also be envisaged where pay for delay 
settlements are used in a broader “product lifecycle management”152 strategy of 
the brand company.  If a brand company enters into a pay for delay settlement with 
a potential generic entrant in order to facilitate unilateral conduct, one should 
consider antitrust scrutiny following under Art. 102 TFEU. This option could also be 
of strategic advantage. In an investigation against a brand company regarding the 
alleged abuse of its dominant position, the European Commission is more likely to 
receive cooperation from the generic company that entered into the pay for delay 
settlement, as only the brand company is subject to the investigation. This is also 
unlikely to be an undue prioritisation of the enforcement, as the investigated 
conduct is based on unilateral conduct that has been facilitated by the agreement 
between the brand company and the generic company. The predominant 
anticompetitive potential is therefore likely to stem from the brand company’s 
unilateral conduct.  
Due to the different focal point, an investigation of a brand company’s 
abuse of dominance should therefore be seen as an alternative enforcement 
strategy against pay for delay settlements rather than a complementary approach 
to the analysis of pay for delay settlements under Art. 101 TFEU.  
An example of this broader type of unilateral conduct by the brand company, 
which goes beyond the competitive practice of “product lifecycle management”, 
can be found under the “second” abuse in AstraZeneca, concerning the 
deregistration of a market authorisation in order to avoid generic entry and to 
facilitate AstraZeneca’s product switch to a second generation version of its brand 
drug Losec. 
This section argues that an adapted version of this conduct, in which the 
deregistration of the marketing authorisation is replaced by a pay for delay 
settlement, can lead to the same anticompetitive result and therefore to an abuse 
                                                          
152 Product lifecycle management is the business activity of managing a company’s products across 
their lifecycle, from the very first idea of a product all the way through until it’s retired and disposed 
of. The main objectives are the increase of product revenue, the reduction of product related costs, 
and the maximisation of the product portfolio’s value for customers and shareholders. John Stark, 
Product lifecycle management: 21st century paradigm for product realisation (2nd edn, Springer, 
London 2011) 1. 
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of the brand company’s dominant position. For this purpose, the “second” abuse in 
AstraZeneca is explained first, before the scenario is adapted to pay for delay 
settlements.  
 
3.1. The second AstraZeneca abuse – deregistration of market authorisations 
The European Commission’s finding of abuse in relation to the selective 
deregistration of market authorisations for AstraZeneca’s brand drug Losec was 
based on AstraZeneca’s so-called “Losec Post-Patent Strategy” which consisted of 
three elements: (1) the extension of the Losec product line by Losec MUPS, which is 
Losec in a tablet form instead of a capsule;153 (2) the raising of technical and legal 
barriers to entry designed to delay generic entry which was accomplished through 
the deregistration of the marketing authorisations for Losec capsules  in several 
Member States; and (3) the introduction of a new generation product called 
esomeprazole, which was supposed to have significant clinical benefits compared to 
omeprazole, the active pharmaceutical ingredient in Losec.154 
The importance of getting the timing right for the entry of a follow-on brand 
drug such as Losec MUPS is highlighted by a statement made by a brand company 
during the European Commission’s sector inquiry. The company stated that: 
 
"[t]he launch of [our second generation product] is a challenge, not 
experienced until now, as generics firms, […] press onto the market with all force 
and as we have to fear the loss of our patent […]. This means each patient that is 
not switched quickly enough to [our second generation product] is forever lost to the 
generics. Once the patient is switched to [our second generation product] the 
physician does not have to, cannot and will not switch him to a generic, and what is 
more important: the pharmacist cannot substitute!!”155 
                                                          
153 It needs to be kept in mind that the extension of the product line by itself does not constitute an 
abuse as ‘an undertaking, even in a dominant position, [can employ] a strategy whose object it is to 
minimise erosion of its sales and to enable it to deal with competition from generic products is 
legitimate and is part of the normal competitive process’ Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European 
Commission [2010] ECR 00 para. 804. 
154 For the purpose of the finding of abuse only the first two points are relevant. Ibid. para. 803.  
155 European Commission (n 1) 360. 
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If a generic version of the original brand drug arrives on the market before the 
brand company has switched to a follow-on version of the brand drug, the brand 
company  not only loses sales volumes but also has to deal with significantly lower 
prices for its original brand drug.156 
In order to switch as many patients as possible from Losec to Losec MUPS 
before generic entry, AstraZeneca  raised barriers to entry by means of creating 
regulatory obstacles that prevented generic companies from obtaining marketing 
authorisations for generic versions of Losec.157 These regulatory obstacles were 
created through the selective deregistration of AstraZeneca’s marketing 
authorisation for Losec. According to the legal framework at the time, an abridged 
drug application for the generic drug, upon which the generic company could rely 
on the clinical trials and the necessary scientific literature,158 was only available if 
the marketing authorisation for the brand drug was in force on the date on which 
the generic abridged drug application was filed.159 With the withdrawal of the 
marketing authorisation, AstraZeneca had prevented generic companies from using 
the abridged application procedure and had therefore delayed generic entry and 
increased the generic companies’ costs to overcome this barrier to market entry.160 
Based on this conduct the European Commission found that: 
 
‘the requests for deregistration of capsules in […] combination with the 
tablet/capsule switch (i.e. the launch of Losec MUPS tablets and the withdrawal 
from the market of Losec capsules), as part of its LPPS Strategy with a view to 
preventing, or at least delaying, generic market entry [resulted in an abuse of 
AstraZeneca’s dominant position]’.161 
                                                          
156 Ibid. 356. 
157 Instant switching from one brand drug to another is not likely to happen due to described 
switching inertia of prescribing doctors that has been discussed in detail in relation to market 
definition in chapter II sec. 5.1.1.1. 
158 For a detailed explanation of the abridged application procedure see Appendix sec. 2.3. 
159 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 153) para. 828.  
160 Ibid. para. 829. Generic companies could still enter the market but were unable to rely on 
AstraZeneca’s clinical data. 
161 AstraZeneca (Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3) Commission Decision 2006/857/EC, [2005] OJ L 332 para. 
860. This finding was upheld by the General Court Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European 
Commission (n 153) para. 671-696 and by the ECJ Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v European 
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The abuse is therefore not to be found in the extension of the product line but in 
the delay of generic competition into the market, which allowed the brand 
company to introduce a follow-on brand drug into the same market and, thereafter, 
attempt to switch as many patients as possible to the new follow-on brand drug 
without fear of generic competition. In doing so, the brand company would be able 
to switch patients to its new – and still patent protected – follow-on version of the 
brand drug. If successful, the brand drug would not face significant competitive 
pressure from generic entrants as these could only enter with a generic version of 
the brand drug but not for the follow-on brand drug, which is effectively replacing 
the brand drug on the same market.   
Finally, it should be noted that this kind of abuse, based on the 
deregistration of market authorisations, is no longer feasible due to the 
replacement of Council Directive 2001/83/EC by Directive 2004/27/EC.162 Since this 
change in secondary legislation, the deregistration of a marketing authorisation can 
no longer prevent a generic applicant from relying on the necessary clinical trial 
data of the brand company. It is now sufficient that the brand drug has received 
marketing authorisation for its drug in an EU Member State at some point in the 
past, meaning the authorisation  no longer has to be active at the time of the 
generic application.163 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission (ECJ, 6 December 2012) para. 129-141 holding that ‘the deregistration of [Losec’s 
markting authorisation] […] by which AstraZeneca intended […] to hinder the introduction of generic 
products […] does not come within the scope of competition on the merits.’ at [130]. 
162 Directive E 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament end of the Council of 31 March 2004 
amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human 
use . 
163 Ibid. ‘if the reference medicinal product was not authorised in the Member 
State in which the application for the generic medicinal product is submitted […] the applicant shall 
indicate in the application form the name of the Member State in which the reference medicinal 
product is or has been authorised. At the request of the competent authority of the Member State in 
which the application is submitted, the competent authority of the other Member State shall 
transmit within a period of one month, a confirmation that the reference medicinal product is or has 
been authorised together with the full composition of the reference product and if necessary other 
relevant documentation.’ (emphasis added) at Art.10(1). 
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3.2. Pay for delay settlements – The delay of generic entry in a broader context 
A pay for delay settlement could replace the closed loophole of deregistration in 
the product switching scenario. As has been discussed in Chapter III, pay for delay 
settlements in the European context do not necessarily provide the brand company 
with the opportunity to foreclose the market by paying off a single generic 
competitor. The foreclosure of the relevant market depends heavily on the 
competitive structure of the market and the number of generic companies that are 
capable of entering the market and of posing a viable threat to the brand 
company’s monopoly profits. Nonetheless, the brand company could attempt to 
delay the most viable and imminent entrant via a pay for delay settlement, in order 
to gain sufficient time to introduce the follow-on brand drug into the same market 
as the brand drug. As described in the section above, it is vital for the brand 
company to introduce the follow-on brand drug on the market before generic 
competition for the original brand drug arises.164  The introduction of a follow-on 
brand drug also does not constitute an abuse itself, as it is part of the normal 
competitive process to mitigate the erosion of sales. 165  The pay for delay 
settlement, however, ensures that the brand company can introduce the follow-on 
brand drug on the market without the fear of generic competition and can attempt 
to switch as many patients as possible from the original brand drug to the new 
follow-on brand drug. With generic competition present in the market, the switch 
of patients would be less likely to be successful on a large-scale as patient’s are 
more likely to be switched to the generic version of the original brand drug than to 
the follow-on brand drug due to the likely significant price difference. A pay for 
delay settlement could therefore be used by a brand company in the same manner 
as the deregistration of marketing authorisations in AstraZeneca, meaning such 
agreements should therefore also be regarded as not falling within the scope of 
competition on the merits given that it delays the introduction of generic 
products.166  
                                                          
164 European Commission (n 1) 360. 
165 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 153) para. 804. 
166 See Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 161) para. 130. 
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The brand company could legitimately attempt to switch patients to the 
follow-on drug by introducing the follow-on brand drug into the market after the 
brand company’s data exclusivity has elapsed but before the 2-year period of 
market exclusivity has expired.167 The brand company might argue that the switch 
at this point in time could lead to the cannibalisation of profits from the original 
brand drug that is still patent protected.  But it should also be noted that the 
follow-on brand drug is likely to still be under data exclusivity and is thus shielded 
from generic competition for a longer period. In contrast to this legitimate business 
practice, the brand company delays generic entry by paying off the generic 
company to a point in time after the expiry of market exclusivity. This means that, 
under normal circumstances, the paid-off generic company could have had the 
potential to enter the market. This could lead to the minimisation of the 
aforementioned profit cannibalisation and to a successful product switch at a point 
in time when the generic company could have already exerted competitive pressure 
on the original brand drug, which would directly benefit consumers. Consumers 
would have been more likely to switch to the cheaper generic version of the original 
brand drug than to the follow-on brand drug. Therefore, the conduct in question 
should be regarded as an abuse of the brand company’s dominant position. 
 
What remains to be discussed is whether the brand company could argue that the 
conduct is objectively justified. The brand company could rely on the exclusionary 
nature of the patent, arguing that it should also be allowed to defend its patent by 
means of patent infringement litigation when the litigation is concluded by a 
settlement. A similar argument was put forward in Microsoft. 168  However, 
Microsoft’s plea that it should be allowed to refuse to grant access to its technology 
to third parties based on the fact that the technology was patent protected was 
rejected by the General Court. The Court held that this would lead to the conclusion 
                                                          
167 Every brand drug that has been approved after 30 October 2005 receives 8 years of data 
exclusivity (where a generic company cannot rely on the brand company’s clinical data), 2 years of 
market exclusivity (where the generic company can produce the drug but is not allowed to market it) 
with a possible extension of a further year (so-called 8+2+1 formula). For more details see Appendix 
sec. 2.3. 
168 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission  [2007] ECR II-3601. 
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that refusal to licence an intellectual property right could never constitute an abuse, 
which would contradict the ECJ’s judgments in Magill and IMS Health.169 In a similar 
vein, it could be argued that it should not be permissible to shield any patent 
enforcement from antitrust scrutiny because of the exclusionary nature of the 
patent.170 In addition, the conduct should not be objectively justifiable by arguing 
that incentives to innovate would be reduced. Contrary to Microsoft, which dealt 
with the refusal to licence an intellectual property right, the brand company is not 
curtailed in putting an innovative product to the market and is not forced into 
providing a generic company with a licence. Instead, the company is prevented 
from shielding the market from generic competition which allows the brand 
company to make the transition from an original brand drug to a follow-on brand 
drug without any competitive constraint from generic companies. The brand 
company should also not be able to argue that the pay for delay settlement which 
facilitates the product switch would realise efficiencies to the benefit of the 
consumers, as the purpose of a pay for delay settlement is to keep cheaper generic 
alternatives to the original brand drug out of the market.  
 
Following these remarks, it can be concluded that pay for delay settlements could 
be used as a means to an end for the brand company to succeed with a broader 
unilateral conduct, which would justify an investigation under Art. 102 TFEU. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The discussion of pay for delay settlements as agreements between competitors 
has shown that the EU courts’ previous case law regarding trademark delimitation 
agreements and no-challenge clauses are not applicable to this scenario. It has 
                                                          
169 Ibid. para.690 In Magill and IMS Health the ECJ stated that refusal to licence can constitute an 
abuse of a dominant position.  
170 This would circumvent antitrust scrutiny of potential anticompetitive conduct such as vexatious 
patent litigation such as the European Commission’s investigation against Rambus for their “patent 
ambush” strategy which has been concluded by a commitment decision RAMBUS (Case 
COMP/38.636) Commission decision [2010] OJ C30/17; or the recent investigations against Samsung 
in relation to standard-essential patents, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission sends 
Statement of Objections to Samsung on potential misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents 
(Brussels, 21 December 2012) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm>. 
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therefore been necessary to develop a novel test for pay for delay settlements 
which, in essence, consists of a structured effects-based analysis in which the actual 
or potential anticompetitive effects of pay for delay settlements are inferred 
through the size of the value transfer from the brand company to the generic 
company.  To base an effects-based analysis on limited evidence is not unheard of, 
as has been shown by reference to the EU courts’ case law in relation to the 
information exchange between competitors. The key advantage of the proposed 
test is the fact that it evades the need for a subjective assessment of patent validity 
by the competition authority. It is rather founded on a cost-based analysis by which 
the competition authority has to quantify the costs and services rendered that are 
included in the relevant pay for delay settlement. The European Commission should 
be a lot more at ease to employ such a cost-based analysis. At the same time, care 
was taken to ensure that the proposed test was not over-inclusive, recognising the 
need for general patent settlements. 
The analysis of pay for delay settlements as part of a broader unilateral 
strategy has shown that the settlement can be used to delay generic entry long 
enough, in order to implement such a broader strategy that might be aimed at 
extending the brand company’s monopoly profits. The discussed example shows 
that legitimate competitive business practice can become anticompetitive if the 
brand company employs a pay for delay settlement in order to ensure the success 
of the business practice by sheltering it from generic competition. Such conduct 
should not fall within the scope of competition on the merits and should not be 
objectively justified. 
 Having discussed pay for delay settlements within the remit of Art. 101 TFEU 
and Art. 102 TFEU, the following final substantive chapter of this thesis puts early 
entry agreements under the same kind of scrutiny based on European competition 
law. 
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V. EARLY ENTRY AGREEMENTS 
1. Introduction 
An early entry agreement is an agreement that is reached between a brand 
company and a generic company, prior to the expiry of the relevant patents, that 
relates to the brand drug. Having finalised the agreement, the generic company is 
allowed to enter the market early. In return for this permitted early entry, the 
generic company has to commit to a number of exclusivity clauses as part of its 
agreement with the brand company. These clauses can impose a variety of 
restrictions on the generic company, such as exclusive sourcing agreements, single 
branding agreements and exclusive distribution agreements.1 The key issue that 
should trigger antitrust scrutiny is the time frame in which these agreements take 
place. As this thesis has mentioned previously,2 at least half of the agreements 
identified in the European Commission’s pharmaceutical sector inquiry were 
entered into by the parties one year prior to the loss of exclusivity of the brand 
company’s patent. On average, the agreements exceeded the loss of this exclusivity 
by two years; however, the most extreme case saw the exclusivity exceeded by 
more than 14 years. Indeed, it is this fact – ie that the exclusive nature of the 
agreement between the brand company and the early generic entrant exceeds the 
loss of patent protection – which raises particular concerns for antitrust.  
Based on the above-developed theory of harm,3 the antitrust concern 
should stem from the brand company’s ability to control the price of the generic 
drug sold by the first generic entrant beyond the life of the patent. The brand 
company could therefore prevent or delay a significant generic price drop shortly 
after patent expiry, thereby distorting the competitive process and harming 
consumers. This strategic control is only possible if the generic first-mover 
advantage is exploited and subsequent entry is foreclosed or delayed after patent 
expiry. The focus of this chapter is therefore on: the restrictions that are imposed 
on the early generic entrant by the brand company through the early entry 
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion of the composition of early entry agreements see chapter III sec. 3. 
2 See chapter III section 3. 
3 For the detailed analysis of the theory of harm see Chapter III. 
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agreement; the potential foreclosure or the delayed entry of subsequent generic 
entrants; and the competing brand companies that also want to enter the generic 
market by means of an early entry agreement. 
This chapter addresses the anticompetitive potential of early entry 
agreements prior to patent expiry as well as post-patent expiry. Just as in the 
analysis of pay for delay settlements in the previous chapter, the discussion of early 
entry agreements also focuses on: (1) agreements between competitors within the 
remit of Art. 101 TFEU, and (2) the potential abuse of the brand company’s 
dominant position following Art. 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). 
In section 2, the discussion focuses predominantly on the applicability of the 
relevant block exemptions to early entry agreements. This analysis highlights the 
general procompetitive nature of early entry agreements prior to patent expiry, but 
also hints at the anticompetitive potential of these agreements post-patent expiry. 
Continuing under the assumption that the brand company is in a dominant position,  
the analysis in section 3 of this chapter shows that the brand company runs the risk 
of abusing its dominant position by means of anticompetitive foreclosure or by 
delaying the  entry of subsequent generic companies and competing brand 
companies. In doing so, the brand company is able to keep the price of the generic 
drug above the competitive level post-patent expiry which, therefore, harms the 
consumer. 
 
2. Agreement between competitors  
The generic company is predominantly in a vertical relationship with the brand 
company, because it either purchases the drug from the brand company and resells 
it following the generic packaging, or it purchases all the necessary requirements 
from the brand company in order to manufacture the generic version of the brand 
drug.  However, the generic company could also be regarded – to some extent – as 
a competitor to the brand company, as it sells the perfect substitute to the brand 
drug on the same relevant market. Determining the relationship between the two 
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parties also has a significant impact on the application of Art. 101 TFEU to this 
scenario. Depending on the details of the actual terms, the agreement could fall 
into the remit of two different block exemptions – namely the Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation (VBER),4  and the Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation (TTBER).5  
The TTBER applies only to agreements for the production of a contract 
product.6 The patent licence that is incorporated into the technology transfer 
agreement must therefore relate to the production of the contract product.7 In 
contrast, licences in agreements that are predominantly aimed at the reselling and 
distribution of a product – rather than its production – have to be evaluated under 
VBER instead of the TTBER.8 The block exemptions might potentially have different 
market share thresholds that determine their applicability and which may lead to 
different outcomes in relation to the scrutiny of early entry agreements under Art. 
101 TFEU. Thus this discussion requires setting up two different scenarios of early 
entry agreements, as it is necessary to determine the application of either the VBER 
or the TTBER depending on the terms of the agreement.  
 
Scenario 1 (the ‘rebranding scenario’) concerns an early entry agreement in which 
the generic company is not producing the generic version of the brand drug itself, 
but rather functions as a licensed distributor of the brand drug which the generic 
company has relabelled.  
 
                                                          
4 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
(2010) OJ L 102/1. 
5 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of technology transfer agreements (2004) OJ L 123. 
6 Ibid. Art 2.1 (the term contract product refers to the product that is produced based on the 
technology transfer agreement) 
7 Lars Kjolbe and Luc Peeperkorn, ‘The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation and 
Guidelines’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European competition law annual 
2005: The interaction between competition law and intellectual property law (Hart, Oxford 2007) 165. 
8 Steven D Anderman, EU competition law and intellectual property rights: The regulation of 
innovation (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) p.258. 
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Scenario 2 (the ‘manufacturing scenario’) concerns an early entry agreement in 
which the generic company receives a licence from the brand company that allows 
the generic company to manufacture and market the actual generic version itself. 
 
In both scenarios, the discussion focuses on the applicability of the relevant block 
exemption, their necessary prerequisites, and the European Commission’s 
Guidance on the potential application of Art. 101(3) TFEU if the block exemption 
should not be applicable. This section does not therefore seek to answer the 
question of whether early entry agreements would be covered by Art. 101, as this is 
a highly fact-specific question. It instead showcases the need for a robust market 
definition in order to accurately determine the market shares of the parties 
involved, as well as the potential procompetitive effects that arise from early entry 
agreements. At the same time, the discussion of the two scenarios outside the safe 
harbours of the respective block exemptions alludes to the anticompetitive 
potential that arises when the brand company has market power. The “grey area” 
for the conduct of companies with a market share outside the block exemption but 
shy of dominance is not addressed in detail. In these cases, Art. 101 TFEU would 
generally be applicable, but the information provided by the European Commission 
in its pharmaceutical sector inquiry is not sufficiently detailed to determine the 
exact nature of the agreements. The analysis would be particularly problematic in 
relation to Art. 101(3) TFEU. Instead, the sections on early entry agreements 
outside the respective block exemption regulations highlight, in general terms, the 
European Commission’s stance towards these initially procompetitive agreements 
once entered into by parties with a degree of market power. This discussion then 
builds up to an examination of the brand company’s abuse of its dominant position 
in section 3, where the anticompetitive potential is discussed in detail.   
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2.1. Scenario 1 (the rebranding scenario)  
In the rebranding scenario, the generic company does not actually produce the 
generic version of the drug but instead enters into an exclusive distribution 
agreement with the brand company prior to patent expiry. In its pharmaceutical 
sector inquiry, the European Commission identified a large number of cases which 
constituted a combination of supply and distribution agreements, where the brand 
company supplied the generic company with the drug for distribution.9  In most 
cases, the brand company reserved the right to sell the drug itself within the 
territory concerned.10  
 
2.1.1.  Applicability of the VBER 
In this scenario, the generic company does not manufacture the drug itself, which 
makes the TTBER inapplicable in this situation. The TTBER only covers patent 
licences that are granted in relation to the production of a contract product, which 
would be the drug in question.11  Instead, the VBER can potentially become 
applicable because the generic company acts as a distributor for the brand 
company on the downstream market and does not manufacture the drug. The fact 
that the brand company is also selling the drug on the same market, thereby 
potentially acting as a competitor to the generic company, does not necessarily 
render the VBER inapplicable. Despite the requirement for the concerned 
undertakings to be active on the separate upstream and downstream markets, the 
VBER entails an exception for competing undertakings. According to the Regulation, 
agreements between competing undertakings can nonetheless be covered if the 
manufacturer is a supplier and a distributor but the buyer is only a distributor and 
not a manufacturer at the same time.12  
This being the case, the VBER would be applicable to early entry agreements 
(in the rebranding scenario) as long as the market share of neither the brand 
                                                          
9 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report (2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html> para. 843. 
10 Ibid. para. 845. 
11 Kjolbe and Peeperkorn (n 7) 165. 
12 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 (n 4). Art. 2(4).  
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company nor the generic company exceeds 30 per cent and the agreement does 
not include any of the hard-core restrictions in Article 4 of the block exemption. 
Indeed, the majority of undertakings questioned during the pharmaceutical sector 
inquiry submitted that their market share fell below this threshold, which seems to 
suggest that the majority of these early entry agreements are likely to be block 
exempted.13  However, this calculation of market share is dependent on the 
definition of the relevant market, which is hugely contentious in the pharmaceutical 
sector and can vary significantly, as shown above.14 If a single drug is regarded as 
constituting the relevant market, then the brand company is likely to exceed the 
market share threshold and the generic company has, by definition, no market 
share at the point of entry, given that the generic company is only about to enter 
the market. The applicability of the VBER is only possible if the market definition is 
wider, taking different pharmaceutical molecules into consideration that can 
potentially also be used to treat the same medical condition. In this case, the brand 
company is likely to have a smaller market share and the generic company could 
have a proportion of the market share despite not having entered the market of the 
drug that is covered by the early entry agreement. 
An additional question that arises is the VBER’s applicability in light of the 
intellectual property rights on which the early entry agreement is based. According 
to the European Commission’s guidelines on vertical restraints, 15 the VBER applies 
to vertical agreements containing intellectual property right provisions where the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) The IPR provisions must be part of a vertical agreement, that is, an 
agreement with conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or 
resell certain goods or services;  
(b) The IPRs must be assigned to, or licensed for use by, the buyer;  
(c) The IPR provisions must not constitute the primary object of the agreement;  
                                                          
13 European Commission (n 9) para. 812. 
14 See chapter II section 5 for the general discussion of the market definition in AstraZeneca and the 
problems that arise once the general principles of that market definition are applied to a different 
market such as the one for antiepileptic drugs. 
15 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/01 para 31. 
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(d) The IPR provisions must be directly related to the use, sale or resale of 
goods or services by the buyer or its customers;  
(e) The IPR provisions, in relation to the contract goods or services, must not 
contain restrictions of competition having the same object as vertical 
restraints which are not exempted under the Block Exemption Regulation.16 
 
Furthermore, the European Commission states that these five conditions ensure 
that the VBER applies to vertical agreements where the use, sale or resale of goods 
or services can be performed more effectively because intellectual property rights 
are assigned to or licensed for use by the buyer. This means that restrictions 
concerning the assignment or use of intellectual property rights are covered by the 
Regulation so long as the main object of the agreement is the purchase or 
distribution of goods or services.17 
In the case of early entry agreements, the underlying patent is not the 
primary object of the agreement. It is rather ancillary to the agreement, as the 
generic company could not otherwise enter the relevant market and distribute the 
generic version of the brand drug prior to patent expiry. The VBER should therefore 
be generally applicable to early entry agreements in the rebranding scenario.  
An early entry agreement is thus likely to be block exempted from Art. 101 
TFEU, provided it does not contain any hard-core restrictions listed under Art. 4 of 
the VBER.  These include minimum resale price maintenance,18 in addition to 
territorial resale restrictions in terms of passive sales.19  
 
2.1.2.  Early entry agreements outside the safe harbour of the VBER 
Once one of the parties to an early entry agreement does not meet the market 
share threshold of 30 per cent in the relevant market, the agreement in question 
                                                          
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. para 32. 
18 Maximum resale price maintenance and the setting of a recommended resale price is expressly 
excluded from the hard-core restrictions in Art. 4 (a) of the VBER. 
19 The restriction of active sales is again excluded from the hard-core restrictions following Art. 4 (b) 
(i) of the VBER. 
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becomes subject to a full competition analysis and the potential individual 
exception following Art. 101(3) TFEU. The guidelines assist in the individual 
assessment of vertical agreements outside the block exemption but, importantly, 
the established principles set out cannot be applied mechanically and must rather 
be applied on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the specific facts of the 
case at hand.20 Nonetheless, it should be possible to derive a few general principles 
that should be applicable to early entry agreements.  
Early entry agreements in the rebranding scenario consist predominantly of 
single branding agreements21 combined with exclusive sourcing agreements.22 Such 
agreements generally bear the possibility of anticompetitive foreclosure of the 
market for competing potential suppliers, which could ultimately have a 
detrimental impact on inter- and intra-brand competition for the consumer.23 The 
extent, or rather the likelihood, of this theory of harm materialising depends on a 
number of factors, including the competitive market structure in terms of the 
position of the supplier24 and the competitors25 the level of consumer demand, the 
                                                          
20 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (n 15) Recital 3 of the preamble. 
21 Single branding agreements restrict the generic company in its sales and distribution activities (e.g. 
territorial restrictions, or the prohibition to sell products from competing brand companies) 
22 This clause obliges the generic entrant to purchase all or at least most of the necessary 
requirements from the brand company or a designated supplier.  
23 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (n 15) para. 130. For a discussion of 
anticompetitive foreclosure through vertical restraints see Patrick Rey and Thibaud Vergé, The 
economics of vertical restraints. Conference paper at the conference on Advances in the Economics 
of Competition Law, (Rome, Italy, June 2005) <http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/staff/ 
verge/Verticals.pdf> 33-41; Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical 
Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy Conference paper at the conference on Advances in 
the Economics of Competition Law, (Rome, Italy, June 2005) <http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~rslee/ 
teaching/io/papers.vertical/Lafontaine%20Slade%20(2007%20handbook%20antitrust)%20%20Exclu
sive%20Contracts%20and%20Vertical%20Restraints.pdf> 8-10. Generally, anticompetitive 
foreclosure in vertical restraints is based on the more general strategy of raising rivals’ cost as 
developed by Steven C Salop and David Scheffman, ‘Raising Rivals' Costs’ (1983) 73 The American 
Economic Review 267; Thomas G Krattenmaker and Steven C Salop, ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over (1986) 96 The Yale Law Journal 209; Steven C Salop and 
David Scheffman, ‘Cost-Raising Strategies’ (1987) 19 The Jounal of Industrial Economics 19.  
24 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints para. 132. 
25 Ibid. para 134. 
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market coverage of the single branding agreement,26 barriers to entry,27 and finally 
the duration of the agreement.28  
As a general rule, it can be said that the potential for anticompetitive 
foreclosure increases with the level of market power of the undertakings 
concerned.29 The higher the market shares are, the higher the tied market share is 
likely to be, which translates into a higher degree of market coverage for the single 
branding agreement. ‘Single branding obligations are more likely to result in anti-
competitive foreclosure when entered into by dominant companies.’30 
If it were to be established that the early entry agreement in question would 
lead to an anticompetitive foreclosure of the relevant market, it would be 
necessary to determine whether any pro-competitive effects are likely to out-weigh 
the foreclosure effects.  
The main line of argument for the objective justification of exclusivity 
agreements between the supplier and the distributor is based on: the distributor’s 
incentives for investment, the free-riding problem that might occur when other 
competitors enter the market and the issue of “hold-up”.31 It has been argued that 
the distributor would only be willing to invest in a distribution network or the pre- 
and post-sale services – such as promotional expenses and staff-training – in return 
for exclusivity, as these costs are often sunk.32 Without such exclusivity, other 
competitors might enter the market and “free-ride” on the pre- and post-sale 
services, thereby enabling them to offer the product at a lower price because they 
                                                          
26 Ibid. para 133. 
27 Ibid. para 136. 
28 Ibid. para 133. ‘Single branding obligations shorter than one year entered into by non-dominant 
companies are generally not considered to give rise to appreciable anti-competitive effects or net 
negative effects. Single branding obligations between one and five years entered into by non-
dominant companies usually require a proper balancing of pro- and anti- competitive effects, while 
single branding obligations exceeding five years are for most types of investments not considered 
necessary to achieve the claimed efficiencies or the efficiencies are not sufficient to outweigh their 
foreclosure effect.’ 
29 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The economics of EC competition law: Concepts, application and 
measurement (University Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010). 5-039 An anticompetitive potential of a 
vertical restraint arises when the restraint reduces competition on a horizontal level, which in turn 
depends on the degree of market power of the relevant undertakings.  
30 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (n 15) para. 133. 
31 Rey and Vergé (n 23) 23. 
32 Lafontaine and Slade (n 23) 7. 
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did not incur the service cost in the first place.33 Where the distributor is likely to 
incur significant start-up costs in order to develop a new market, territorial 
exclusivity – including the restriction of passive sales for a period of up to two years 
– can be justified.34 The hold-up problem describes the situation in which the 
distributor needs to be incentivised in order to set up a distribution network or any 
other infrastructure that is specific to the distribution agreement.35 However, the 
hold-up issue should be negligible in the case of early entry agreements, as the 
distribution network developed by the early generic entrant is one of the key 
considerations for the brand company to actually enter into such an agreement.36 
Additionally, the set-up costs of the early generic entrant should be comparatively 
low in the rebranding scenario because it does not have to produce the generic 
drug in the first place. The early generic entrant simply has to distribute the drug 
provided by the brand company using its already established distribution network.  
In the case of early entry agreements, however, the exclusive nature of the 
agreement can instead be justified by the existence of the patent that protects the 
brand drug. Prior to patent expiry, the brand company could technically try to 
exclude every generic company from the market. It should therefore be acceptable 
for the brand company to restrict the distribution of the generic drug by the generic 
company. However, as soon as the drug has lost its patent protection, the situation 
needs to be re-evaluated. At this point, any objective justification of the exclusivity 
based on the need to incentivise the generic company should be carefully 
considered. Despite the fact that the exclusivity prior to patent expiry is based on 
the patent protection of the brand drug, the generic company also benefits from 
this exclusivity period as it means it need not fear any generic competitor. This 
enables the generic company to establish itself on the market and to recoup its 
investment in the launch of the generic drug, as well as eradicating any free-riding 
problem.  
                                                          
33 Lester G Telser, ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and 
Economics 86, 91. 
34European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (n 15) para. 61. 
35 Ibid. para. 107 (d). 
36 European Commission  (n 9) para 729. 
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Thus, once the patent has expired, it should be – at the very least – exceedingly 
difficult to objectively justify any exclusivity contained in the early entry agreement.  
 
2.1.3.  Early entry agreements in the light of the VBER 
Early entry agreements that fall within a safe harbour of the VBER are likely to be 
block exempted as they are unlikely to include any hard-core restrictions. Even if 
the agreement were to include a hard-core restriction such as the restriction of 
passive sales, the agreement should be individually exempted under Art. 101(3), 
due to the patent protected nature of the brand drug. The agreement does, after all, 
provide a generic version of the brand drug prior to patent expiry which is 
beneficial to consumer welfare.  
However, the situation changes once the brand drug comes off patent. If the early 
entry agreement is stipulated for a period that exceeds the patent life, and if the 
parties exceed the market share threshold, the agreement is unlikely to satisfy Art. 
101(3) TFEU, as any objective justification for such exclusivity should be rejected.  
 
2.2.  Scenario 2 (the manufacturing scenario)  
In contrast to the rebranding scenario above, in this scenario the generic company 
receives a patent licence from the brand company that allows the generic company 
to manufacture and sell the drug.37  Under these circumstances, the generic 
company is required to produce a contract product which is based on the provided 
patent licence, thereby leading to the potential applicability of the TTBER.  
 
2.2.1.  Applicability of the TTBER 
For the TTBER to become applicable, the parties to the agreement in question must 
also satisfy a market share threshold. However, the determination of the applicable 
market share threshold in relation to the TTBER is more nuanced than under the 
VBER, as the answer to this question depends on whether the parties to the 
agreement are competitors or non-competitors. If the parties are regarded as 
                                                          
37 European Commission (n 9). para. 851. 
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competitors, the market share threshold is a combined 20 per cent;38 if they are 
regarded as non-competitors, the threshold is 30 per cent each.39 
 
 ‘In order to determine the competitive relationship between the parties it is 
necessary to examine whether the parties would have been actual or potential 
competitors in the absence of the agreement. If without the agreement the parties 
would not have been actual or potential competitors in the relevant market affected 
by the agreement they are deemed to be non-competitors.’40 
 
Based on these considerations, the parties to an early entry agreement are likely to 
be classified as non-competitors, as becoming a competitor by virtue of the patent 
licence is irrelevant to the assessment.41 Without the patent licence, the generic 
company would not be able to produce the generic version of the patent protected 
brand drug. One could argue that the generic company might be able to produce 
the drug without the know-how conveyed by the patent licence, but even this 
possibility cannot be taken into consideration, as the generic company is not 
considered an actual or potential competitor if, in the absence of the agreement, 
the activity would constitute an infringement of the intellectual property rights of 
the other party.42  
The relevant market share threshold for both parties to the agreement is 
therefore likely to be 30 per cent, which is similar to the situation of the rebranding 
scenario in relation to the VBER. 
The distinction between competitors and non-competitors also has an 
impact on the overall assessment of the agreement in question under the TTBER, as 
the hard-core restrictions in relation to territorial and non-territorial restrictions 
differentiate between competitors and non-competitors. Furthermore, this 
distinction is far-reaching as it also applies to agreements outside the safe harbours, 
                                                          
38 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 (n 5). Art. 3 (1) 
39 Ibid. Art. 3 (2) 
40 European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology 
Transfer Agreements [2004] OJ C 101/2 para. 27 
41 Kjolbe and Peeperkorn (n 7) p.8 
42 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 (n 5). Art. 1 (j) (ii);  Kjolbe and Peeperkorn (n 7) p.9 
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as long as the market shares of the parties to the agreement are below the level 
required for dominance.43 
 
Territorial restrictions  
The TTBER and its relevant Guidelines distinguish between two types of territorial 
restrictions – the restriction on production by means of an exclusive licence and 
sales restrictions.  
Following the Guidelines, 44  an early entry agreement that provides the early 
generic entrant with an exclusive licence, guaranteeing that no other generic 
company will enter the market for the duration of the agreement, is likely to be 
either block exempted or individually exempted under Art. 101(3) TFEU, depending 
on the level of market shares.  Such a licence is necessary to induce the licensee to 
invest in the production of the licenced technology, especially if the sunk 
investment is substantial, 45  which in turn addresses the hold-up problem. 
Additionally, one has to keep in mind that the licensor is sharing its patent with the 
generic company prior to patent expiry. The possible alternative would be the 
exclusion of the generic company until patent expiry, which would deprive the 
generic version of the brand drug from emerging prior to patent expiry.46 
With regard to sales restrictions, the restriction of active sales is generally 
block exempted if it is within the safe harbour. Even if the agreement is outside the 
safe harbour but the company falls short of being dominant, the restriction of 
active sales is likely to be individually exempted, as the European Commission 
states that ‘a technology owner cannot normally be expected to create direct 
competition with himself on the basis of his own technology.’47 Restrictions of 
passive sales are generally block exempted for two years from the date on which 
the licensee first markets the product incorporating the licenced technology, as 
licensees often have to commit to substantial investments on production and 
                                                          
43 Anderman (n 8) 259. 
44 European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 (n 40). 
45 Ibid. para 165 
46 Anderman (n 8) p.275. 
47 European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 (n 40) para. 172. 
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marketing.48 If the restriction of passive sales exceeds this two year period, it is no 
longer block exempted and unlikely to satisfy the conditions of Art. 101(3) TFEU.49 
The period of two years is thus regarded as sufficient protection with regards to the 
start-up costs and other potential investment of the new licensee that is often 
sunk.50 
 
Non-territorial restrictions 
Possible non-territorial restrictions in early entry agreements include non-compete 
obligations, no-challenge clauses and the calculation and duration of royalties.  
Non-compete obligations, which prevent the licensee from using third party 
technologies that compete with the licenced technology, are generally exempted, 
so long as the parties to the agreement are within the safe harbour.51 However, 
outside the safe harbour and especially if the licensor has significant market power, 
a non-compete obligation can potentially have an anticompetitive foreclosing effect 
if high barriers to entry impede third-party technologies from entering the market. 
This is the case if third-partes do not have access to the necessary production and 
distribution assets.52 
Under the TTBER, no-challenge clauses are not black-listed but rather 
regarded as excluded restrictions following Art. 5 of the TTBER. These kinds of 
excluded restrictions do not benefit from the block exemption and can only be 
individually exempted following Art. 101(3) TFEU. Yet, at the same time, they do 
not affect the remainder of the agreement.53 The licensor has a strong incentive to 
include such a clause in the early entry agreement, as it provides the generic 
company with first-hand knowledge of the patent process and potential weakness 
of the patent, which could lead to a potential challenge by the generic company. It 
is therefore likely that the licensor would completely refrain from licensing its 
patent in the absence of such contractual protection. 
                                                          
48 Ibid. para. 101. 
49 Ibid. para. 174. 
50 Kjolbe and Peeperkorn (n 7) 17. 
51 European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 (n 40) para. 197. 
52 Ibid. para 198. 
53 Anderman (n 8) p.265. 
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The parties to the agreement are also allowed to determine the royalties 
which are payable by the licensee in return for the patent licence. Nonetheless, 
competition concerns arise when the royalty is set in a way that indirectly amounts 
to price fixing by restricting the licensee in its ability to determine the prices 
charged to third parties.54 The only noted exception is the imposition of a maximum 
sale price or recommended sale price in a licence agreement between non-
competitors.55  The duration of the agreement regarding the royalties is not 
necessarily an indicator of sham royalties.  
 
‘Notwithstanding the fact that the block exemption only applies as long as 
the technology is valid and in force, the parties can normally agree to extend royalty 
obligations beyond the period of validity of the licensed intellectual property rights 
without falling foul of Article [101(1)]. Once these rights expire, third parties can 
legally exploit the technology in question and compete with the parties to the 
agreement. Such actual and potential competition will normally suffice to ensure 
that the obligation in question does not have appreciable anti-competitive effects.’56 
 
Thus the duration of the agreement beyond the patent life is justified on the basic 
notion of self-correcting markets. However, if one accepts the above-developed 
theory of harm,57  the corrective measure of competitive constraints through 
subsequent generic entrants might be missing or are at least delayed. If this should 
be the case, the early generic entrant might pay higher royalties beyond the loss of 
the exclusivity of the underlying patent, ultimately leading to supra-competitive 
prices for the generic drug, which is to the detriment of consumer welfare.  
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 (n 5)  Art 4 (2) a. 
55 Kjolbe and Peeperkorn (n 7) 13. 
56 European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 (n 40) para 159. 
57 See chapter III sec. 3.2 arguing that subsequent generic entry might be delayed because of the 
first-mover advantage of the early generic entrant, which is to a certain extend controlled by the 
brand company.  
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2.2.2.  Early entry agreements in the light of the TTBER 
Having applied the TTBER in its current form, it can be deduced that early entry 
agreements in the manufacturing scenario are generally likely to be covered by the 
TTBER and the accompanying guidelines as long as the parties involved are not 
dominant or, at least, do not have significant market power. All restrictions 
potentially have pro-competitive effects as they give the generic company the 
incentive to invest and avoid potential free-riding problems. After all, early entry 
agreements deliver a generic drug to the market prior to brand drug’s patent expiry, 
which is beneficial for the consumer.  
However, once the parties have significant market power, the 
anticompetitive potential for foreclosure through early entry agreements might 
arise, similar to the discussed rebranding scenario.   
 
2.3. Conclusion 
The discussion of early entry agreements under the VBER and the TTBER has shown 
that the single branding agreements, non-compete obligations, no-challenge 
clauses and sales restrictions – all of which can be included in early entry 
agreements – can have procompetitive features and might therefore be exempted 
from antitrust scrutiny. However, following the discussion of the relevant guidance, 
it can  also be said that the European Commission is wary of these agreements once 
the involved parties  obtain a degree of market power. 
This should be even more so the case if the brand company is in a dominant 
position, which opens the door for an Art. 102 TFEU investigation into the potential 
anticompetitive effects of early entry agreements. The following section therefore 
discusses the brand company’s potential abuse of its dominant position by 
controlling the early generic entrant through an early entry agreement. 
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3. Abuse of a dominant position 
This section scrutinises early entry agreements in relation to Art. 102 TFEU. The 
emphasis here is on the potential foreclosure of the relevant market and, in 
addition, on the delay of entry caused by the exclusive sourcing obligations of the 
generic company and the single branding agreements that are incorporated into 
early entry agreements. As has been mentioned above, such a delay of entry is 
essential if the brand company is to, firstly, exploit the generic first-mover 
advantage with the aim of retaining control over the generic drug price post-patent 
expiry and, thereby, keep generic prices at a supra-competitive level. 
 For the purpose of this chapter, it is assumed that the brand company is in 
a dominant position. The fact that a dominant undertaking enters into an 
agreement does not contradict an analysis under Art. 102 TFEU because of the 
existence of unilateral conduct. Art. 101 and 102 TFEU are not mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, the ECJ held in Hoffmann-La Roche, dealing with exclusive purchasing 
agreements, that: 
 
‘Article [101] does not preclude the application of Article [102] since this latter 
article is expressly aimed in fact at situations which clearly originate in contractual 
relations so that in such cases the [European] Commission is entitled, taking into 
account the nature of the reciprocal undertakings entered into and to the 
competitive position of the various contracting parties on the market or markets in 
which they operate to proceed on the basis of Article [101] or Article [102].’58 
 
Particularly in the case of early entry agreements, it is sensible to scrutinise the 
brand company’s conduct under Art. 102 TFEU, as these agreements are based on 
the brand company’s patent(s) - a patent is also a form of temporary legal 
monopoly, which is likely to impact upon the brand company’s position in the 
market. In addition, these agreements are entered into prior to the expiry of the 
brand company’s patent but continue beyond the date of expiry. This situation 
                                                          
58 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461 para. 116. 
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increases the potential for the brand company to abuse its assumed dominant 
position post-patent expiry. 
This section is structured as follows. Before turning to the legal analysis of 
exclusive sourcing obligations and single branding agreements as part of early entry 
agreements, section 3.1 discusses the brand company’s special responsibility to not  
distort competition in  light of the fact that the brand company’s patent protection 
expires inside the duration of the early entry agreement. Section 3.2 examines the 
generic company’s exclusive sourcing obligation prior and post-patent expiry based 
on the relevant decisional practice and guidance offered by the European 
Commission and the relevant case law. By further utilising these sources, section 
3.3 examines single branding agreements and their potential for anticompetitive 
foreclosure of subsequent generic entrants and competing brand companies, as 
well as the agreement’s potential for the restriction of choice of the early generic 
entrant. Both sections suggest that the EU Courts are likely to follow a more 
formalistic approach to these kinds of agreements. This approach is thereby 
critiqued and an argument is put forward in favour of an alternative approach 
consisting of an effects-based case-by-case analysis. 
 
3.1. The brand company’s special responsibility 
A dominant undertaking’s special responsibility is a fundamental principle 
governing Art. 102 TFEU. Since the ECJ’s judgment in Michelin, the EU Courts have 
consistently held that the dominant undertaking, irrespective of the reasons for 
which it has acquired such a dominant position, has the special responsibility to not 
impair undistorted competition on the Common Market.59 In Compagnie Maritime 
Belge, the ECJ further elaborated that: 
 
                                                          
59 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Baden-Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461 para. 57. 
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‘the actual scope of the special responsibility imposed on a dominant 
undertaking must be considered in the light of the specific circumstances of each 
case which show that competition has been weakened.’60 
 
This statement seems to suggest that the concept of the special responsibility is 
based on a sliding scale of sorts, placing a particular heavy responsibility towards 
the competitive process for undertakings in a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic 
position.61 
According to the recent ECJ judgment in Post Danmark, one factor that 
should be taken into consideration is whether the dominant position of the 
undertaking in question originates from a former legal monopoly.62 This finding 
suggests that the special responsibility of a dominant undertaking depends, to a 
certain extent, on the circumstances that lead to the undertaking’s dominant 
position. In the case of Post Danmark, the undertaking held a monopoly within the 
market for the delivery of addressed letters prior to the liberalisation of the postal 
sector in Denmark.63 With this case in mind, Rousseva argues that a legal monopoly 
conferred by the state might justify stricter antitrust scrutiny than would usually be 
expected. Because of the monopoly, the undertaking has enjoyed certain 
advantages – such as state resources, an established customer base or network 
effects – which, in return, makes it more difficult for entrants to become as efficient 
as the dominant undertaking, leading to possible adverse effects on the interests of 
consumers.64 It is therefore the dominant position resulting from a legal monopoly 
that warrants an enhanced special responsibility of the undertaking to not impair 
undistorted competition after the sector has been liberalised.65  
                                                          
60 Cases C-395 and 396/96P, Compagnie Maritime Belge and Others v. Commission  [2000] ECR I-
1365 para. 114. 
61 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU competition law: Text, cases, and materials (5th edn, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2014) 423. 
62 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrenceradet (ECJ, 27 March 2012) para. 23. 
63 Ibid. para. 4. 
64 Ekaterina Rousseva and Mel Marquis, ‘Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for Assessing 
Exclusionary Conduct under Article 102 TFEU’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 32, 44. 
65 Ibid. 44. 
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The special responsibility of a former legal monopolist post-liberalisation is 
not dissimilar to the situation of a patent holder post-patent expiry. As suggested 
above, a patent can also be regarded as a form of a legal monopoly. Although it can 
be challenged by competitors, the patent nonetheless confers a right on the holder 
of a valid patent to exclude any competitor that wants to make, sell or use the 
patented invention for a fixed period.66 In essence, the patent holder has obtained 
the patent through competition on the merits. In order to reward the patent holder 
for his innovation, he is sheltered from competition for 20 years.67 The patent is 
granted to ensure that the innovator can recoup its investment by enabling it to 
reap monopoly profits for a limited period of time, thus fostering innovation and 
increasing dynamic efficiencies.68 In return, the innovation goes into the public 
domain after patent expiry so that society can benefit from this innovation by 
copying it.69 There is therefore an observable trade-off between rewarding the 
innovator and allowing society to benefit from this innovation.70  However, just as 
in the market liberalisation scenario above, the patent holder is also likely to have 
gained additional advantages such as an established customer base, a possible 
advanced distribution network and network effects.  
Drawing an analogy with the decision in Post Denmark, if it is accepted  that 
a former conferred legal monopoly can have an impact on the special responsibility 
of the dominant undertaking  to not impair undistorted competition after the expiry 
of such monopoly, special focus should therefore be placed on conduct that is 
based on the advantages that the dominant undertaking acquired because of the 
sheltered nature of a legal monopoly. Equally, focus should be afforded to the 
advantages that the dominant firm continues to receive beyond the expiry of the 
monopoly. In terms of early entry agreements, this would mean that the focus of 
antitrust scrutiny should concentrate on the brand company’s conduct with regards 
to the exploitation of the generic first mover advantage post-patent expiry and the 
                                                          
66 Stanley M Besen and Raskind Leo J. ‘An introduction to the law and economics of intellectual 
property’ (1991) 5 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 7. 
67 Bronwyn H Hall, ‘Patents and patent policy’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 568, 568. 
68 Ibid. 568. 
69 Ibid. 571. 
70 Besen and Raskind Leo J. (n 66) 6. 
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control gained over the generic company prior to patent expiry, which are both 
aimed at increasing generic prices to the detriment of the consumer. 
 
3.2. Exclusive sourcing obligations 
The European Commission has defined exclusive purchasing obligations as those 
that require:  
 
‘a customer on a particular market to purchase exclusively or to a large 
extent only from the dominant undertaking. Certain other obligations, such as 
stocking requirements, which appear to fall short of requiring exclusive purchasing, 
may in practice lead to the same effect.’71 
 
According to the pharmaceutical sector inquiry, a number of generic companies 
that entered into an early entry agreement and agreed to an exclusive sourcing 
agreement were required to purchase from the brand company all the 
requirements that are necessary for the drug.72 One of the main requirements in 
the production of a drug – and certainly the most important - is the active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (API).73 The API is also a significant cost factor. In the 
case of generic oral solid drugs, for example, the cost of the API constitutes 40-50% 
of the production costs.74  
The global API market is generally very competitive. A descriptive study in 
2009 found that, internationally, 2,056 manufacturers operate 3,700 manufacturing 
sites.75 Due to the large number of API manufacturers in existence, there has been 
                                                          
71 European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 
of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/02 Recital 
33. 
72 European Commission (n 9) para 826. 
73 Generally drugs are composed of two different components. The active pharmaceutical ingredient 
is the chemical substance that produces the desired effect on the body. The second component, 
called the excipient, is the substance of which the actual drug consists. This can be for example a 
liquid or a powder. See <http://www.pharma-ingredients.com/active_pharmaceutical_ingredients/>. 
74 Janet Bumpas and Ekkehard Betsch, ‘Exploratory Study on Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient 
Manufacturing for Essential Medicines, HNP Discussion Paper’ <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-1095698140167/APIExploratoryStudy.pdf> 
10. 
75 Ibid. 11. 
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a widespread trend towards firms specialising in the production of a specific type or 
range of APIs. Companies often choose to focus on manufacturing for certain 
therapeutic areas, producing more complex APIs, or producing large amounts of API 
for generic purposes.76 In fact, every API is manufactured by a number of different 
companies, 77  including larger generic companies that have their own API 
production facilities.78 Following a recent survey conducted by the World Health 
Organization, the price differentials between the different manufacturers of the 
same API were found to be very significant. In some cases, the price difference 
between the cheapest manufacturer and the most expensive was up to 700%.79 It 
should be mentioned that the most extreme example concerns HIV drugs, which is 
likely to be a special case. Therefore, while these price differentials might not be 
representative of the entire API market, they definitely shed some light on the 
potential savings that generic pharmaceutical companies can realise by choosing 
the right API manufacturer.  
The exclusive sourcing obligation of the generic early entrant could 
therefore lead to the foreclosure of the API market. Post-patent expiry, competing 
API manufacturers can produce the API upstream but are prevented from supplying 
it to the early entered generic company, due to the exclusive sourcing obligation, 
imposed on the early generic entrant by the brand company. 
This does not necessarily lead to a complete foreclosure of the market for 
this specific API as other generic companies are likely to enter the market 
subsequently and these new entrants will also require the relevant API for the drug 
production. But one should bear in mind that the market share of subsequent 
generic entrants is significantly smaller compared to the first generic entrant.80 This 
                                                          
76 Ibid. 12. 
77  See <www.api-data.com> This database offers the possibility to search for the available 
manufacturers of a large number  of APIs. A random search has shown that up to 20 different 
companies manufacture the same API. 
78 i.e Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd A.P.I Division; Lupin Ltd; CIPLA Ltd; Mylan Laboratories Ltd; 
Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd. 
79 WHO, ‘Sources, quality and prices of active pharmaceutical ingredients of antiretroviral drugs: 
Results of a 2012 WHO survey’ (World Health Organization, Geneva, 2012) 10. 
80 It has been shown that the first generic entrant has a significant first-mover advantage over 
subsequent entrants. The first generic entrant has a stable increase in market share in the first 4 
years after entry of an average 34 per cent, whereas the second entrant only has a 10 per cent 
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is likely to have an impact on subsequent generic entrants’ demand for API. API 
manufacturers might therefore find it difficult to realise economies of scale, which 
is an important factor in the high-volume, low-margin business of API production.81 
It may only be viable for the competing API manufacturers to enter the market after 
the exclusive sourcing obligation is terminated or a critical mass of subsequent 
generic companies have entered downstream, so that economies of scale can be 
realised. In return, this might have an impact on the early generic entrant’s 
production costs, as it is not able to source the cheapest API available which 
indirectly affects the price customers have to pay. The early generic entrant is 
unlikely to oppose this obligation as it is part of the commercial consideration 
between the brand company and the early generic entrant. However, the obligation 
is likely to have a negative effect on the generic price and, in turn, on consumer 
welfare. 
 Despite not being obliged to use the same API manufacturer as the early 
generic entrant, the subsequent generic entrants may not initially have any another 
choice. This causes subsequent generic prices to become higher than in a 
competitive environment, which is detrimental to consumer welfare. 
So the question that needs to be posed is whether the exclusive sourcing 
obligation imposed by the brand company on the early generic entrant constitutes 
an infringement of Art. 102 TFEU. The remainder of this section discusses this 
question and separately considers the situation prior to patent expiry and post-
patent expiry. 
 
3.2.1. The situation prior to patent expiry 
Early entry agreements are generally stipulated whilst the relevant brand drug is 
still under patent protection. This being the case, the generic company’s obligations 
under the early entry agreement, such as the exclusive sourcing of the API, could be 
permissible as such conduct could be regarded the mere exercise of the rights 
                                                                                                                                                                    
increase in market share in the same period. Aidan Hollis, ‘The importance of being first: evidence 
from Canadian generic pharmaceuticals’ (2002) 11 Health Economics 723, 729. 
81 Bumpas and Betsch (n 74) 10. 
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conferred by patent policy. Generally speaking, a patent entitles its holder to 
exclude others from using that property right.82 The ECJ has repeatedly found with 
regard to the abuse of a dominant position that the exercise of an intellectual 
property right cannot in itself constitute an abuse.83 Yet the Court has also clarified 
that conduct that is based on the exercise of an intellectual property right is not 
excluded from antitrust scrutiny and, thus, cannot be used as sole justification for 
otherwise anticompetitive types of conduct.84 To establish whether a certain type 
of conduct should be subject to an Art. 102 TFEU review or rather permissible due 
to the exclusionary nature of the intellectual property right, it has to be determined 
whether the conduct at issue is within the scope of the patent. The core rights that 
are within the scope of the patent are sometimes referred to as the ‘essential 
functions’.85  
As long as the conduct stays within this scope, it should be regarded as 
procompetitive and should therefore be permitted.86 This kind of exploitation of an 
exclusive right is viewed as competition on the merits as it fosters dynamic 
competition and the development of new products.87  
The conduct can exceed the scope of the exclusive right in different ways. 
For example, the conduct can go beyond what is necessary to exercise the exclusive 
right if the dominant undertaking uses the market power it has gained in one 
market – due to the exclusive right – to leverage market power in an adjacent 
market that is not covered by the exclusionary power of the same exclusive right. 
This exceeds the breadth of the exclusive right and, in other words, the conduct 
attempts to exert an exclusionary effect on subject matter  is not covered by the 
exclusive right. However, the scope of the exclusive right also has a temporal 
                                                          
82 Robert O'Donoghue and A. J Padilla, The law and economics of Article 82 EC (Hart, Oxford, 2006) 
415. 
83 Cases C-241-1/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission  [1995] ECR I-743 para. 49. 
84 Ibid. para. 48. 
85 O'Donoghue and Padilla (n 82) 436; “[A]ccording to the case-law of the Court of Justice and 
[General Court] […] [t]he crucial point is whether the conduct goes beyond what is necessary to fulfil 
the essential function of the exclusive right as permitted in Community Law.” DSD  (Case COMP 
D3/34493) Commission Decision 2001/463/EC  [2001] OJ 2001 L166/1 para. 144. 
86 O'Donoghue and Padilla (n 82) 436. 
87 Steven D Anderman, ‘The IP and Competition Interface: New Developments’ in Steven D 
Anderman and Ariel Ezrachi (eds), Intellectual property and competition law: New frontiers (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2011) 18. 
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element. For example a patent is granted for a period of 20 years. If the conduct 
exceeds the period of protection which is granted to the dominant undertaking, 
one can also argue that the conduct goes beyond the scope of the exclusive right 
and should be put under the scrutiny of Art. 102 TFEU. 
So it has to be determined whether the exclusive sourcing obligation in the 
early entry agreement between the brand company and the generic company is 
within the scope of the patent on which the early entry agreement is based. The 
exclusive sourcing obligation at issue concerns the supply of all necessary 
requirements of the API needed for the production of the generic version of the 
drug. Given that the API is the core ingredient of the drug and the innovative 
compound that has the actual therapeutic effect on the body, it is generally 
covered by the brand company within the basic patent. Typically, the brand 
company either produces the API itself or provides an API manufacturer with the 
licence to produce the API for the brand company. It is within the scope of the basic 
patent and thus accepted by competition law that the brand company prevents 
other API manufacturers from ‘copying’ its API.88 So if the brand company can 
legally hinder other companies from producing the API in the first place during 
patent protection, the outcome should be the same for exclusive sourcing 
obligations for the generic company, forcing it to purchase all necessary API from 
the brand company. The outcome is the same – the generic company purchases its 
requirements of API from the only API manufacturer. 
 
3.2.2. The situation post-patent expiry 
This stance towards exclusive sourcing obligations changes once the patent on 
which the early entry agreement is based expires. At this point in time, other API 
manufacturers can produce the API in question upstream and could compete for 
the generic company’s demand downstream. Such competition would only be 
fruitful if the generic company were freely able to choose the API supplier.  
In a number of cases, the early entering generic company is bound by the 
exclusive sourcing obligation beyond the expiration of the patent. Exclusive 
                                                          
88 Ibid. 
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sourcing obligations are stipulated for an average period of 3.7 years.89 However, in 
the majority of cases, the contracting parties tend to enter into early entry 
agreements   within 12 months prior to patent expiry;90 thus exceeding the patent 
life by, on average,  at least two years. From the moment the patent expires, 
exclusive sourcing obligations should be put under antitrust scrutiny and it needs to 
be established whether such obligations are likely to foreclose the relevant market. 
The remainder of this section therefore sets out the European Commission’s 
approach to exclusive sourcing obligations outlined in its Guidance on its 
enforcement priorities on the application of Art 102 TFEU to abusive exclusionary 
conduct,91 as well as the EU courts’ position towards these obligations based on 
their case law.  
 
According to its Guidance, the European Commission focuses on cases in which the 
exclusive sourcing obligations have the effect of preventing the entry or the 
expansion of competitors – in this case, competing API manufacturers.92 This 
foreclosing effect is established by determining whether competitive pressure could 
have been exerted by competitors in the absence of the exclusive dealing obligation. 
It is not necessary that potential competitors are able to compete for the entire 
demand of the customers.93 It might be the case that the dominant undertaking is 
an unavoidable trading partner and that its brand is a ‘must stock item’, either 
because it is preferred by many final consumers or because the capacity constraints 
on the other suppliers are such that a part of demand can only be provided by the 
dominant supplier.94 An important factor for the establishment of the foreclosing 
effect is the duration of the exclusive dealing obligation. The longer the duration, 
the more likely the foreclosure.95 Such a foreclosure must ultimately have the 
capability of causing consumer harm in order to be anticompetitive. This consumer 
                                                          
89 European Commission (n 9) para. 844. 
90 Ibid. Figure 126. 
91 European Commission (n 71). 
92 Ibid. Recital 34. 
93 Ibid. Recital 36. 
94 Ibid. Recital 36 citing Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods ltd v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653. 
95 European Commission (n 71) Recital 36. 
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harm needs to be independently verified,96 but there is no need to prove actual 
harm, as the law is meant to prevent harm before it is done.97  This last statement 
seems to contradict the European Commission’s proclamation of pursuing a more 
effects-based approach. It is not possible, or at least unnecessary, to show actual 
anticompetitive effects if it is sufficient to prove that a certain type of conduct has 
the mere capability of leading to consumer harm. Although the European 
Commission has been criticised for not applying a pure effects-based analysis in its 
Guidance,98 this discrepancy can be explained by the limitation posed by the 
relevant case law. The European Commission may wish to focus on economic 
effects and proof of likely consumer harm but the case law simply does not allow 
much room for such analysis.99  
 
Exclusive purchasing agreements were initially regarded by the ECJ as per se illegal 
in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission. The Court expressly stated that: 
 
“an undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and ties 
purchasers — even if it does so at their request — by an obligation or promise on 
their part to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from the said 
undertaking abuses its dominant position within the meaning of Article [102 TFEU], 
whether the obligation in question is stipulated without further qualification or 
whether it is undertaken in consideration of the grant of a rebate.”100 
 
                                                          
96 O'Donoghue and Padilla (n 82) 361. 
97 Anderman (n 87) 20. 
98 Marsden argues that the European  Commission stride towards a more-effects based approach is 
hampered by two fundamental assumption which have not been adequately addressed by the 
European Commission in its Guidance: (1) The assumption that dominance inevitably harms the 
competitive structure of the market. The guidance fails to offer an analysis of the question whether 
dominance actually leads to less competitive constraint by rivals. (2) The assumption that 
foreclosure is anticompetitive itself without the necessity to prove that consumer harm is likely. 
Philip Marsden, ‘Some outstanding issues from the European Commission's Guidance on Article 102: 
Not-so-faint echoes of Ordoliberalism’ in Federico Etro and Ioannis Kokkoris (eds), Competition law 
and the enforcement of article 102 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 55, 56. 
99 Ibid. 54. This statement should not suggest that EU jurisprudence creates precedent. It rather 
expresses the view that the EU Courts are reluctant fully endorse the European Commission’s efforts 
to follow a more effects-based approach. 
100 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 58) 89. 
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Whereas the Court referred in vague terms to “all or most of their requirements” 
with regards to the finding of an exclusive purchasing agreement that infringes Art. 
102 TFEU, this requirement was subsequently clarified. Under the Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation, a non-compete obligation101 is defined as an obligation that 
requires the buyer to purchase at least 80 per cent of its requirements from one 
source.102 
What is also important to note from the abovementioned quote in 
Hoffmann-La Roche is the fact that it does not matter whether the exclusive 
purchasing obligation was imposed on the buyer. Even if the buyer requests such an 
obligation to be part of the agreement, it can potentially constitute an infringement 
of Art. 102 TFEU.103 
In Van den Bergh Foods, the General Court seemed to move away from the 
formalistic approach holding that the exclusive dealing arrangement at issue was 
not abusive per se, but amounted to being abusive due to the fact that it had “the 
effect […] of preventing competing manufacturers from gaining access to the 
relevant market”.104 This can be seen as support of the European Commission’s 
finding in the same case, where it was decided that: 
  
“for the purpose of applying Article [102 TFEU], the circumstance 
surrounding the [exclusive dealing] agreements and particularly their effect on the 
structure of competition in the relevant market must be taken into account in 
establishing the existence of an abuse.”105 
 
However, the General Court again relied in subsequent cases on the ECJ’s judgment 
in Hoffmann-La Roche and reverted to the more formalistic view of exclusive 
                                                          
101 Non-compete obligations can be used interchangeably with exclusive purchasing obligations in 
this context, as the intended outcome of both obligations is the same – requiring the buyer to obtain 
at least 80 of its requirement s from one source. 
102 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (1999) OJ L 336. Art. 1(b) replaced by 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 (n 4). Art.1 (d). 
103 Richard Whish, Competition law (7th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 684. 
104 Van den Bergh Foods ltd v Commission  (n 94) para. 160. 
105 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd  (Case Nos IV/34.073, IV/34.395 and IV/35.436) Commission Decision 
98/531/EC [1998] OJ L246/1 para. 268. 
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purchasing agreements or on fidelity rebates that indirectly amount to exclusive 
purchasing agreements in Solvay SA v Commission, 106  and Imperial Chemical 
Industries Ltd v Commission.107  
It is argued that this divergent and more effects-based approach in Van den 
Bergh Foods is owed to the fact that the Commission had brought the proceedings 
under both Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 102 TFEU.108 If proceedings are brought under 
both articles the same approach should be taken, which arguably led to 
consideration of the more economic approach of Art. 101 TFEU in Art. 102 TFEU.109 
This line of argument would explain the General Court’s different approach to a 
seemingly similar abuse. Fundamentally, this would mean that the Court has not 
reverted to more a formalistic approach after Van den Bergh Foods but, rather, saw 
the necessity for a different approach if the European Commission takes a “dual 
approach” in its investigation. 
The following considers whether the EU courts’ approach has changed as a 
reaction to the European Commission’s Guidance in 2009. As will be shown, this is 
unfortunately not the case. During the modernisation process of the European 
Commission’s approach to Art. 102 TFEU, the ECJ had the chance to move to a more 
effects-based approach in relation to fidelity rebates in British Airways v 
Commission.110 However, the Court rejected British Airways’ plea that the General 
Court had made an error of law inasmuch as it did not examine direct consumer 
harm, by reiterating that it is sufficient to show that the conduct in question had a 
negative effect on the competitive structure and therefore led to a distortion of 
competition.111 In its recent judgment in Tomra Systems v Commission, the ECJ 
reaffirmed this position by stating that it is:  
 
                                                          
106 Case T-57/01 Solvay SA v. Commission [2009] ECR II-4621. para. 365 overruled only on procedural 
appeal on right to the access of files by Case C-109/10P, Solvay SA v. European Commission [2011] 
ECR I-10329 para. 51-73. 
107 Case T-66/01 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Commission  [2009] ECR II-2631. para. 315. 
108 Jones and Sufrin (n 61) 452. 
109 Ibid. citing Ekaterina Rousseva, Rethinking exclusionary abuses in EU competition law (Hart, 
Oxford and Portland 2010) 431-453. 
110 Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v EC Commission [2007] ECR I-2331. 
111 Ibid. para. 106, 107. 
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‘unnecessary to undertake an analysis of the actual effects of the rebates on 
competition given that, for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 
102 TFEU, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct at issue is capable of 
having an effect on competition.’112 
 
It follows from this judgment that a decision by the European Commission in 
relation to a fidelity rebate scheme will not be overruled by the EU courts, even if 
the European Commission investigates the actual effects of a rebate scheme and 
commits an error in its assessment. 113  Such an analysis would merely be 
complementary, as the European Commission does not have to show actual effects 
that prevent an ‘as efficient’ competitor from competing on the relevant market.114 
The fact that most of the discussed recent case law relates to fidelity 
rebates and not to direct exclusive purchasing obligations should not compromise 
the applicability of the case law to the latter. Fidelity rebates are regarded in the 
European context as instruments that induce customers not to purchase a certain 
product from competitors of the dominant undertaking in an attempt to drive these 
competitors out of the market. In contrast, exclusive purchasing obligations do not 
have to induce customers in the same way, as the obligation stipulates that the 
customer has to buy all or most of his requirements of a certain product from the 
dominant undertaking. An exclusive purchasing obligation does not even give the 
customer the theoretical choice not to purchase all requirements and to waive the 
potential rebate.  It would therefore be logical if the EU courts were to take a 
similarly formalistic approach to exclusive purchasing obligations, as they are even 
more likely to be capable of distorting competition.  
  
3.2.3. Conclusion 
It can therefore be concluded that the exclusive sourcing obligation as part of the 
early entry agreement stipulated between the brand company and the generic 
                                                          
112 Case C-549/10P Tomra Systems and Others v Commission (ECJ, 19 April 2012) para.79. 
113 Ariel Ezrachi, EU competition law: An analytical guide to the leading cases (3rd edn Hart, Oxford, 
2012) 213. 
114 Ibid.  
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company is only partially within the scope of the underlying patent. As long as the 
patent is valid and has not expired, an exclusive sourcing obligation constitutes an 
exercise of the exclusive right which prevents the copying of the patent protected 
innovation. At the point of patent expiry, the exclusive sourcing obligation should 
be put under antitrust scrutiny. Following the discussion of the relevant case law, it 
is clear that such an obligation is likely to infringe Art. 102 TFEU if the generic 
company is obliged to purchase more than 80 per cent of API from one source. 
Proving actual anticompetitive effects is, for now, only likely to be necessary if the 
European Commission has brought proceedings against the brand company in 
relation to Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 102 TFEU, as this might at least sway the General 
Court to consider a more effects-based analysis following its judgment in Van den 
Bergh Foods. 
Despite the criticism of the EU court’s formalistic approach to exclusive 
purchasing agreements, the distinction between exclusive agreements prior to 
patent expiry and post-patent expiry makes sense from a policy perspective. The 
central argument for granting a patent is to incentivise companies to invest in 
innovation and to spur dynamic competition. The bounty for such investment is the 
prospect of large future profits and the possibility of avoiding competition from 
rival firms.115 The reliance on these prospects, which might lead some firms to take 
risky decisions regarding expensive innovations ex ante, should not be unsettled ex 
post, as this may have a stifling effect on future dynamic competition.116 However, 
the pre/post-patent distinction does not interfere with or diminish the prospects of 
innovating companies. Ex post, the companies rely on the fact that the patent is 
granted for a period of 20 years in which they can recoup their investments and 
reap profits. After these 20 years have passed, the companies undoubtedly still 
make profits but they cannot expect them to be unchallenged, as they are no 
longer part of the deal with society.  Thus it is acceptable to treat the same kind of 
agreement differently post-patent expiry as opposed to prior to patent expiry. 
 
                                                          
115 O'Donoghue and Padilla (n 82) 453. 
116  It is this difficult balance between short-term static efficiencies and long-term dynamic 
efficiencies that makes it problematic to impose a duty to deal on innovating companies. 
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3.3. Single branding agreements 
Having analysed the potential foreclosure of the upstream market for API 
production post-patent expiry and its potential consequence of creating higher 
generic drug prices, this section now turns to an investigation on the impact of 
single branding agreements on the downstream market. This examination largely 
concerns conduct post-patent expiry. In one instance, potential anticompetitive 
foreclosure prior to patent expiry is discussed – namely the hampered access to the 
market for subsequent generic entrants that are not willing to enter “at their own 
risk” prior to patent expiry. 
The term ‘single branding agreements’ itself is not used by the European 
Commission in its pharmaceutical sector inquiry. It rather describes supply and 
distribution agreements between the brand company and the early generic entrant 
that includes exclusivity clauses and non-compete obligations in terms of territorial 
restrictions as well as non-territorial restrictions. Yet, taking all of these clauses 
together, their effect amounts to a single branding agreement.  Generalising these 
clauses in this way is beneficial to the legal analysis itself, as the case law of the EU 
courts as well as the decision practice of the European Commission offer a number 
of decisions and judgments that can be used as guidance for the application of Art. 
102 TFEU to early entry agreements.117  
According to the pharmaceutical sector inquiry, 29 out of the 87 identified 
early entry agreements contained non-compete clauses.118 25 of these agreements 
also restricted the generic company’s active sales outside the territory that was 
covered by the agreements, therefore preventing the company from advertising 
and actively searching for customers outside the territory.119 What is more common 
in these agreements is the fact that the brand company provides the generic 
company with a copy of its own market authorisation or with the underlying 
                                                          
117 In contrast, an investigation of the specific non-compete obligation could not be supported by the 
same amount of case-law. Non-compete clauses have only been rarely addressed by the Courts and 
if so exclusively under Art. 101 or within merger investigations. Thus it might have been necessary to 
develop novel theory of harm. This would have been within the scope of Art. 102 TFEU, as the list of 
types of abuse is non-exhaustive, but would not have contributed to the legal certainty of the 
application of Art. 102 TFEU. Such a step should only be taken if absolutely necessary. 
118 European Commission (n 9) para. 827. 
119 Ibid. para. 848. 
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documentation that enables the generic company to apply for its own market 
authorisation. However, the copy of the market authorisation or the underlying 
documentation is contractually restricted to a certain territory.120 In doing so, the 
brand company has not actually stipulated an exclusive agreement that is restricted 
to a certain territory, but these agreements have a similar effect. The generic 
company would technically be able to apply for its own marketing authorisation for 
other territories, but such behaviour would incur significant time and cost. To be 
able to apply for a marketing authorisation, the generic company would have to 
prove that its generic drug is bioequivalent to the brand drug, which is done by 
means of human clinical trials. Aside from the length of these trials, they also 
constitute the lion’s share of the cost for generic entry.121  So despite the possibility 
existing in principle, such an extension of the territorial coverage is unlikely to be 
profitable and thus not probable. Additionally, 29 agreements contained a non-
compete clause with respect to competing products. The generic company is not 
only prevented from marketing alternative products containing the same API or any 
of its salts,122  but it is also barred from marketing alternative competing products 
from a different source in the territory concerned and within the time frame of the 
agreement.123 So potentially the generic company  not only has to refrain from 
sourcing all required ingredients for the product from anyone other than the brand 
company, it is also explicitly or effectively hindered from actively selling the generic 
drug outside the agreed territory and cannot market competing products during 
the duration of the agreement.  
Just as in the case of exclusive sourcing obligations, it has to be kept in mind 
that a single branding obligation as part of the early entry agreement is to be 
regarded as a legitimate exercise of the underlying patent right. The possibility of 
commercialisation is at the core of every patent and should not be interfered with 
by antitrust rules. However, just as with regard to the exclusive sourcing obligation 
discussed above, this situation changes at the time of patent expiry. Upon the 
                                                          
120 Ibid. para. 849. 
121 See chapter III sec. 3.1. 
122 A salt is a part of the patented molecule and thus also covered by the patent. 
123 European Commission (n 9) para. 848. 
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expiration of the patent term, the patented information is in the public domain and 
can no longer be enforced by the patent holder who, in turn, can no longer 
exclusively commercialise the invention.  It is therefore only consequential that a 
single branding obligation that is based on the exclusionary power of a patent loses 
its legal basis with its expiry.  This is also acceptable from a policy perspective. The 
patent owner is allowed to exploit his patented invention for the granted period of 
time. Any exclusive agreements that were originally based on the exclusionary 
power of a patent, but that last longer than the patent life, should be regarded as 
commercial considerations that should be subject to antitrust scrutiny.  
The fact that generic companies seem to accept single branding obligations 
that go beyond the period of patent protection might be explained by the fact that, 
in some cases, the generic companies are provided with a copy of the marketing 
authorisation of the brand company. Initially, obtaining a copy of such an 
authorisation might be desirable, as it is cost-reducing and time-saving, but it also 
provides the brand company with significant leverage against the generic company. 
With the withdrawal of the authorisation by the brand company, the generic 
company would have to cease marketing the drug until it has acquired its own 
marketing authorisation, a process that is very time-consuming and costly. In 
essence, this would effectively lead to the exit of the generic company from the 
market. These circumstances are likely to lead to the generic company’s acceptance 
of less profitable contract terms post-patent expiry. The key question, however, is 
not whether the early generic entrant is harmed but rather whether the market is 
foreclosed for subsequent entry which could lead to higher prices due to reduced 
competitive pressure. 
Single branding agreements post-patent expiry could therefore be 
scrutinised on the basis of their potential for: (a) the anticompetitive foreclosure of 
subsequent generic entrants and competing brand companies, and (b) the 
restriction of choice for the early generic entrant which, indirectly, also has an 
impact on competing brand companies that want to cooperate with the same 
generic company. These two scenarios will be discussed in turn. Again, one noted 
exception to this general distinction between conduct prior and post-patent expiry 
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is the impeded access of subsequent generic entrants that are willing to enter “at 
their own risk” prior to patent expiry in order to challenge the relevant patent or 
because they believe that their generic drug is not infringing the relevant brand 
patent. The discussion below shows that such an examination is not at odds with 
the general policy consideration that allows the brand company to exploit its 
intellectual property right during the protection period. 
 
3.3.1. Anticompetitive foreclosure 
Anticompetitive foreclosure is defined by the European Commission in its Guidance 
as: 
 
‘a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to 
supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of the 
dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a 
position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of consumers.’124 
 
Prior to patent expiry, a single branding agreement between the brand company 
and the early generic entrant could hamper the market access of subsequent 
generic entrants that want to enter the market “at their own risk” prior to patent 
expiry.125 A generic company’s risk is the likelihood of being sued for patent 
infringement by the brand company. This likelihood is determined by the strength 
of the patents that would be infringed by the entering generic company and the 
brand company’s willingness to enforce its patents. If the generic company believes 
that it does not infringe the brand company’s patents or that these patents are 
invalid, it might take the risk of entering prior to patent expiry. The incentive for 
taking this risk is the prospective increase in generic profit that is gained from 
entering as early as possible. However, this incentive could be significantly reduced 
by an early entry agreement, especially if the agreement is concluded with a 
                                                          
124 European Commission (n 71) Recital 19. 
125 See chapter III sec. 2.3.2 Following the European regulatory regime, generic companies can 
obtain marketing authorisation prior to patent expiry regardless of existing patents of the brand 
company.  
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generic company that has a large distribution network.126 Pharmacies that are part 
of the distribution network of a large generic company with a diverse product 
portfolio are likely to purchase most of their necessary supply of generic drugs from 
this generic company. Not only is it likely to be more cost efficient to purchase most 
of the supplies from a single source, but the generic company might also incentivise 
the pharmacies to do so by offering a rebate scheme.127 Furthermore, it should be 
noted that pharmacies generally tend to stock only one generic product.128 With 
such an early generic entrant already present on the market that provides a large 
number of pharmacies with the generic drug, the demand for a second generic drug 
is already significantly reduced. A subsequent generic company might therefore be 
unwilling to take the risk of entering prior to patent expiry and will instead wait for 
the relevant patent to expire.  The reduced demand is still the same after patent 
expiry, but the subsequent generic company no longer runs the risk of incurring 
legal costs following a patent infringement lawsuit. 
Apart from the fact that this outcome contradicts general patent policy,129 
the brand company could thereby distort the competitive process on the market for 
generic drugs post-patent expiry. If the brand company would not have entered 
into such an agreement, it is likely that the simultaneous entry of several generic 
companies would have occurred at the time of patent expiry. By concluding an early 
                                                          
126 The generic company’s distribution network is an important factor that is considered by the 
brand company in its decision of the appropriate generic partner. European Commission (n 9) para. 
729. Additionally it has been stated in a brand company’s strategy document that the ‘Launch [of a 
generic drug] via an early entry agreement with main players in the distribution channel [prevents] 
disproportionate discounting of [other generic drugs]’ by means of controlling the sales for a large 
part of the market beyond loss of exclusivity. European Commission (n 9) para 825. 
127 i.e. TEVA’s rebate scheme offers pharmacies the nett-price for all its products that are included in 
the scheme, if the pharmacy spends at least £2500 per months. Teva also offers additional discounts 
of 3% and 5% once the pharmacy reaches certain expenditure thresholds  (£4500+ and £6000+ 
respectively). TEVA UK Limited, TevaTwo, <http://tevascheme.tevauk.com/pharmacy/tevatwo>. 
128 Information obtained through discussions with a Professor in the School of Pharmacy at the 
University of East Anglia. 
129 A patent gives its owner not the “right to exclude” but rather the “right to try to exclude”. Carl 
Shapiro, ‘Antitrust limits and patent settlements’ (2003) 34 Rand Journal of Economics 391, 395; 
every patent should be challengeable.  Although it is true that an early entry agreement does not 
actually foreclose the possibility to patent challenge, it is nonetheless likely to have that effect. A 
generic company will not enter at risk without gaining an incentive that outweighs the increased 
costs of patent litigation. Thus the patent owner enjoys the full period of patent protection 
regardless of the merit of the patents, by minimising the incentives for a generic company’s patent 
challenge. 
  
 V. Early entry agreements 
213 
 
entry agreement, the brand company has changed the simultaneous entry game 
into a sequential entry game. Even if several generic companies enter the market 
simultaneously at the time of patent expiry, the early generic entrant is in an 
advantageous position by virtue of already being present in the market. Indeed, it 
has already been shown as part of the discussion of market definition130 and the 
theory of harm131 that the generic first-mover advantage can potentially have a 
significant impact on the market structure itself. Empirical evidence has shown that 
the longer a generic drug is prescribed by doctors, the less likely it is that these 
doctors will switch to a new generic drug.132 Using the example of antiepileptic 
drugs, it has been shown that prescribing doctors might only switch their patients 
to a generic drug on one occasion, because of the fear of significant adverse side-
effects.133 This first-mover advantage of the early generic entrant can translate into 
a long-lasting effect on the market share of the generic companies on the market. 
Empirical evidence has shown that the early generic entrant has a market share of 
about 30 per cent over several years, as opposed to a market share of about 10 per 
cent for the subsequent generic entrant which declines over time.134 Depending on 
the market size and the relevant minimum efficient scale, there may be the 
potential for the brand company to foreclose the market. 
 
In addition, a single branding agreement that continues to operate beyond the life 
of the patent could also hamper the market access of competing brand companies 
by blocking the early generic entrant from producing and distributing the generic 
drugs of competing brand drugs. This would force the competing brand company to 
“use” another generic company with a potentially smaller distribution network. 
Having to use a potentially less efficient generic company as an early generic 
entrant in order to distribute the generic version not only leads to a likely increase 
                                                          
130 See chapter I section 4.1.1.1. 
131 See chapter II section 2.1.1.2.  
132 See chapter II section 2.1.1.2. (i). 
133 See Chapter I p.20, 21 and section 4.1.1.2. 
134 Hollis (n 80) 729. 
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in cost – in accordance with the theory of raising rivals’ costs135 – but may also 
result in the potential foreclosure of a significant part of the market; assuming that 
pharmacies only stock one generic version and are incentivised to purchase the 
majority of its supply from one generic company.136  
 
The question is how this potential anticompetitive foreclosure would be addressed 
by the European Commission and the EU courts. According to the European 
Commission’s Guidance,137 its assessment of anticompetitive foreclosure relies on 
factors such as: the position of the dominant undertaking; the condition of the 
relevant market including the existence of economies of scale; the position of 
competitors; the position of consumers and input suppliers; the extent of the 
alleged abusive conduct; and possible evidence of actual foreclosure including 
direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy.138  In relation to retroactive loyalty-
inducing rebates, the European Commission further states that: 
  
 ‘as with exclusive purchasing obligations, the likelihood of anti-competitive 
foreclosure is higher where competitors are not able to compete on equal terms for 
the entire demand of each individual customer.’139 
 
It is therefore necessary to assess the ‘contestable share’ of the market in order to 
determine how much of the customer’s purchase requirements can be switched to 
the competitor.140 One could therefore assume that the European Commission 
determines the contestable portion of the market in terms of minimum efficient 
scale. This would be a sensible approach as it would consider a market to be 
foreclosed if the contestable part of the market was not large enough for an as 
efficient competitor to viably enter.  
                                                          
135 See generally Salop and Scheffman (n 23); Krattenmaker and Salop (n 23); Salop and Scheffman (n 
23). 
136 Information obtained through discussions with a Professor in the School of Pharmacy at the 
University of East Anglia. 
137 European Commission (n 71). 
138 Ibid. Recital 20. 
139 Ibid. Recital 39. 
140 Ibid. Recital 42. 
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The EU courts, however, seem to have once again opted for a more formalistic 
approach to the question of what determines a contestable market with regard to 
anticompetitive foreclosure. In the case of Tomra Systems v Commission,141 which 
was recently upheld by the ECJ,142 it was found that: 
 
‘the customers on the foreclosed part of the market should have the 
opportunity to benefit from whatever degree of competition is possible on the 
market and competitors should be able to compete on the merits for the entire 
market and not just for a part of it [and that] it is not the role of the dominant 
undertaking to dictate how many viable competitors will be allowed to compete for 
the remaining contestable portion of demand.’143 
 
The General Court had already stated in its judgment that the fact that a limited 
number of competitors can still enter the market competing for the “non-
foreclosed” contestable part of the market is not contrary to the finding of an abuse 
of Art. 102 TFEU. Competitors should be able to compete on the merits for the 
entire market and not just for the contestable part of it.144 In addition, the General 
Court has found that the foreclosure of 40 per cent of the total demand is regarded 
as a restriction of competition on the relevant market.145 
These findings have been subject to heavy criticism. In particular, the 
statement concerning the entirety of the market has been described as ‘one of the 
most extraordinary statements ever made in a competition law judgment’146 as, if 
                                                          
141 The fact that the exclusivity agreement in Tomra was achieved by means of retroactive rebates 
granted to the downstream firms does not impact the applicability of the judgment to the case of 
early entry agreements. It has already been held in Hoffmann-La Roche that the exclusive dealing 
agreement can either be reached by contractual stipulation or by means of offering rebates. This is 
only logical as a contractual agreement legally binds the contracting party, whereas a rebates merely 
induces an incentive for the party to buy exclusively from the supplier. It could theoretically choose 
to buy from a different supplier nonetheless. This possibility is not given in the case of stipulated 
exclusivity.  
142 Tomra Systems and Others v Commission (n 112). 
143 Ibid. 42 
144 Case T-155/06 Tomra Systems ASA and Others v European Commission [2010] ECR 00 para 241. 
145 Ibid. para. 243 also upheld by the ECJ Tomra Systems and Others v Commission (n 112) 44. 
146 Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Nicolas Petit, EU competition law and economics (1st edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 4.217. 
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read literally, it implies that the foreclosure of 10 per cent of the relevant market 
could be regarded as an abuse despite 90 per cent still being left contestable.147 
Furthermore, the General Court’s finding that the foreclosure of 40 per cent 
of the demand should be regarded as restriction of competition is heavily criticised, 
as the mere existence of a certain share of foreclosed demand does not necessarily 
indicate that other competitors are foreclosed from the market as a whole.148 Again, 
this statement does not account for the potential competitive pressure that 
entrants might exert even though they might not be able to compete for the entire 
market. Interestingly, it has been suggested by one commentator in the United 
States that:  
‘the introduction of important safe harbours for promotional contracts 
foreclosing less than 40% of distribution and for those shorter than one year in 
duration would significantly reduce false positives, providing certainty without 
significant offsetting risks of competitive harm.’149 
 
Based on these considerations, it would be more appropriate to determine whether 
the foreclosure of a relevant market is substantial by considering the market’s 
minimum efficient scale. This means it would be necessary to consider the context 
of a relevant case before determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether the 
foreclosure would result in anticompetitive behaviour.150 
In the case of Intel, the European Commission has indeed followed an 
effects-based approach using the ‘as efficient competitor’ analysis in order to show 
that the fidelity rebates in question were capable of causing or likely to cause 
anticompetitive foreclosure.151 Despite devoting a substantial part of the decision 
to this analysis, the European Commission also added a formalistic reasoning to its 
                                                          
147 Ibid. 4.218; also Nicolas Petit, The Future of the Court of Justice in EU Competition Law - New Role 
and Responsibilities (2012) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2060831>, 11. 
148 Graciella Mieralles, ‘Tomra: Exclusive Dealing and Rebates in the Light (and Shadows) of 
Dominance’ (2011) 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation 129, 132. 
149 Joshua D Wright, ‘Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution’ (2006) 23 Yale Journal on 
Regulation 169, 208. 
150 Damien Geradin, A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-Competitive Conditional Rebates from Anti-
Competitive Ones (2008) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1315292> 34, 35. 
151 Intel (COMP/37–990) Commission Decision OJ C 227/13 para. 1002-1640. 
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analysis arguing that Intel had engaged in naked restrictions. According to the 
Commission, not only had Intel offered conditional rebates to producers of personal 
computers and laptops for the exclusive purchase of Intel processors, but it had 
also offered payments to the largest electronics retailer in Europe in return for their 
commitment to sell only personal computers and laptops that were manufactured 
using Intel processors, thereby reducing the contestable market.152 It is somewhat 
unfortunate that the Commission chose to include this formalistic reasoning, but it 
is worth noting that, on appeal, the EU courts are likely to review the decision on 
this basis.153 
It is questionable whether the General Court would consider an effects-
based analysis including arguments based on the minimum efficient scale on the 
relevant market in an early entry agreement scenario. It may just reiterate the 
relevant case law and apply the formalistic approach instead. From a dominant 
brand company’s perspective, it is therefore more likely to infringe Art. 102 TFEU 
because its conduct only needs to be capable of leading to anticompetitive 
foreclosure.  
 
3.3.2. Restriction of choice 
In addition to the foreclosing effect on competing brand companies and subsequent 
generic companies, a single branding agreement also restricts the ‘freedom of 
choice’ of the generic company that entered into the early entry agreement. Due to 
the single branding obligation, the generic company is no longer allowed to choose 
freely which generic drugs it wants to produce and market. 
However, one should keep in mind that every contract restricts the freedom 
of choice of the contracting parties. It needs to be established at what point a 
contractual restriction of choice turns into an anticompetitive restriction. This is 
particularly important in the present case, where the contractual restriction in the 
form of a single branding obligation is entered into by the generic company and the 
brand company as a patent owner prior to patent expiry.  As has already been 
                                                          
152 Ibid. para 580, 581. 
153 Ezrachi (n 113),216; The European Commission also noted that the Guidance Paper is technically 
not applicable as the investigated events took place prior to the Guidance Paper. 
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mentioned above, the existence of an intellectual property right does not 
constitute an abuse itself but, at the same time, the exercise of the right is not 
automatically exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The appropriate balance has to be 
struck between the interest in protection of the intellectual property right and the 
interest of protecting free competition.154 The patent owner can generally exclude 
others from making, using or selling his invention. The patent owner also has the 
right to enforce the patent right against infringement. These rights are at the core 
of the patent right.155 If the patent owner has the right to exclude potential 
competitors and to enforce the patent against an infringement, it is logical that it 
should be within the general scope of the patent for the patent owner to grant a 
third party the right to make, use or sell the invention to a another party. It is also 
accepted that this license is granted on exclusive terms and can be restricted by the 
patent owner in territorial terms. Yet, post-patent expiry, this assessment ought to 
change, similarly to the above discussion relating to the anticompetitive foreclosure. 
 
Over the past few decades, the European Commission as well as the EU courts have 
nonetheless repeatedly referred to the ‘freedom of choice’ or the ‘freedom to 
choose’ in their decisions and judgments concerning the infringement of Art. 102 
TFEU, largely concerning the choice of trading partners.156 Regarding the type of 
abuse, the freedom of choice has been, not surprisingly, often addressed in cases 
dealing with rebates and single branding agreements.157 The restriction of this 
freedom suffices to constitute the requirements for showing an exclusionary 
                                                          
154 John Kallaugher, ‘Existence, exercise, and exceptional circumstances: The limited scope for a 
more economic appraoch to IP issues under Article 102 TFEU’ in Steven D Anderman and Ariel 
Ezrachi (eds), Intellectual property and competition law: New frontiers (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011) 136. 
155 Ibid. 137. 
156 Pinar Akman, ‘The role of ‘freedom’ in EU competition law’ (2013) forthcoming Legal Studies 1. 18. 
157 Michelin v Commission (n 59)  where it was held that one has to consider whether the granting of 
certain discounts restricts or removes the buyer’s freedom of choice when determining whether a 
pricing practice is abusive. at [85]; this finding of the Court was subsequently restated in a number 
of cases dealing with rebates under Art 102 TFEU, Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar plc v EC Commission  
[1999] ECR II-2696. at [214]; Case T-203/01 Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v 
Commission  [2003] ECR II-4071. at [62]; Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v EC Commission (n 110) 
at [67]. 
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effect.158 According to one commentator,159 the leading case in terms “freedom of 
choice” as an important concept for competition policy is France Telecom,160 where 
it was held by the ECJ in relation to the recoupment requirement in predatory 
pricing that:  
 ‘the lack of any possibility of recoupment of losses is not sufficient to prevent 
the undertaking concerned reinforcing its dominant position, in particular, following 
the withdrawal from the market of one or a number of its competitors, so that the 
degree of competition existing on the market, already weakened precisely because 
of the presence of the undertaking concerned, is further reduced and customers 
suffer loss as a result of the limitation of the choices available to them.’161 
 
 In a recent judgment, the General Court expressly stated that exclusive agreements 
are: 
‘incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition within the [internal] 
market, because they are not based on an economic transaction which justifies this 
burden or benefit but are designed to remove or restrict the purchaser’s freedom 
to choose his sources of supply and to deny producers access to the market.’162 
 
In Intel, the European Commission has argued in the same vein. However, the 
European Commission did not only refer to the choice of the relevant trading 
partners but also emphasised the impact of single branding agreements on final 
consumers by stating that:  
 ‘products for which there was a consumer demand did not reach the market, 
or did not reach it at the time or in the way they would have in the absence of Intel’s 
conduct . As a result, customers were deprived of a choice which they would have 
otherwise had.’163 
                                                          
158 Akman (n 156) 19. 
159 Paul Nihoul, Freedom of Choice - The Emergence of a Powerful Concept in European Competition 
Law (2012) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2077694>. 
160 Case C-202/07 P France Télécom SA v. Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR I-
2369. 
161 Ibid. para. 112 (emphasis added) 
162 Tomra Systems ASA and Others v European Commission (n 144) para. 209. 
163 Intel (n 151) para. 1679. 
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 ‘Intel was able to use the tool of conditional rebates that were capable of 
inducing loyalty and thereby limiting consumer choice and foreclosing the access of 
competitors to the market.’164 
The European Commission has also clarified in its Guidance on Art. 102 TFEU that, 
despite the fact that the concept of ‘consumers’ also encompasses intermediate 
producers and distributors, the focus in the analysis should be on final consumers, if 
the intermediate producers are actual or potential competitors of the dominant 
undertaking.165 So in the case at hand, it is not sufficient to only show that the 
single branding agreement restricts the freedom of choice of the generic company 
but, in addition, it must be demonstrated that the choice of the final consumer is 
restricted, leading to likely consumer harm.  
Finally, it is suggested that the “freedom of choice” is not only 
complementary to the analysis of efficiencies, but might even be prioritised above 
efficiencies by the ECJ. In France Telecom, the choice of consumers was discussed in 
relation to the recoupment requirement in predatory pricing cases. Whereas the 
lack of recoupment could lead to sustained low prices, which are beneficial to 
consumers, the harm could be considered in the reduction of choice following the 
elimination of competitors.166 
If this should be true, then these considerations would support the EU 
courts’ rather formalistic approach to exclusive dealing arrangements and would 
lead to an increased likelihood for the brand company to infringe Art. 102 TFEU by 
entering into early entry agreements beyond the life of the underlying patent. The 
single branding obligation in an early entry agreement restricts the generic 
company’s ability to produce and sell drugs from other competing brand companies. 
This restriction prevents the generic company from offering a wider portfolio of 
drugs to the pharmacies and ultimately deprives the final consumer of an extended 
choice of drugs. Apart from a wider product range, the increased choice can also 
                                                          
164 Ibid. para. 1598. 
165 European Commission (n 71) Recital 19 fn 2. 
166 Nihoul (n 159) 27. 
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have a significant impact on price, depending on the substitutability between the 
different generic drugs.  
3.4. Conclusion 
The analysis of early entry agreements under Art. 102 TFEU has shown that there is 
a possibility that brand companies entering into such arrangements could be found 
to have infringed Art. 102 TFEU. The likelihood of an infringement occurring – due 
to a single branding agreement being arranged prior to patent expiry and having 
the effect of deterring the entry of subsequent generic entrants that are no longer 
willing to enter the market “at their own risk” – depends on the acceptance of the 
theory that patents do not provide a right to exclude but a right to try to exclude. 
Post-patent expiry, the finding of an abuse is based on the European Commission’s 
decisional practice and the relevant case law. The brand company should have the 
special responsibility of not exploiting the advantages which it obtained during the 
period of patent protection after this patent has expired. Nonetheless, the finding 
of abuse should not be based on the formalistic approach adopted by the EU courts, 
which does not seem to be effectively challenged by the European Commission. 
Rather, it should take the form of an effects-based approach, showing the actual or 
potential foreclosing effects of the investigated conduct on a case-by-case basis.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Early entry agreements are, in essence, a number of exclusive dealing agreements 
in different vertical relationships. The analysis under Art. 101 TFEU has shown that 
early entry agreements are likely to be block exempted from antitrust scrutiny as 
long as the parties to an early entry agreement do not exceed the relevant market 
share thresholds of 30 per cent. This result is not unexpected as early entry 
agreements have the clear potential for procompetitive effects. After all, the brand 
company allows a generic competitor to enter the market prior to patent expiry. 
Nonetheless, the anticompetitive potential that arises from exclusive sourcing 
obligations and single branding agreements should not be disregarded and should 
be scrutinised  when the brand company is in a dominant position, if not before. 
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The Art. 102 TFEU analysis has shown that exclusive sourcing clauses in early 
entry agreements have the potential to foreclose the downstream market for input 
from upstream manufacturers for active pharmaceutical ingredients. The single 
branding clause of the agreements can have a foreclosing effect on the generic 
downstream market for competing brand companies as they are unable to compete 
for the entirety of the market. Additionally, early entry agreement have the 
potential to disincentive competing generic companies from challenging the validity 
of brand company patents due to the reduced profitability of “at their own risk” 
entry by generic companies. Single branding agreements can also reduce the 
generic company’s freedom of choice to sell generic drugs by competing brand 
companies which is ultimately likely to have adverse effects on consumer welfare.  
All of these types of conduct, with the exception of the “at their own risk” entry of 
generic competitors, are capable of – or likely to – lead to anticompetitive 
foreclosure only after the expiry of the underlying patent.  
Despite this anticompetitive potential, the European Commission and the 
EU courts should refrain from a formalistic approach to early entry agreements. 
Finding an early entry agreement to have infringed Art. 102 TFEU in the absence of 
showing the actual foreclosure of the relevant market and the likely consumer 
harm arising from this, could lead to costly Type I errors – especially given the 
potential pro-competitive features of an early entry agreement. Furthermore, the 
divergent approach of the European Commission and the EU courts towards 
exclusive dealing arrangements creates legal and business uncertainty, which is 
particular problematic for the commercial sector.167 Such legal certainty is only 
likely to be achieved if the European Commission advocates for the effects-based 
approach set out in its Guidance and applies this approach in its decisional practice. 
This would give the EU courts the opportunity to change their formalistic view and 
to clarify the boundaries of Art. 102 TFEU.168 
                                                          
167 Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Form and effects based approaches: A challenging duality in the application of Art. 
102 TFEU’ (2010) 2 Concurrences. 1. 
168 Ibid. 2. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has painted a picture of the current state of European pharmaceutical 
antitrust and offers recommendations for the prospective approach to a number of 
issues in the field. In doing so, the thesis ranges from an analysis of the AstraZeneca 
judgment, as the first fully litigated case in European pharmaceutical antitrust, to 
proposals for novel approaches to pay for delay settlements and early entry 
agreements. Finally it sets out areas of potential future research. 
 
1. Findings and policy recommendations  
This thesis started by analysing the General Court’s AstraZeneca judgment in an 
attempt to derive general principles that could be used for future investigations 
into the European pharmaceutical sector. On the one hand, the analysis has shown 
that the AstraZeneca judgment unfortunately fails to provide general guidance for 
the pharmaceutical business sector in relation to market definition. Chapter II’s 
application of the AstraZeneca market definition to a hypothetical market of 
antiepileptic drugs shows that the definition of the relevant market for Losec was 
highly fact-specific and should not be transposed to other markets. The General 
Court’s fundamental assumption that doctors’ prescribing inertia should be 
regarded as an exogenous factor to market definition is flawed. Not only has this 
assumption attracted criticism in the case of AstraZeneca itself, but the 
hypothetical analysis has also shown that doctors’ prescribing inertia can constitute 
a key factor to consider when defining markets in an appropriate way. The analysis 
has provided empirical evidence that prescribing doctors and dispensing 
pharmacists will, for a number of reasons, tend to be cautious when switching their 
patients or customers to generic drugs. They can be wary of actual substitutability 
and thus related side-effects; want to avoid any confusion for their patients; and, in 
the case of pharmacists, can be faced with mistrust and suspicion and have to fight 
misconceptions about generic drugs. In the case of antiepileptic drugs in particular, 
the evidence provided shows that it is necessary to differentiate between ‘drug 
switchability’ and ‘drug prescribability’ because of the possible variance in the 
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generic drugs’ bioequivalence, which can lead to severe adverse effects such as 
breakthrough seizures. This distinction depends on whether or not the patient has 
already been treated with an antiepileptic brand drug in the past.  Doctors’ inertia 
can therefore be seen as a rational behaviour that needs to be considered in order 
to define markets, so that the definition reflects the market realistically.  
A robust market definition is essential not only for Art. 102 investigations 
but also in relation to the applicability of block exemption regulations to 
investigations under Art. 101 TFEU. Without a robust market definition, the 
likelihood of over-enforcement (Type I errors) increases, especially in the 
pharmaceutical sector which is highly regulated and heavily reliant on intellectual 
property rights. The European Commission should therefore not regard doctors’ 
prescribing inertia as an exogenous factor to market definition and should refrain 
from drawing general principles from the market definition in AstraZeneca for 
future investigations in the European pharmaceutical sector. The definition in 
AstraZeneca is too fact-specific for these purposes. 
 
On the other hand, the European Commission’s and EU courts’ dismissal of 
AstraZeneca’s ‘Walker Process argument’ is an exemplar for careful comparative 
legal analysis, which is essential in pharmaceutical antitrust. It has been shown that 
the European Commission and the EU courts were right not to accept AstraZeneca’s 
argument, that the very same conduct concerned would have been barred from 
antitrust scrutiny in the United States. The comparative analysis highlighted the fact 
that AstraZeneca’s conduct would indeed not have met the required standards of 
proof to trigger a Walker Process claim, which would have put the conduct under 
antitrust scrutiny. But it would be wrong for the comparative analysis of this 
situation to end at this point. For a robust comparative analysis, one has to examine 
the underlying fundamental principles in the economic and legal context of the 
compared regimes and ask the question, whether the two regimes are actually 
comparable. Only following the answer to this question can one determine whether 
a certain type of conduct that is present in both regimes should actually be 
addressed by the same approach or not. In the case of AstraZeneca, the European 
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Commission and the EU courts opted for a European approach to the 
anticompetitive conduct of submitting misleading information to patent offices in 
an attempt to gain patents which the applicant is not entitled to. Following the 
analysis, it can be said that this approach is correct from a comparative perspective. 
The high US standards of proof for antitrust liability are caused by the private 
nature of the antitrust enforcement in relation to section 2 of the Sherman Act and 
the consequences of the trebling of damages. The US courts use these higher 
standards to reduce the number of successful private antitrust lawsuits as a 
corrective means to avoid over-deterrence. The absence of treble damages in 
Europe and the fact antitrust infringements are predominantly based on public 
enforcement by the European Commission, therefore justifies lower standards of 
proof in the European approach. The European Commission’s approach to 
AstraZeneca’s conduct should thus be seen as a “beacon” of comparative analysis 
and should be used as cornerstone for future investigations of conduct that is 
present in the United States and Europe. 
With this consideration in mind, one would hope that the European 
Commission would take the same careful approach to other areas of 
pharmaceutical antitrust, particularly in relation to pay for delay settlements.  
The analysis in chapter III has highlighted the fundamental differences 
between the US and European pharmaceutical drug approval litigation, which 
therein required the development of a European theory of harm. In contrast to the 
United States, brand companies in Europe cannot generally foreclose the market by 
paying off a single generic competitor. European pharmaceutical drug approval 
regulation does not prevent generic companies from entering the market based on 
the existing patent protection of the brand drug. Of course these generic entrants 
are likely to be exposed to patent infringement litigation, but entry is not foreclosed 
by a regulatory bottleneck, as is the case in the United States. However, the 
alternative theory of harm in chapter III shows that a pay for delay settlement can 
also lead to foreclosure in Europe, if the relevant market is conducive to foreclosure 
due to its actual characteristics and structure. The anticompetitive effect of a pay 
for delay settlement is therefore dependent on the economic context in which the 
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settlement takes place. If only one potential generic competitor exists, 
anticompetitive foreclosure is likely; however, if a large number of potential 
entrants are present, paying off a single entrant or even a few is unlikely to lead to 
foreclosure. In this case, generic entry would be imminent. In the latter example, it 
is difficult to see how the pay for delay settlement would cause anticompetitive 
effects.  
For these reasons, this thesis calls for an effects-based approach to pay for 
delay settlements and develops a “structured effect-based” approach to these 
settlements under European competition law. Similar to the guidance provided for 
the lower courts by the US Supreme Court in FTC v Actavis, the proposed test 
avoids an examination of the validity of the underlying patent without dis-
incentivising general patent settlements in the pharmaceutical sector. In addition, 
the proposed test takes into consideration the regulatory differences described in 
the previous paragraph and only regards pay for delay settlements as 
anticompetitive if, based on the market structure, they have the actual potential to 
cause anticompetitive foreclosure. Further advantages of this test include the fact 
that it enhances legal certainty and does not require any legislative change.  
Legal certainty is enhanced as the test circumvents the most contentious 
and problematic issue – the probabilistic nature of patents and the need to 
determine their validity as part of the antitrust inquiry. Instead, the proposed test is 
a cost-based analysis into the economic gains received by the generic company as 
part of the pay for delay settlement. This test is beneficial for the competition 
authority, who should be comfortable in administering a cost-based analysis, as 
well as for the brand and generic company, because the test offers a brighter line 
than a potential inquiry into the validity of the underlying patent, whose outcome is 
often difficult to predict.   
The applicability of the proposed test is also provided under the current 
European competition law regime. The EU courts’ effects-based approach in 
Delimitis can be regarded as a structured inquiry into anticompetitive effects. The 
proposed test is therefore to be seen as an extension to the rationale of Delimitis. 
The EU courts have also previously recognised, in relation to information exchange 
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in RPM cases, that certain proxies might be used as evidence of effects. A truncated 
effects-based analysis is therefore not unheard of. The proposed test combines 
these two features. The European Commission should thus be able to issue 
guidelines for the pharmaceutical sector which set out the approach to pay for 
delay settlements and outline the facts considered in such an analysis. 
Unfortunately, the European Commission has since reverted back to its old 
modus operandi, despite previously proclaiming an effects-based approach in its 
pharmaceutical sector inquiry. In its first ever investigation into a European pay for 
delay settlement case, involving Lundbeck and a number of generic competitors, 
the European Commission found a ‘restriction by object’. This finding of course 
increases the European Commission’s likelihood of success on appeal, in particular 
because of the European courts’ reluctance to apply an effects-based approach in 
European competition law. However, the question that remains is whether or not 
the European Commission and the European Commission’s legal service team 
should focus predominantly on success in litigation1 in front of the EU courts or 
whether it should rather aim to convince the EU courts to accept a more effects-
based approach, as has been proclaimed by the European Commission since 2004.
  
 
In addition to pay for delay settlements, this thesis has also addressed early entry 
agreements. For the first time, a European theory of harm has been developed for 
such agreements and has subsequently been put under detailed European 
competition law scrutiny. The general rationale behind this novel theory of harm is 
that the brand company ‘teams up’ with an early generic entrant in order to create 
a ‘pet competitor’. Given the restrictive nature of early entry agreements and the 
fact that their duration proceeds in many cases beyond the expiry date of the brand 
company’s patent, this provides the brand company with the opportunity to control 
its first generic competitor. This control allows the brand company to maintain 
generic prices above the competitive level and, fundamentally, has affords it the 
                                                          
1 The European Commission’s legal service seems to pride itself with a high success rate in litigation 
in front of the EU courts, see European Commission Legal Service, ‘Presentation of the legal service 
and its activities’ (April 2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/index_en.htm> p.19. 
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ability to distort the competitive process post patent expiry, as the brand company 
can exploit the significant first-mover advantage that the generic entrant has 
attained due to the early entry. Such control and exploitation of the generic first-
mover advantage is only achievable if subsequent entry is deterred or delayed.  
The focus of the competition law analysis, particularly in relation to the 
potential abuse of the brand company’s dominant position, is therefore centred on 
the exclusive nature of early entry agreements and their impact on the relevant 
market post patent expiry.  In a detailed legal analysis, the final chapter in this 
thesis determines the likely approach to be adopted by the European Commission 
and the EU courts in relation to exclusive sourcing agreements and single branding 
agreements (both a common feature of early entry agreements according to the 
pharmaceutical sector inquiry). The chapter derives evidence from a number of 
sources, including previous decisional practice, guidelines and previous case law. In 
relation to both exclusive sourcing agreements and single branding agreements, the 
European Commission is likely to opt for a more form-based – rather than a more 
effects-based – approach. Throughout the chapter, this approach is critiqued and 
an argument is put forward in favour of a more effects-based analysis. Just as in the 
case of pay for delay settlements, it is vital to strike the right balance between 
short-term and long-term efficiencies. This is even more so the case with early 
entry agreements, which can clearly have pro-competitive effects. After all, these 
agreements allow generic entry prior to the brand company’s patent expiry, which 
provides the consumer with a wider and cheaper choice of drugs.  
These pro-competitive effects have generally been highlighted by the Art. 
101 analysis which shows that early entry agreements would tend to be block-
exempted as long as the parties meet the market share threshold. The analysis of 
the applicability of the relevant Block Exemption Regulation once again emphasises 
the need for a robust market definition, which has already been addressed in 
chapter II. The market definition determines – to a large extent – whether the 
parties to an early entry agreement are block-exempted or not.  For the sake of 
completeness, it should be reiterated that this thesis does not analyse the ‘grey 
area’ for early entry agreements; namely, agreements which fall just outside those 
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thresholds but where the brand company is nonetheless short of being in a 
dominant position. Early entry agreements have too many variables to undertake 
an effective analysis of this, and the pharmaceutical sector inquiry provides 
insufficient information and details. 
In terms of policy recommendations, early entry agreements definitely 
warrant antitrust scrutiny. Once the brand company is in a dominant position, early 
entry agreements can have significant anticompetitive potential, as they keep the 
generic price above the competitive level and restrict choice for the consumer. 
However, because of the potential pro-competitive effects that can arise from early 
entry agreements, the European Commission should adopt an effects-based 
approach and should refrain from a form-based analysis. Finally, there is no need to 
develop a novel type of abuse. The novel theory of harm, based on the creation of a 
pet competitor, can be remedied by ensuring that the brand company cannot deter 
or delay subsequent entry by means of exclusivity arrangements with the early 
generic entrant post patent expiry.  
 
Fundamentally, the aim of pharmaceutical antitrust must be to strike of the right 
balance between dynamic and static efficiencies. In a highly regulated sector such 
as the pharmaceutical sector, this is only possible if the actual economic and legal 
circumstances are considered within the investigated conduct. Ultimately, this 
requires an effects-based approach. 
 
2. Future research  
It is envisioned that a number of potential research projects could follow from this 
thesis.  As has been stated in the introduction, the aim of this thesis has been to 
adopt a “macro approach” to pay for delay settlements and early entry agreements 
in the European context. This has created the opportunity to: develop two general 
theories of harm, develop a novel test for pay for delay settlements, and conduct a 
general competition law analysis for early entry agreements. To some extent, this 
has been possible because of the stated limitations, namely the exclusion of 
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pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement regulations, which are within the 
competences of the relevant European Member State.  
 One potential future research project applies the general principles and 
tests on a micro-level to individual Member States, thereby relaxing the initial 
limitations. The introduction of national pricing and reimbursement policies can 
have a significant impact on the anticompetitive potential that might arise from pay 
for delay settlements and early entry agreements in particular. For example, some 
Member States have a free pricing policy for drugs whereas others impose price 
regulation. 2  A free pricing policy, however, does not necessarily give the 
pharmaceutical companies free reign in their pricing behaviour. The drug price can 
be indirectly influenced by the reimbursement price, which determines how much a 
third party payer like an insurance company will pay for the drug. The 
reimbursement price is again determined through different methods. In addition to 
this already complex structure, generic drug policies can once again differ across 
the Member States. Most Member States have price controls in place for generic 
drugs sold at the manufacturer, wholesale or pharmacy level; yet the methodology 
is different. Although internal reference pricing is the most common procedure, 
whereby the generic price is compared to the prices of identical or similar drugs in 
the same country, a number of Member States also employ what is regarded 
“generic price linkage”.3 This linkage can require generic drugs to be priced at a 
certain percentage lower than the brand drug. The actual percentage again 
depends on the policy of the relevant Member States. This mere enumeration of 
possible variables that can have an impact on potential effects, subsequent entry 
and especially the final drug price for consumers, once again confirms the need to 
exclude these kinds of regulations from the analyses in this thesis. However, it also 
showcases the potential for a number of country-specific case studies in relation 
                                                          
2 Sabine Vogler, PPRI report: pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement information (Gesundheit 
Österreich GmbH Geschäftsbereich ÖBIG, Vienna, 2008) 59. 
3 Sabine Vogler, ‘The impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies on generic 
uptake: implementation of policy options on generics in 29 European countries - an overview’ (2012) 
1 Generics and Biosimilars Intiative Journal 44, 46. 
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the anticompetitive potential of pay for delay settlements and early entry 
agreements in a given Member State. 
 Another potential research project would investigate the multimarket 
contact between a brand company and a generic company. In the pharmaceutical 
sector inquiry, it has been stated that a large number of originator companies have 
preferred generic companies with whom they repeatedly work together. Mapping 
the repeated business contacts of the same brand and generic company could 
enable one to extend the developed European theory of harm to a scenario where 
the early generic entry in one market could be used as a form of value transfer in 
return for the delay of entry in another market. However, for this to be feasible, 
one would have to identify the parties to the pay for delay settlements that are 
referred to in the pharmaceutical sector inquiry and then find agreements between 
the same parties in other Member States that involve a generic entry decision. At 
an earlier stage of my doctoral research I attempted to gain access to the data set 
on which the pharmaceutical sector inquiry was based; however, this attempt 
proved to be unsuccessful. This research idea has therefore been postponed for 
post-doctoral research.  
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APPENDIX 
This appendix explains in detail the relevant approval procedures for brand drugs 
and generic drugs. Section 1 deals with the approval procedures in the United 
States and section 2 deals with the approval procedures in Europe.  
 
1. The US drug approval procedure 
Every new drug that a pharmaceutical company wishes to market in the United 
States has to be approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
Depending on the type of drug for which approval is sought, a specific regulatory 
procedure is in place. Any drug whose composition is not generally recognised 
among experts – namely, experts who are qualified by scientific training and 
experienced in evaluating the safety and effectiveness of drugs – is regarded as a 
new drug.1 This is the case for drugs that include new active ingredients, are 
formulated differently, have a new route of delivery, or are intended to be used for 
purposes which have yet to be approved by the FDA. For these kinds of drugs, the 
approval process for “new drugs” has to be followed. In contrast to new drugs, 
generic drugs have to follow the “abbreviated new drug application” process. This is 
a shorter application process for drugs that are not new but, rather, equivalent to 
an approved drug which has therefore already been examined by the FDA and has 
been declared safe and effective. 
 
1.1. Approval of a new drug 
In simple terms, the approval process for new drugs consists of  4 stages: (i) pre-
clinical testing, (ii) an investigational new drug application, which is followed by (iii) 
clinical testing in 3 phases and, finally, (iv) submitting a new drug application which, 
if successful, certifies the safety and efficacy of the drug.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 21 CFR §321 (p)(1). 
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1.1.1. Investigational new drug application  
Once an innovating pharmaceutical drugs company (brand company) has 
discovered a potentially new drug in pre-clinical trials, the investigational new drug 
application (IND) is the first necessary step in the drug approval process. Without 
having been granted the IND, the brand company that is sponsoring the 
development of the drug cannot enter into the clinical testing stage. During the 
process of evaluating the IND, the pharmaceutical company has to prove that the 
active ingredient is reasonably safe for testing on humans. This is usually 
established by means of animal testing. These pre-clinical tests on animals 
determine the pharmacological activity of the new molecules and their toxicity 
potential in animals. In addition to this data, an IND application must also include 
information about the manufacturing process of the drug, such as: the composition 
of the drug, information about the pharmaceutical company itself, its researchers 
and detailed protocols about the design and the execution of the clinical tests.2 
Following the submission of a complete IND application, the pharmaceutical 
company must wait 30 days before it can start the clinical testing phase. Within this 
timeframe, the FDA has the opportunity to review the application and establish 
whether the risk to humans – which would be thoroughly analysed in the clinical 
testing phase – would not be unreasonable high.3 If this time period concludes 
without the submission of a statement of objections by the FDA, the 
pharmaceutical company can proceed to the clinical trials stage. 
 
1.1.2. New drug application 
The final hurdle in the approval process for a drug arrives at the new drug 
application (NDA) stage. The essential part of this application concerns the results 
that the company obtains from clinical testing, which consists of three phases: 
 
(1) Phase 1: ‘This includes the initial introduction of an investigational 
new drug into humans. Phase 1 studies are typically closely 
                                                          
2 21 CFR §312.23. 
3 21 CFR §312.20. 
  
 Appendix 
234 
 
monitored and may be conducted in patients or normal volunteer 
subjects. These studies are designed to determine the metabolism 
and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, the side effects 
associated with increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early 
evidence on effectiveness. During Phase 1, sufficient information 
about the drug’s pharmacokinetics and pharmacological effects 
should be obtained to permit the design of well-controlled, 
scientifically valid, Phase 2 studies. The total number of subjects and 
patients included in Phase 1 studies varies with the drug, but is 
generally in the range of 20 to 80’.4 
(2) Phase 2: ‘Phase 2 includes the controlled clinical studies conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or 
indications in patients with the disease or condition under study and 
to determine the common short-term side effects and risks 
associated with the drug. Phase 2 studies are typically well 
controlled, closely monitored, and conducted in a relatively small 
number of patients, usually involving no more than several hundred 
subjects’.5 
(3) Phase 3: ‘Phase 3 studies are expanded controlled and uncontrolled 
trials. They are performed after preliminary evidence suggesting 
effectiveness of the drug has been obtained, and are intended to 
gather the additional information about effectiveness and safety that 
is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug 
and to provide an adequate basis for physician labelling. Phase 3 
studies usually include from several hundred to several thousand 
subjects’.6 
 
                                                          
4 21 CFR §312.21. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid. 
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Having filed all information about these clinical studies, as well as the other content 
required for a successful application set out in 21 CFR §314.50,  the FDA is then able 
to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the drug whose approval is sought.  
 
In addition to the submission of an NDA, the applying brand company has to file 
certain patent information with the FDA. All of the patent information that has 
been submitted must be gathered and consolidated into a publication called 
‘Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations’, more 
commonly known as ‘the Orange Book’. In accordance with this requirement, the 
pharmaceutical company ‘shall submit information on each patent that claims the 
drug or a method of using the drug that is the subject of the new drug application or 
amendment or supplement to it and with respect to which a claim of patent 
infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner of 
the patent engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug product’.7 This 
Orange Book requirement can be seen as the linkage of patent protection with the 
safety and effectiveness of the relevant drug. This requirement is vital for the 
applying pharmaceutical company, as well as the FDA itself with regard to the 
application and the potential future approval of similar drugs by other 
pharmaceutical companies or generic versions of the same drug.8 Nonetheless, the 
FDA does not examine the submitted patents for their conformity with the Orange 
Book filing requirements. It has repeatedly stated that it lacks the resources and 
expertise that are necessary for reviewing patent matters.9 The FDA considers itself 
to be in a mere ministerial role and regards private patent litigation as ‘the 
appropriate mechanism for the resolution of disputes about the scope and the 
validity of patents’.10 Consequently, following a “Final Rules Changes” in the Federal 
Register, the FDA refused to propose an administrative process for challenging 
patent listings and for seeking the removal of a patent from the Orange Book.11 
                                                          
7 21 CFR §314.53 (b). 
8 See infra 1.2.2 for further discussion. 
9 59 Fed. Reg. 50338, 50343 (Oct. 3, 1994); 68 Fed. Reg. 36676, 36683 (June 18, 2003). 
10 Ibid. 
11 68 Fed. Reg. 36676, 36683 (June 18, 2003). 
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1.1.3. Patent term restoration 
The possibility of patent term restoration for pharmaceutical patents was 
introduced by Congress in 1984 as part of the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Restoration Act of 1984, more commonly known as the Hatch Waxman Act. The aim 
of the Act was to mitigate the adverse effects of the lengthy drug approval process 
of the FDA. These adverse effects are caused by the fact that two different 
regulatory agencies are involved in the pharmaceutical sector. On the one hand, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) grants pharmaceutical patents 
that secure the intellectual property rights of companies. To be able to market the 
patent-protected drug, the pharmaceutical company has to follow the 
aforementioned approval process. During this process, the “patent clock” is already 
ticking as the pharmaceutical company typically applies for a patent with the USPTO 
before the clinical testing phase, at the same time as it applies for the IND with the 
FDA.12 The normal patent term lasts for 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent is filed with the USPTO.13 As this application takes place 
prior to the IND application with the FDA, the effectiveness of patent protection is 
significantly reduced in the pharmaceutical industry compared to other industries. 
Empirical research has shown that the effective patent life in the pharmaceutical 
sector is, on average, 11-12 years.14 The pharmaceutical company holding the 
patent can therefore apply for a patent extension. Such an extension can be 
granted for up to 5 years,15 provided that the overall patent protection period does 
not exceed 14 years in total.16 The application for a patent extension must be filed 
with the USPTO within 60 days of the date at which the product is approved by the 
FDA. ‘Usually, the approval date is the mailing date of the FDA letter granting 
                                                          
12 Federal Trade Commission, To promote innovation: The proper balance of competition and patent 
law and policy. A report by the Federal Trade Commission (2003) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ 
innovationrpt.pdf> chapter 3, 6. 
13 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
14 Henry Grabowski, ‘Patents, innovation and access to new pharmaceuticals’ (2002) 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law 849, 852,853; Henry G Grabowski and Margaret Kyle, ‘Generic 
competition and market exclusivity periods in pharmaceuticals’ (2007) 28 Managerial & Decision 
Economics 491. 
15 35 U.S.C. § 156 (g)(6). 
16 35 U.S.C. § 156 (c)(3). 
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permission for commercial marketing or use’.17 This application is then referred to 
the FDA who will determine the regulatory review period which will be published in 
the Federal Register. This determination becomes final after a period of 180 days. 
Following notice of the final determination, the USPTO will proceed to calculate the 
actual patent term extension and will then issue it to the applicant.18 
 
Fig. 11: US drug approval process 
 
 
1.2. Approval of a generic drug 
A generic company intending to produce and market a generic version of a drug has 
to seek FDA approval for this drug, just as in the case of brand companies. Prior to 
the Hatch Waxman Act, every generic applicant was required to fulfil the same 
conditions for an application as the pharmaceutical company that had invented the 
drug. Generic companies therefore had to satisfy the same clinical test that had 
already been overcome by the brand company. As generic companies struggled to 
meet these requirements, it created a problem whereby only a few generic drugs 
were available in the marketplace, even though the patent protection for around 
                                                          
17 Karin L Tyson, ‘The Role of the Patent and Trademark Office Under 35 U.S.C. Section 156’ (1999) 
54 Food & Drug Law Journal 205, 206. 
18 Ibid. 205. 
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150 drugs had expired at that time.19 During deliberations in the US Senate, it was 
estimated that the enactment of legislation to facilitate generic entry would lead to 
significant savings for federal as well as local governments, particularly given they 
had spent ‘approximately 2.4 Billion US dollars for drugs in the MEDICAID program, 
and in veteran and military hospitals’ during the fiscal year 1983 alone.20 Congress 
passed the Hatch Waxman Act in 1984 in an attempt to facilitate generic entry and 
to realise these cost savings. In doing so, Congress broadened the FDA’s remit 
beyond mere safety and effectiveness considerations to also encompass economic 
considerations. In light of this,  the following section describes the procedure of an 
‘abbreviated new drug application’ (ANDA) and sets out the differences between 
this and a ‘new drug application’ (NDA) which has to be filed with the FDA by every 
innovating company in order to be granted approval for their new drug. 
 
1.2.1. Abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)  
An abbreviated new drug application must contain: (1) ‘a full list of the articles used 
as components of such drug’, (2) ‘a full statement of the composition of such drug’, 
(3) ‘a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, 
the manufacture, processing, and packing of such drug’, (4) ‘samples of such drug 
and of the articles used as components thereof as the Secretary may require’, and 
(5) ‘specimens of the labelling proposed to be used for such drug.’21 These are the 
same requirements as for an NDA.22 However, the main difference is that an ANDA 
does not require a full report to be filed showing ‘whether or not such drug is safe 
for use and whether such drug is effective in use’ and supported by clinical trials.23 
Instead, the generic applicant has to show that its drug is the ‘same’ as an existing  
‘listed drug’; meaning a drug which has already been approved by the FDA 
following a NDA. This ‘sameness’ requirement has to be proven through different 
means. Information has to be provided that shows ‘that the route of administration, 
                                                          
19 House Report on the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act, H.R. REP. 98-857(I), 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2652. 
20 Ibid. 
21 21 U.S.C. §355 (b)(1)(B)-(F). 
22 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(2)(A) vi) referring to 21 U.S.C. §355 (b)(1)(B)-(F). 
23 21 U.S.C. §355 (b)(1)(A) 
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dosage form, and strength of the drug product are the same as those of the 
reference listed drug’.24 ‘An ANDA may not be considered for a condition of use that 
has not been previously approved for the listed drug’.25 Additionally, the generic 
applicant also has to show that its generic product is ‘bioequivalent’ to the listed 
drug. This means that ‘the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a 
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when 
administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar 
experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses’.26 For this purpose, 
the generic company can rely on the results of the clinical trials filed by the brand 
companies for their NDA. 
However, the possibility of referring to the clinical data that the brand 
company had to file with the FDA is limited by data protection provisions. These 
provisions not only prevent the FDA from granting generic applications but also 
from assessing them. Generally speaking, the period of data exclusivity is five years. 
During this period, an ANDA cannot even be submitted to the FDA,27 as the generic 
company cannot rely on the clinical data from the brand company. The effect of this 
is that the grant of a generic application is, on average, delayed by 6.5 years, as the 
FDA needs an average of 18 months to approve such an application.28 This 
exclusivity period can be reduced to four years if the ANDA contains what is called a 
Paragraph IV certification, which will be discussed below.29 A third possibility gives 
the brand company three years of market exclusivity. This is applicable to cases 
where the FDA has only approved a new type of use or indication for a drug that 
has already been granted approval. The main difference between this and the other 
two types of data exclusivity is that it does not preclude generic companies from 
submitting an ANDA during this period. They are free to seek market authorisation 
                                                          
24 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(2)(A); 21 C.F.R. §314.94(a)6. 
25 House Report (n 19) 2654. 
26 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(8)(B)(i); 21 C.F.R. §320.1(e).  
27 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(5)(F)(ii). 
28  Judit R Sanjuan, ‘U.S and E.U Portection of Pharmaceutical Test Data’ (2006) 
<http://www.cptech.org/ publications/CPTechDPNo1TestData.pdf> 6. 
29 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(5)(F)(ii). 
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during this period and enter the market as soon as the period of market exclusivity 
expires.30  
 
1.2.2. Certification of brand companies 
As an additional requirement for a successful ANDA, the generic company has to 
notify the brand company, whose drug it wishes to copy. Subject of these 
certifications are all patents that claim the listed drug, which was previously 
approved by the FDA. During the process of an NDA, the FDA endeavours to list 
every patent that is filed with the drug application and that claims the drug. Only 
patents that are listed in the abovementioned Orange Book are subject to such a 
certification. The FDA’s regulations provide four different types of certifications:31 
 
(1) that no patent has been filed with the FDA that claims the drug 
(Paragraph I certification); 
(2) that the relevant patent has expired (Paragraph II certification); 
(3) that the generic company is seeking with its ANDA approval by the FDA 
for the time after the relevant patent has expired (Paragraph III 
certification); and 
(4) that the patent which claims the drug of the innovator company ‘is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture , use, or sale of the 
new drug for which the application is submitted’,32  (Paragraph IV 
certification). 
 
The first three certifications are generally not problematic as they claim that either 
no patent is listed with the FDA or that the patent has already expired or will not be 
infringed because the generic company is waiting for the patent to expire before 
starting with the marketing and sale of the generic version of that product.33  
                                                          
30 Ibid. 7. 
31 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(2)(A)(vii). 
32 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
33 Elizabeth S Weiswasser and Danzis Scott D. ‘The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and 
Legacy’ (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 585, 600. 
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However, the situation is different with Paragraph IV certifications. In these cases, 
the generic applicant is of the opinion that a patent which is listed with the FDA is 
either invalid – and thus wrongfully listed – or simply not infringed by the drug 
product for which the generic company is seeking FDA approval. Without such a 
notification, the brand company would only become aware of a generic version of 
its drug product after the beginning of the generic marketing and sale. Therefore, it 
had been anticipated that the Paragraph IV certification should be provided to the 
brand company simultaneously to the submission of the ANDA to the FDA.34 The 
FDA regulations, however, state that the paragraph IV certification has to be 
submitted ‘not later than 20 days after the date of the postmark on the notice with 
which the FDA informs the applicant that the application has been filed’.35 This 
intertwines the generic drug approval with the validity of patents that cover the 
already approved brand drug. The independence of both the USPTO’s process of 
awarding patents and the FDA’s drug approval and market authorisation is still 
maintained, but the Hatch Waxman Act can be regarded as an interface linking the 
two different events in the case of generic drug approval, by means of the previous 
explained Orange Book requirement. 
 
1.2.3. Approval of an ANDA 
The date on which the notification has been submitted to the brand company also 
triggers a period of 45 days during which the brand company is entitled to bring an 
action for patent infringement against the ANDA applicant.36 In case this period has 
expired without filing for an action for patent infringement, the approval of the 
ANDA shall be effective from that point onwards.  In contrast, the approval of the 
FDA will be automatically postponed by 30 months, if the brand company has filed 
a lawsuit against the generic company.37 During this period of time, the patent 
challenge ought to be resolved through litigation in front of the court. Following 
this postponement, the FDA approval will be effective from the date at which: (1) 
                                                          
34 House Report (n 19) 2657. 
35 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(2)(B)(ii)(I). 
36 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(5)(B)(iii). 
37 Ibid.  
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the patent expires; (2) the court decides on the non-infringement or patent 
invalidity in the patent litigation; or (3) the thirty months from the date of 
notification have expired,38 whichever occurs first. 
 
1.1.1 180-day generic exclusivity 
The Hatch Waxman Act grants a period of generic exclusivity to the first generic 
company that challenges the validity of a pharmaceutical brand patent. The first 
generic applicant who files an ANDA that includes a Paragraph IV certification is 
given a 180-day period of generic exclusivity.39 This means that every subsequent 
generic applicant that files an ANDA with the FDA for the same drug will not be 
approved until this period has expired. ‘The 180-day exclusivity period was included 
in the legislation to encourage generic companies to invest in the required product 
testing and to cover expensive legal challenges to innovator products’.40 Without 
such an incentive, it would be less likely that generic companies would take the risk 
of challenging the validity of patents, as patent infringement lawsuits are costly and 
– in case of success – beneficial to every other generic company that intends to 
enter. The patent is not just invalidated “inter partes” but rather “erga omnes”, 
meaning that other generic companies can free-ride on the first-filing generic 
company’s success in patent litigation.41 
Yet it is important to determine at what stage of patent litigation this 
generic exclusivity period is rewarded. While initially this bounty was only awarded 
following a successful patent infringement litigation that had been triggered by a 
Paragraph IV certification, since 1998 the generic challenger has been eligible for 
the bounty ‘provided that it does not lose the patent suit, even if it never actually 
wins the patent litigation’.42 This change in the interpretation of the Hatch Waxman 
                                                          
38 Federal Trade Commission, Generic drug entry prior to patent expiration: A FTC study (2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study> 41. 
39 21 U.S.C. §355 (j)(5)(B)(iv). 
40 Robin J Strongin, Hatch-Waxman, generics, and patents: Balancing prescription drug innovation, 
competition, and affordability (2002) NHPF Background paper <www.nhpf.org/pdfs_bp/ 
BP_HatchWaxman_6-02.pdf> 11. 
41 C. S Hemphill and Mark A Lemley, ‘Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-
Waxman Act’ (2011) 77 Antitrust Law Journal 947, 953. 
42 Ibid. 954, 955. 
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Act by the FDA opened the doors for pay for delay settlements. In 2003, the Hatch 
Waxman Act was amended by the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA),43 in order 
to rectify a number of problematic provisions including the exclusivity award for the 
generic first-filer. With enactment of the MMA, forfeiture rules were introduced 
under which the first-filing generic applicant may now lose the generic exclusivity it 
has been awarded.44 Under these provisions, a later-filing generic applicant can 
force the first-filing generic applicant to start using its generic exclusivity or 
otherwise face losing it. In order for these provisions to apply, the later-filing 
generic applicant has to win a patent infringement lawsuit of its own – not only at 
the district court level but also in front of an appellate court. If the later-filing 
generic succeeds in doing this, the generic exclusivity has to be triggered within 75 
days. Not only has this process  been described as very time-consuming, but also as 
very difficult to achieve, as it requires the later-filer to be sued for patent 
infringement by the brand company. If the brand company were to decide not to 
file a suit against the later-filer, the generic company is stuck behind the first-filing 
ANDA and cannot gain FDA approval.45 The only other possible option would be to 
file for declaratory judgment which would trigger the same mechanism.46 
 
2. The European drug approval procedure 
The drug approval procedure in Europe is similar to that observed in the United 
States, but with some significant differences which will be addressed in this section. 
The procedure in Europe is not as straightforward as in the United States. Market 
authorisation for a drug can be obtained via different routes. A pharmaceutical 
company can apply for market authorisation by using the centralised procedure, 
also referred to as the Community authorisation. On a national level, the company 
can also utilise the mutual recognition procedure or the decentralised procedure.  
For the sake of simplicity and understanding, this section focuses on the centralised 
                                                          
43 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 
117 Stat 2066. 
44 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D). 
45 Hemphill and Lemley (n 41) 964. 
46 Ibid. 
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procedure and briefly addresses the mutual recognition procedure and the 
decentralised procedure separately at the end of the section. 
 
2.1 Approval of a new drug  
Similarly to the United States, the approval process for a new drug consists of 4 
stages:  (i) pre-clinical testing, (ii) a request for clinical trial authorisation, followed 
by (iii) clinical trials which lead to (iv) an application for marketing authorisation, 
which if success certifies the safety and efficacy of the drug. 
 
2.1.1 Request for a clinical trial authorisation 
In contrast to the US procedure, the request for clinical trial authorisation has to be 
filed with the Ethics Committee in the European Member State in which the clinical 
trials shall take place.47 Based on the information provided in this request, the 
Ethics Committee of the relevant Member State has to come to the ‘conclusion that 
the anticipated therapeutic and public health benefits justify the risks [of clinical 
trials] and may be continued only if compliance with this requirement is 
permanently monitored’.48 The time-frame in which to make this decision is 30 days 
from the day the request was submitted.49 The requirements for the conduct of 
clinical trials in Europe are set out in the ‘Clinical Trial Directive’,50 and are 
formalised in the ‘Good Clinical Practice Directive’.51 Based on this secondary 
legislation, Member States have set up clinical trials that are very similar to the 
aforementioned trials in the United States, as described in detail above.52  
                                                          
47 Council Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the 
implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for 
human use  [2001] OJ L 121/34, Art.9 (2). 
48 Ibid. Art.3 (2) (a). 
49 Ibid. Art.9 (4). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Commission Directive 2005/28/EC laying down principles and detailed guidelines for good clinical 
practice as regards investigational medicinal products for human use, as well as the requirements 
for authorisation of the manufacturing or importation of such products [2005] OJ L 91/13 
52 The author therefore refrains from setting out the clinical trials in a European Member State.  See 
NHS, ‘Clinical trials and medical research - Phases of trials’ <http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Clinical-
trials/Pages/Phasesoftrials.aspx>. 
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2.1.2 Market authorisation application following the centralised procedure 
Following the clinical trials, an application for market authorisation can then be 
filed with the European Medicines Agency (EMEA). Within the EMEA, the actual 
decision on market authorisation applications is made by the Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP), which draws up its opinion on why it 
chooses to grant or refuse market authorisation.53 The CHMP itself must ensure 
that this opinion is given within 210 days of the receipt of a valid application.54 A 
valid application has to include ‘the name and the qualitative and quantitative 
particulars of all the constituents of the medicinal product, the manufacturing 
method, therapeutic indications, contra-indications and side-effects, posology, 
pharmaceutical form, method and route of administration, expected shelf life, 
reasons for precautionary and safety measures during storage and administration 
of the medicinal product and disposal of waste, the risk to the environment, the 
results of pharmaceutical, pre-clinical tests and clinical trials, a summary of the 
product characteristics and a mock-up of the packaging together with a package 
leaflet’.55 In the event of an application being rejected, the CHMP must notify the 
applicant of the reasons for the rejection and has to give the applicant the 
possibility to rectify its application within 15 days. Having received the amended 
application, the CHMP has a further 60 days to re-examine the application.56 The 
opinion of the CHMP is then referred to the European Commission who will adopt 
the final decision on the market authorisation after consulting the Member States 
and the applicant.57 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Council Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the European parliament and of the Council laying down 
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency [2004] OJ L 136, Art. 55, 56 (1)(a). 
54 Ibid. Art. 6 (3). 
55 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report (2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html> 119. 
56 Council Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 (n 53) Art. 9. 
57 Ibid. Art. 10. 
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2.1.3 Supplementary protection certificate 
A supplementary protection certificate (SPC) is the European equivalent of the 
patent restoration provision of the Hatch Waxman Act in the United States. Just as 
in the provisions of the Hatch Waxman Act, the SPC Regulation58 is based on the 
notion that brand companies may require a patent extension due to the long and 
costly research involved with innovating new drugs and which, ultimately, results in 
a reduced term of patent protection. In the absence of such a patent extension, it is 
argued that the incentives for firms to engage in pharmaceutical research would be 
diminished, as the return of the companies’ investment in R&D could not be 
guaranteed.59 
The SPC regulation provides brand companies with the ability to apply for a 
patent extension for a maximum of five years, which takes effect at the end of the 
lawful term of the basic patent that the company wants to extend. Under special 
circumstances this protection can be extended by further six months.60 The actual 
additional exclusivity period granted by an SPC is calculated by taking the period 
between the award of the basic patent and the first valid market authorisation, and 
reducing it by five years.61 However, the period of exclusivity shall not exceed 15 
years calculated from the date of the first market authorisation in the Union.62 For 
this purpose, the applicant has to file an application for an SPC in the Member State 
in which the product in question is already protected by a basic patent. This 
application must also include information about the first valid market authorisation 
for the product and a statement confirming that the product is not already the 
subject of such a certificate.63  
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Council Regulation (EC) 469/2009 of the European parliament and the Council concerning the 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products [2009] OJ L 152/1. 
59 Ibid. preamble. 
60 Ibid. Art.13. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. preamble (9). 
63 Ibid. Art.3. 
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2.2 Marketing authorisation application at the national level 
As mentioned above, the centralised procedure is not the only possible means of 
obtaining market authorisation for a drug in the European Union. This can also be 
achieved by submitting applications to the relevant national regulatory agencies in 
the Member States. Two procedures are available for this purpose – the mutual 
recognition procedure and the decentralised procedure. A common feature of both 
procedures is that they must be used in cases where the brand company is applying 
for market authorisation in more than one Member State. Each Member State has 
to receive an application, including an identical dossier containing the same 
information that is necessary for the centralised procedure and a list of the 
Member States to which the applicant has applied.64 
 
2.2.1 Mutual recognition procedure  
The mutual recognition procedure can be utilised if a drug has already been 
approved in one Member State and the applicant wants to obtain market 
authorisations for further Member States. In such cases, the Member State that has 
already approved the market authorisation for the drug will act as a Reference 
Member State that prepares an assessment report. This report – together with the 
approved summary of product characteristics, labelling and package leaflet – shall 
be sent to the Member States concerned and to the applicant that enables the 
Member State in question to recognise the market authorisation that has already 
been granted by the Reference Member State.65 Where a Member State decides 
that it is not willing to recognise the already approved market authorisation, it 
needs to provide the other Member States concerned, as well as the applicant, with 
its reasons for this decision. Based on this submission, these reasons will then be 
deliberated in a coordination group, consisting of representatives of all Member 
States concerned.66 Should this group not be able to come to an agreement, the 
                                                          
64 Council Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use [2001] OJ L 311, Art. 28 (1), ‘The dossier shall 
contain the information and documents referred to in Articles 8, 10, 10a, 10b, 10c and 11’. 
65 Ibid. Art. 28 (2). 
66 Ibid. Art. 29 (1). 
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application will be referred to the CHMP which will render an opinion on which the 
European Commission will decide.67 In case of a dispute between the Member 
States, the mutual recognition procedure is basically converted into the centralised 
procedure. 
 
2.2.2 Decentralised procedure 
In contrast to the mutual recognition procedure, the decentralised procedure is 
applicable to cases in which no market authorisation has yet been granted at the 
time of application. Under this procedure, the same dossier as above is sent to the 
relevant Member States and the applicant nominates one of these Member States 
to be the Reference Member State. The designated Reference Member State will 
then ‘prepare a draft assessment report, a draft summary of product characteristics 
and a draft of the labelling and package leaflet’.68 This report is forwarded to all of 
the Member States concerned. If every Member State approves the assessment, a 
market authorisation in all these Member States is granted to the applicant. In an 
instance where a Member State cannot approve the application, the decision is 
referred to the coordination group of the Member States. From this point on, the 
procedure takes the same route as for disagreements in the mutual recognition 
procedure. 
 
2.3 Approval of a generic drug following the centralised procedure 
European legislation provides special provisions for the application of generic 
market authorisation. Just as in the US ANDA, the European Union offers generic 
companies an abridged application for market authorisation. Following this kind of 
application, the generic company does not have to provide the ‘results of pre-
clinical tests and of clinical trials if he can demonstrate that the medicinal product is 
a generic of a reference medicinal product which is or has been [already] 
authorised’.69 In contrast to the regulatory system established in the United States, 
                                                          
67 Ibid. Art. 29 (4), 32, 33, 34. 
68 Ibid. Art. 28 (3). 
69 Ibid. Art. 10 (1). 
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there is no need for the generic applicant to notify the brand about its abridged 
application. Furthermore, unlike the US system which intertwines the regulatory 
procedure of generic drug approval with the granting procedure of patents by the 
USTPO and the filing of patents in the above discussed Orange Book, the European 
approach keeps the two regulatory systems separate. European regulations do not 
provide for a patent linkage. The relevant secondary EU legislation provides that 
market authorisations shall not be refused, suspended or revoked except on the 
grounds set out in the Regulation70 and the Directive.71 Following these provisions, 
and the fact no other criteria apart from those regarding public health – such as the 
safety, the quality and the efficacy of the relevant drug – should be taken into 
consideration when deciding on the application for a market authorisation, 
underpin this approach.72 If it is the case that a market authorisation for a generic 
version of a drug interferes with the patent status of the brand drug, the issue can 
be resolved by means of private patent litigation in front of competent courts. The 
patent protection for a drug is an important issue for the pharmaceutical company, 
but it is a separate issue altogether with regards to the safety and efficacy of the 
drug.  
However, this is not to imply that patent law issues have no impact on the 
market authorisation process. In contrast to the US regulatory system, these issues 
are dealt with by patent law and policy itself and not by the pharmaceutical 
regulator that might be forced to suspend the application process due to a patent-
related dispute. Prior to 31 October 2005, there had not been any legislation on the 
European level that dealt with the issue of the pre-patent expiry development of 
generic drugs. The patent laws in most Member States prevented generic 
companies from from engaging in such conduct, as this had been regarded as an 
infringement of the brand company’s patent rights. 73  Yet pre-patent expiry 
development and testing is necessary for generic companies to be able to apply for 
market authorisation in time, so they may enter the market as soon as the patent 
                                                          
70 Council Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 (n 53) Art. 81. 
71 Council Directive 2001/83/EC (n 64) Art. 126. 
72 European Commission (n 55) 130. 
73 Ibid. 122. 
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protection of the brand company’s brand drug expires. With the introduction of the 
so-called “Bolar provision” into the European regulatory framework, such 
development and testing is exempted from patent infringement if it is aimed at the 
acquisition of a market authorisation by a generic company using the abridged 
application procedure.74 This provision provided a lot of legal certainty for generic 
companies at the European level, as they no longer had to fear patent infringement 
lawsuits by the brand companies based on this issue. Again, it should be noted that, 
even though this uncertainty between the different national patent laws existed, it 
did not directly interfere with the application process for market authorisations, but 
rather indirectly interfered as the generic companies had to fear patent 
infringement lawsuits based on the simple fact that they had prepared themselves 
for market entry. 
 
Although generic companies can develop a generic version of a drug before the 
patent protection expires, this does not mean that they can start this process on 
the day the brand drug is sold on the market. To be able to develop such a drug, the 
generic company requires data from the brand company, such as the results of the 
pre-clinical tests and the clinical trial which have been produced to show the safety 
and efficacy of the brand drug. This data is generally protected for a certain amount 
of time by data exclusivity provisions, which enable the brand company to keep 
their results secret. Following the amendment of the relevant Directive in 2004,75  
the European legislation now provides brand companies with a mixture of data 
exclusivity and market exclusivity which is referred to as the “8+2+1 formula”. 
Broken down into words, this formula provides the brand companies with eight 
years of data exclusivity, two additional years of market exclusivity, and the 
possibility of extending this market exclusivity by one additional year, if a new 
therapeutic indication with a significant clinical benefit has been approved within 
the first eight years of data exclusivity.76  It is important to understand the 
distinction between data exclusivity and market exclusivity. Within the first eight 
                                                          
74 Council Directive 2001/83/EC (n 64) Art. 10 (6). 
75 Council Directive 2001/83/EC amended by Council Directive 2004/27/EC. 
76 Ibid. Art. 10(1). 
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years of data exclusivity, a generic company that is applying for market 
authorisation cannot rely on the clinical trial data of the already approved brand 
drug in an abridged application. After this period has expired, the generic company 
can apply for market authorisation using the abridged application process. 
Nonetheless, even if the market authorisation were to be granted within two years, 
the generic company must refrain from putting its product on the market because 
of the existing market exclusivity which is between two and three years. However, 
but the generic company still has the opportunity to prepare for market entry, 
which would not be possible if the brand company simply had ten years of market 
exclusivity. This would lead to a scenario whereby the generic company would only 
be allowed to apply for market authorisation using the abridged application 
procedure after this ten year period had elapsed, which would give the brand 
company extended market exclusivity due to the time required for the regulatory 
authority to assess and grant the generic application. 
This “8+2+1 formula” replaced the old provisions regarding data protection 
and came into force on the 30th October 2005. Even though this formula was 
several years ago, it is still necessary to consider the “old” provisions, as the 
formula has not been enacted retroactively.77 Due to this, generic applications 
which need to take the new data protection provisions into consideration will not 
occur before 2013.78 Therefore, every market authorisation application that has 
been submitted to the EMEA or the national regulatory agencies before 30th 
October 2005, will still benefit from ten79  or six80  years of data protection, 
depending on the Member State in which this market authorisation was submitted 
and depending on the regulatory procedure that has to be followed. This period of 
                                                          
77 Art 2 and 3 of the Directive 2004/27/EC which amended Directive 2001/83/EC expressly state that 
the “8+2+1 formula” shall not be applied to cases in which the originator company has submitted an 
application for market authorisation before 31 October 2005. 
78 European Generic Medicines Association, ‘Data exclusivity’ http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-
dataex.htm accessed 06 June 2011. 
79  Ten years for national authorisations granted by: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK and Luxemburg and for authorisations granted on the European level by the EMEA 
following the centralised procedure. 
80 Six years for national authorisations granted by: Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Estonia, Cyprus, and also Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. 
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data protection is regarded as the period of ‘data exclusivity’, during which time 
authorities are prevented from accepting applications. Just as in the United States, 
this leads to an increased delay of generic market authorisation due to the fact that 
the application procedure takes between one and three years.81 
 
Fig. 12: European drug approval process from 30 October 2005 onwards (8+2+1 formula) 
 
 
Fig. 13: European drug approval process prior to 30 October 2005  
                                                          
81 European Generic Medicines Association  (n 78). 
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